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and markets, and on the complex inter-organisational basis of innovation
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the series. At the interface between the different disciplines of economics,
sociology, management studies and geography, the development of economic
sociology lends a unifying methodological approach. A strong comparative
and historical dimension to the variety of innovation processes in different
capitalist economies and societies is supported by the international character
of the contributions.
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CRIC is an ESRC funded research centre based in the University of Man-
chester and UMIST.
Series foreword
There has been increasing interest and debate in recent years on the instituted
nature of economic processes in general and the related ideas of the market
and the competitive process in particular. This debate lies at the interface
between two largely independent disciplines, economics and sociology, and
reflects an attempt to bring the two fields of discourse more closely together.
In many ways this is to return to a previous age when the study of institutional
arrangements was at the centre of the study of capitalism. The contributions
to this volume explore this interface in a number of ways. The purpose of this
Introduction is to place these contributions in the wider context and briefly
to outline the content of the various chapters.
We consider the best place to start to be with the analysis of the nature of
markets by drawing a distinction between the general market system and
particular markets. This inevitably leads us to a discussion of the relation
between markets and competition. The central presence of markets in the
operation of capitalism should require no comment, although the ‘end of
history debate’ has focused our attention on the multiple meanings and ways
in which the market system can be organised. While the market may be per-
vasive it is not monolithic, and while it may be spreading as the dominant
mode of organisation in modern society, it remains the case that substantial
areas of activity lie beyond the market. The boundary between the market
and the non-market cannot be taken for granted. It is to a degree fluid and
reflects the circumstances of time and place. Thus, for example, there is a
whole range of economic activity that lies outside the market, as in house-
hold production, and there is also serious debate about extending market
principles to other spheres including trade in genetic material.
The approach we take reflects our view that markets are indissolubly and
simultaneously economic and social. As frameworks of norms that provide
regularity to behaviour but permit changes in behaviour, they operate at mul-
tiple levels thereby constraining the conduct of individuals, groups and
organisations. As frameworks, they are continually evolving. They emerge,
grow, stabilise and decline, and it is the dynamics of these processes that are
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central to our conception of the operation of modern capitalism. Consider
the market arrangements for the food industry in the UK. In the last half
century they have been transformed irrevocably as the supermarket form has
displaced almost entirely a system based on centralised wholesale markets
and small retail stores (Harvey et al., 2001). In the process the social,
temporal and spatial nature of the activity of procuring food has also been
transformed with major implications for the conduct of urban life and the
social and economic behaviour of households. Similarly, in regard to mass
entertainment the development of radio and television has led to the emer-
gence of a market-based system for the provision of mass entertainment
services that co-exists in many countries with a state-funded service. This
reflects not only developments in technology but an extension of the space
where the market operates, a development that is very obvious in relation to
the broadcasting of sporting activities. In the process the very notions of the
market for sports’ entertainment, its social and cultural meanings, the mode
in which it is consumed, the way it is financed, and the distribution of its
returns to the players and organisers have changed fundamentally.
In this Introduction we raise a number of issues relevant to the appraisal
of ‘the market’. Markets, of course, are not natural phenomena; they are
created institutions, frameworks assembled and adhered to by the market’s
participants. Their number varies over time as innovations of technique and
organisation open up new ways of using economic resources. At one level
therefore the market system is the framework for creating specific new
markets and destroying existing ones, and is a basis of the dynamism of the
system. Thus it is important to distinguish the modus operandi of the market
system in general from the very specific instituted conditions that define any
particular market.
The traditional economic perspective on the market has been to judge it
in terms of the efficiency with which resources are allocated across rival
activities and over time. Here the discussion of the market becomes indistin-
guishable from a discussion of the degree of competition that prevails in
any particular market. This emphasis upon the efficiency properties of the
market–competition complex is of course important, but it is by no means
the whole story or the story that most adequately captures the operation of
capitalism. Markets are devices for adapting to new possibilities and creating
new resources; markets, that is, facilitate and stimulate economic and social
change as well as allocating given resources. It is this creative aspect of the
market system which is lost in the concern to rationalise static concepts of
efficiency in the allocation of given resources to given ends using given
means. What is unique about capitalism is its combination of market
exchange and competitive rivalry in the promotion of internally generated
change. Not only is capitalism distinguished from socialism, but different
forms of capitalism are also distinguished by that fact.
Open markets facilitate and create incentives to innovation and simultane-
ously transform their own internal structure. However, not every innovation
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possible is permissible within prevailing ethical codes, social mores and polit-
ical regulation, for ‘markets’ constrain as well as enable. The social and polit-
ical dimensions of market processes – inequality, fairness, power, uncertainty,
status – all influence the range and nature of what takes place in the market
context. More deeply still, the acceptance of market processes and the rheto-
ric with which they are described and assessed tell us a great deal about dif-
ferent kinds of market society.
The rhetoric, discourses and doctrine of the market
In the middle of the twentieth century, a substantial proportion of the
population of the globe considered market principles unjust and the operation
of markets a major basis of inefficiency. The slump, the poverty and the
inequality of the 1930s, the lessons of co-operation in wartime, and optimism
about the prospects of democratic socialism and welfare states, contributed
to an atmosphere critical of markets, not only across Europe but also in the
USA. The extent to which the market was re-evaluated positively in the late
twentieth century is thus remarkable. The background to the rehabilitation of
market principles reflects many factors. Among these we would draw atten-
tion to the long period of post-war economic growth across the globe, the
effective response to the oil crisis of the 1970s, the emergence of new right
politics in most Western states, the decline of communism in Europe, the cri-
tique of the bureaucratic power of states, and the seductiveness of the notion
of consumer choice.
Callon (1998) and Miller (2002) are among commentators who suggest
that powerful theories, especially from economics, have a tendency to create
the world which they purport to describe, reality coming to mirror theory
through the policy and practice of the powerful. We would not go so far as
to say that the discourse of the virtuous market has created the institutional
forms that it (mis)describes. Nevertheless, there are many potential ways in
which the attribution of positive functions to market relations would affect
understandings of reality and thus economic, political and social action.
What we find most striking is the extent to which the market is considered
to be without stain in the current period. Unparalleled, if not entirely
unprecedented, confidence is being expressed about markets. What happened
at the end of the twentieth century was that the market mechanism was
pressed into service into new areas, as a matter of policy. In the de-regulation
of what were publicly owned agencies, in the extension of quasi-market
principles within public administration, for example in health services, and in
the extended commercialisation of broadcasting, we find clear examples of
the spread of the market. Markets were overtly promoted, and this process
required strong legitimisation from a discourse of ‘market virtue’.
The notion of the virtuous market is based on a number of propositions
that go weakly contested. Among the most important of these are the
following:
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● The market enshrines the principle of consumer sovereignty.
● The market permits, sustains and delivers individual freedom of choice
and action across the economic and social spheres.
● The market is an ideal mechanism for exchange because its incentive
structures are consistent with basic features of human nature.
● The market is applicable to a great many, if not all, forms of human activity,
its principal mode of rational calculation being suitable to all spheres of life.
● The market is the epitome of efficiency in the allocation of resources and
is unfailingly superior to any other system of economic governance.
● The market is the best guarantor of reliable quality in products and
services.
● The market guarantees sustained growth in standards of living in all coun-
tries, whatever their level of development.
The power of the discourse operates in several modes: as political rhetoric,
in business practice and through the ghostly role of markets in economic
analysis. Despite the central role of competition and markets in capitalism,
in economic analysis these concepts are subsidiary to the notions of the firm,
the consumer and the transaction. The even more primitive concepts are
resources, technologies and preferences. Markets have no substantive status,
other than as abstract demand and supply correspondences whose origin
is treated unproblematically. This is not a helpful way to understand how
market economies operate and develop.
Markets in capitalism
Markets are not unique to capitalism but capitalist systems are always market
systems. In answer to the question ‘What do markets do?’, the overwhelm-
ingly unanimous reply from economics is that they produce an equilibrium in
the allocation of resources. The traditional view is that markets are institu-
tions to facilitate exchange. Originally, ‘markets’ referred to the ‘places’ where
exchanges occurred. But what is meant by the notion of the market system is
that the plans of dispersed individuals to buy and sell are rendered mutually
consistent within and across all the markets in an economy – markets for
labour, for free capital disposal, for commodities and services more generally.
Co-ordination is fundamental to the appraisal of market processes, but equi-
librium is not, for equilibrium requires a state of rest from which there is no
internally generated reason to change behaviour. In equilibrium, choices are
not made. Market processes always generate reasons to change behaviour, to
transform the prevailing way of conducting affairs, for they are contexts
within which new knowledge is always being accumulated and new knowl-
edge always opens up new opportunities. The market system is an open sys-
tem: every established economic position is open to challenge from a new
commodity, a new method of production or new model of business. Because
economic change is open-ended it is never uniform in its effects, and although
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one might make a claim for economic progress, on average it remains the
case that the distribution of gains and losses, of winners and losers, remains
very uneven.
It is important to distinguish the instituted framework of the market system
in general from the arrangements in particular markets. While the norms of
the market system change only gradually, the number of distinct markets is
subject to much more rapid change. Technological and organisational inno-
vations are a powerful source of such lower level market transformations.
Markets for personal computers, mobile phones or satellite television services
were unknown even twenty years ago yet each is now a major market in its
own right in advanced economies. Similarly, the introduction of major inno-
vations such as derivatives and other complicated swaps contracts has trans-
formed the way financial markets operate and has created serious doubts
about the ability of the authorities to regulate financial transactions. Equally,
in regard to labour markets, innovations in contractual form have had widely
different effects on conditions of employment in different countries. These
different types of market appear to operate in different ways, with different
instituted rules of the game. In each case the relationships among buyers,
among sellers and between buyers and sellers vary considerably. This raises a
number of questions including that of whether there is there a general model
of the market.
The social institutedness of the market system
Besides the specifically economic instituted arrangements for the conduct of
market exchange there are, it is well known, also sets of necessary social con-
ditions for the existence of markets. The very emergence of ‘the economy’ as
an entity recognised as a separate sphere of existence, a separate ‘field’ in
Bourdieu’s terms, is itself a historical process. Exchange is only one way of
facilitating economic interaction: as Polanyi (1957) pointed out, the gift
economy and the redistributive economy are alternative socially mediated
systems for interlinking production and consumption. The idea that the mar-
ket was its own pure and necessary logic diverts attention from the social con-
ditions in which particular markets and the market system itself exist.
Non-economic conventions of social interaction which are consistent with the
operation of markets in economic life include phenomena like social capital,
trust and moral codes of conduct. There are also, as Max Weber pointed out,
formal institutional conditions for the operation of rational capitalist eco-
nomic activity. He emphasised the importance of rational calculation as a
defining characteristic of capitalism and made clear that rational capital
accounting required free markets for labour and commodities, as well as pri-
vate property and a stable legal and administrative framework, including the
rule of law, private property rights and enforcement of contracts (commercial
law). The market also presupposes sets of politically generated regulations
governing market exchange, which vary from time to time and from country
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to country. Interventions, conditioned by ethical considerations, may limit
what might be offered for sale – for example limitations on the sale of
alcohol, or the sale of human tissue material – and alter the distributive effects
of particular markets through taxation, controls on consumption, and so
forth. Finally, the extant unequal distribution of resources is also a social pre-
condition of the operation of any actual market or market system. Different
original distributions always affect the operations and outcomes of market
competition. That is to say, power influences the making of markets, with
some agents having more ‘influence’ than others in setting the rules.
The general point is that markets are constructed and operated within
wider institutional frameworks. They are instituted, first, by the prevailing
norms in relation to property rights, contracts and the conduct of competi-
tion. They are instituted also by the broad social acceptability of particular
activities reflecting ethical stances of time and place. Finally, they are insti-
tuted in relation to the specifics of particular goods and services: the limita-
tion on who may trade, the definition of quality, the standards of
measurement, the uses to which a product is put, are examples of the specific
rules of the game in particular markets. These instituted frames are not given
but evolve with the development of the production and consumption activi-
ties in question. If, following Hayek, it is suggested that the market process
is one of discovery, then what is being discovered is also the way to arrange
and regulate market activity.
The contributions
Chapters 1–3 treat the instituted relation between economy and market from
a number of complementary perspectives. Richard Nelson approaches the
issues through an assessment of the complexity and varied nature of market
arrangements and an appraisal of the limits to markets. Although the current
consensus is in favour of markets, that has not always been so and Nelson
traces the swings of the pendulum from Adam Smith to the debate on ‘the
end to history’. The core of his argument is that it is misguided simply to pre-
sume that markets are the best solution to the problem of production and
distribution. The case needs to be argued – and to be sensitive to the fine
details of different market contexts. In many cases the pro-market argument
is clear. Equally there are other cases where the pro-market argument fails.
However, it is the middle ground which matters, because the middle ground
reflects the shifting balance of the mix between market and non-market
forms of economic governance. Even in the situations where the market case
prevails, for example air transport and pharmaceuticals, public regulation is
an important feature of the market’s operation. Thus contests over bound-
aries help us understand the complexities of the market system and the ways
in which it can be governed more effectively. Here Nelson identifies three
broad classes of argument to facilitate a judgement of the proper scope of
markets. The first is the familiar economists’ class of market failure suitably
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bolstered to reflect the fact that the strength of markets is not typically to be
found in their efficiency at allocating given resources but rather in their
adaptivity to unforeseen change and in their openness to innovative activity.
The second concerns the role of the state in taking responsibility for the rules
of the market game and in providing, through the political process, the
means to challenge and vary the rules in particular cases. The third reflects
distributional issues in a broad sense, the possibility of a mismatch between
market outcomes and social perceptions of what those outcomes should be –
what Nelson calls the problem of social cohesion and human rights. Nelson
concludes with an interesting taxonomy of the factors that contribute to the
appraisal of the applicability of the market to specific cases. That this list is
as much concerned with social as with economic matters highlights their
mutually instituted nature in market capitalism.
The second chapter, by Andrew Sayer, provides a critical evaluation of the
idea of the market as the definitive form of co-ordination and of the socially
embedded nature of market processes. Sayer draws attention, first, to the
multiple uses of the word ‘market’ and to the difference between the market
in general and markets in particular. The inclusiveness of the market defini-
tion determines the scope of what is to be explained and how. As an exem-
plar, Sayer addresses the problematic question of the boundary between
market and production. He points out that firms do not do what markets do
and conversely, so that the Coasian idea that firms fill the residuum left when
markets have reached their limit is a distorting mirror. While recognising the
importance of networks and trust, Sayer develops a critique of ‘embedded-
ness’ in terms of its overly benign view of economic relations. For the dis-
ruptive and retrogressive aspects of market processes are as much embedded
as are their constructive and progressive tendencies. Sayer traces this mis-
taken view to a belief in the superiority of co-ordination through networks
and to the neglect of power relations. Similarly, he argues, there is an exces-
sively positive assessment of the role and the origins of trust in the working
of market relations. Thus he observes that contractual relations can be
exploited opportunistically, that trust is malleable and contingent, and that
networks allow for exit.
The third chapter, by Brian Loasby, is an exposition of the connections
between market arrangements and what might be called the ‘problem of
knowledge’. Loasby begins by observing that the standard and pervasive use
in economics of the notion of equilibrium precludes choice and decision; for
in equilibrium clock time passes, yet nothing happens, so nothing new needs
to be assessed. Out of equilibrium, decision is essential, and for decision to
be possible sense must be made of the world. Sense depends, in turn, on
the possibility of pattern formation, and Loasby links capacities for pattern
formation to the structure of the sensory and mental apparatus, to the limi-
tations that this creates on the range of patterns that an individual can hold,
and thus to the division of personal knowledge in society. In turn, the divi-
sion of knowledge corresponds to a division of labour in relation to decision
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making and thus raises the fundamental economic problem – how are the
multiple decisions of multiple agents to be rendered consistent? After all,
the division of labour is a pattern beyond the comprehension of any single
mind. Loasby finds the answer to the question of consistency in the institu-
tion of particular rules and conventions that facilitate market processes. It is
the advantages offered by particular arrangements that justify the costs of
instituting markets. The primary function of market conventions is to
provide information that improves the knowledge, and thus the decision-
making abilities, of consumers and producers. As Loasby points out, a
neglected aspect of these conventions is their aesthetic appeal. Thus knowl-
edge of market arrangements is an important feature of the knowledge
possessed by consumers: in Marshallian fashion, markets are part of their
external organisation.
The second group of essays, chapters 4–6, conveniently occupies the mid-
dle ground between the entirely conceptual material of the first and the
empirical papers that form the final group of three in the volume. In chapter
4, Mark Harvey explores the idea of competition as an instituted economic
process and poses the important question: ‘Why does competition not destroy
the competitive process?’ He traces the interdependence of competition and
markets through the writing of Weber and Polanyi and on to the modern soci-
ology of embeddedness and networks. However, embeddedness is not fixed,
nor is it absolute; economic relations can be just as equally disembedded and,
as it were, the polarity reversed with the social framing the economic. Thus
Harvey suggests, in Polanyian style, that three ideas capture the concept of
institutedness. First, the relation between the social and the economic is vari-
able and contingent, so creating the possibility of varieties of capitalist system.
Second, the the economic and social are mutually conditioning. Third, the
relations between competition and markets are constructed at widely diverse
interdependent levels in economy and society. There follows a rich discussion
of the units of competition and the scales on which competition takes place.
Harvey also observes that competitive processes require accumulative
processes and the differential growth in capacities and capabilities underpins
the dynamic nature of competition. The chapter concludes by applying these
ideas to the co-evolution of competition and market arrangements in the UK
retail trade. Neither the market nor competition has remained constant in
form: they have mutually shaped each other, as innovations have created new
units of competition, and as new scales of market have emerged together with
new rules of the competitive game.
Don Slater, in chapter 5, is also concerned with how markets come to be
made, framed or ‘stabilised’. Locating his reflections on the nature of markets
in the context of arguments about the emergence of the ‘new economy’, he
finds many of the central and accepted propositions about change mistaken.
For Slater, what we witness today is much more rapid destabilisation of cate-
gories of goods. Since a market is defined in terms of substitutable items, he
reasons that the delineation of the boundaries of any market depends on
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agreement as to the particular definition of the items being sold therein. This
focuses attention on what he calls the ‘the process of materialization’. Not a
new process at all, this involves a recognition of the process whereby a par-
ticular item, including an event, comes to be recognised as one thing rather
than another. It requires examination of ‘the social processes by which things
come to be treated as things in the social world’ (p. 96). This normally
requires recognition in terms of both functional and symbolic attributes, as he
demonstrates with reference to the notion of a ‘product concept’, an integral
element of the marketing armoury. The product concept contains a high
potential for destabilization, as producers purposively manipulate both the
physical content and design of the object, and its associated cultural meanings,
into a new, or rather a recognisably distinct, type of product, fully cognisant
that the process is one of ‘conceptualising and choosing the different things a
given product could be’ (p. 107). This is a process which Slater sees as indi-
cating corporate intervention becoming more reflexive, rationalised and insti-
tutionalised. So what is distinctive about the present is the level of
commercially inspired contestation over the stabilisation and destabilisation
of the fundamental categories of material culture which declare what things
are. Moreover, it is not only producers who are aware of the malleability of
the identification of goods, but the general public, the consumers, are becom-
ing more adept at problematising the meaning of goods and, indeed, of
improvising their use for their own purposes. This position, conducted in dia-
logue with Callon, permits Slater to issue an incisive challenge to several of
the most widely employed distinctions in understanding contemporary eco-
nomic life. He argues that conventional sharp distinctions between material
and non-material goods, between the physical and symbolic aspects of com-
modities, between goods and services, and ultimately between the economic
and the cultural, are fundamentally misleading.
Fran Tonkiss, reflecting in chapter 6 on an empirical study of cultural
industries in East London, addresses a related and currently topical issue,
that of the distinctiveness of the operations of ‘cultural industries’. She
addresses the debate about whether we currently can be said to have a ‘cul-
tural economy’ with newer principles of operation than those of an older
industrial economy. Finding it hard to understand the producers in terms of
the products being sold, she argues that attention should be paid instead to
the role of specialised knowledge involved in the framing of goods to be sold
in cultural markets. Distinctive firms, labour contracts and mixed forms of
governance imply a definition of the boundaries of sectors in terms of knowl-
edge and skill rather than end products. The distinctiveness of the labour
processes, which in practice correspond to particular types of labour con-
tract, have the effect of ‘hollowing-out’ firms in these fields. This allows
some insight into alternative modes of governance of economic activities –
of the related roles of firms, markets and networks – in an expanding and
highly volatile field. Among the features of those sectors of the economy are
the importance of cultural knowledge in developing commercial strategies,
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but in a context where firms are small and unstable, where expert labour in
particular is likely to be freelance and imbued with an ethos of ‘creativity’.
Such arrangements make it less easy for firms to act as collective repositories
of knowledge and know-how, such key functions tending to be met by alter-
native arrangements of the network type. However, networks pose problems
for economic governance of cultural production, which frequently requires
the involvement of the state, reminding us of how the firm is just one among
several instruments of economic co-ordination. In this regard she makes use
of the insights of evolutionary economics (of Hodgson and Metcalfe).
The final group of three chapters is more empirically oriented. Chapter 7,
by Jonathan Michie and Christine Oughton, explores the instituted arrange-
ments constituting the ‘peculiar economics’ of professional sports. The par-
ticular features of the football market in the UK include strong fan loyalty to
local clubs, the importance of broadcasting revenue to the finances of the
game and the managed nature of league competition. These arrangements
have changed considerably over time and opened up the possibility of verti-
cal integration between broadcast companies and football clubs, to adversely
affect the future organisation of the game. The chapter concludes by arguing
that a dedicated regulatory process needs to be established to ensure that
football is instituted in ways that ensure its long-run survival.
In chapter 8, Suma Athreye gives an analysis of the emergence of one par-
ticular market in the UK, that for computer software. She examines some of
the conditions which resulted in the UK coming to specialise in services to
client companies rather than the production of software packages for an arm’s
length market. The explanation she finds in the scale of demand for particu-
lar services and the effect its heterogeneity had upon competences – the skills
and expertise available to British companies. So, at a critical point, when
demand for computer packages took off, established competences were too
limited to compete effectively with US companies, skills in general manage-
ment, R&D and marketing especially being lacking. Thus, Athreye elaborates
a model of cumulative causation to account for the continuing weak presence
of the UK in the software product segments of the global market.
In the final chapter, Michael Best provides an account of regional economic
adaptation to changed market circumstances. This is the story of the dynam-
ics of capitalism focused on the resurgence of the Route 128 region around
Boston following its decline in the mid-1980s in the face of competition from
Silicon Valley. The chapter addresses the question of how this resurgence was
achieved. The core of the explanation is that a new model of business had to
be developed to integrate and manage more effectively the well-established
technological assets of the region. The old 128 model is characterised in this
account as vertically integrated and inflexible. The new model, by contrast,
is described as vertically disintegrated but systems integrated – it is an open
system constructed around flexible networks of firms, universities and
research laboratories in the region. As an open system it has strong adaptive
properties that arise from the combinatorial association of the many skills and
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kinds of knowledge in the region. It forms an experimental system that
through its innovative and entrepreneurial attributes has regenerated the
region. This fits well with the notion of a restless capitalism that is creative
and adapts to changing market circumstances. It fits also with Marshall’s
emphasis on the external organisation of a firm in developing its competitive
position. This is well described here as a collective entrepreneurial capability.
On what is this capability founded? Best argues that three elements are
crucial: the deep technical heritage in engineering, the modular design and
systems integration skills available, and the skill formation system built
around MIT. Each of these has long historical roots, and it is on these foun-
dations that the region based its adaptive and innovative response to the chal-
lenge from the West Coast. Thus entrepreneurship was crucial to recovery but
was premissed upon and instituted within the wider set of arrangements that
had built and maintained the available base of knowledge and skills.
The Conclusion discusses the key theoretical and conceptual advances con-
tained in the book and identifies outstanding issues for further investigation.
References
Callon, M. (1998), The Laws of the Market, Sociological Review monograph series,
Oxford, Blackwell.
Harvey, M., Nyberg, A. and Metcalfe, J. S. (2001), ‘Deep transformation in the service
economy: innovations and organisational change in food retailing in Sweden and
the UK’, ESSY Working Paper, CRIC, University of Manchester.
Miller, D. (2002), ‘Some things are virtual (but not the internet)’, in DuGay, P.
and Pryke, M. (eds), Cultural Economy: Cultural Analysis and Commercial Life,
London, Sage.
Polanyi, K. (1957), ‘The economy as instituted process’, in Polanyi, K. Arensberg, 




The close of the twentieth century saw a virtual canonisation of markets as
the best, indeed the only really effective, way to govern an economic system.
The market organisation being canonised was simple and pure, along the
lines of the standard textbook model in economics. For-profit firms are
the vehicle of production and provision. Given what suppliers offer, free
choice on the part of customers, who decide on the basis of their own knowl-
edge and preferences where to spend their money, determines how much of
what is bought by whom. Competition among firms assures that production
is efficient and tailored to what users want.
This chapter’s aim is not to gainsay the present conventional wisdom, but
rather to civilise it, and make it more nuanced and subtle. Market organisa-
tion, broadly interpreted, certainly has proved an effective way to govern a
wide range of economic activities, and for a number of these it is hard to
think of an alternative that would do nearly as well.
However, here I want to argue, highlight, that modern societies are facing
a number of challenging and contentious issues regarding how to organise and
govern a variety of activities that employ a large and growing fraction of their
resources, where simple market solutions do not seem a good answer. While
for some of these for-profit firms free customer choice and competition can
provide the core of a satisfactory governance structure, to make market gov-
ernance work satisfactorily will require strong and fine-grained regulation,
and perhaps a number of other supplementary non-market elements. And for
a number of these activities it likely would be best to rely centrally on other
basic organisational modes, with markets in an ancillary role.
This argument clearly flies in the face of conventional wisdom. Hasn’t
market organisation proved to be a general purpose way of governing
economic activity? Haven’t we learned that markets work best when there is
minimal regulation or other interference from government? And hasn’t
negative experience with forms of economic organisation that repress
markets and use other mechanisms ruled out serious consideration of non-
market alternatives?
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On the complexities and limits 
of market organisation
Richard R. Nelson
I propose that the answer to each of these questions is more complicated
than that implied by the way it is posed. To assess market organisation as a
governing system, it is essential to widen the analytic context. By a governing
system more generally I mean a system that does two roughly separable kinds
of things. First, it defines the values and interests that are to count in the deter-
mination of what and how much is to be provided and distributed; the mech-
anism here usually can be characterised in terms of a process. Second, it
involves an assignment of responsibility for provision and a system of incen-
tives, controls and overview mechanisms for enforcing accountability. These
two aspects of governing systems show up in political science as, on the one
side, political process and policy making, and, on the other side, matters of
administration and implementation. In economics the former clearly relates to
the organisation of demand and the latter to the organisation of supply.
Market organisation clearly provides one kind of governance system, in
the sense above, and one that is widely used. However, while the conven-
tional wisdom seems to have it that market organisation is a relatively simple
structure, in fact in many sectors generally thought of as market organised,
the structure of demand and supply is highly complex, involving major non-
market elements. Different sectors vary greatly in their mix of market and
non-market elements. And even with this variegation and complexity, and
hence the ability to tailor markets to particular circumstances, market organ-
isation is not the principal governance mode we use for many activities
and sectors. Indeed in a number of areas we actually try to fence out markets.
These are facts in all capitalist countries, including the USA, despite a
tendency to repress them.
Part of the difficulty many seem to have in seeing the complexity and the
limits of markets as governing structures stems from the tendency to think of
the economy as mainly concerned with producing and distributing things like
peanut butter, automobiles, haircuts, telephone messages, and computers
and computer services. However, a large share of an economy’s resources are
employed in activities that are central to the workings of our society, our
political system and our culture. Some of these are conventionally thought of
as outside the economic system – and appropriately outside.
A few examples will bring out the gist of the latter argument. Thus con-
sider the care of young children, or crime prevention and criminal justice, to
identify two areas where modern societies presently are facing some difficult
problems regarding organisation and governance. Neither of these activities
is governed largely through the market, at least as market organisation is gen-
erally conceived. While these cases are not what most people have in mind
when they think of ‘economic’ activities, they certainly do employ consider-
able resources that could be used productively in other activities. Expendi-
tures on the police and the courts get counted in the GNP statistics. So does
much of child care outside of the family, and the purchased inputs used in
family child care, and feminists have not been alone in arguing that house-
wives’ services should be counted in GNP. And it surely is important that the
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quantity and quality of resources dedicated to these activities be appropriate
to the task, and that these resources be effectively employed to serve the
values at stake.
These examples are important in their own right, because they surely do
present major problems of organisation and governance of activities employ-
ing substantial resources. But they are important also because they highlight
the often neglected fact that the lines between ‘economic’ activities, and
activities that generally might be thought of as social or political or cultural
are blurred rather than sharp. An economy is not a sphere of activity that is
separate from child raising, or from dealing with crime, or from supporting
art or religion, or from political campaigning, for that matter. Rather, eco-
nomics should be viewed as an aspect of any activity. From that point of view,
it should be clear that the problem of economic organisation and governance
is not simply about the production and distribution of commodities like
peanut butter.
In any case, under standard circumstances, child care is presumed to be the
province of the child’s parents or extended family. At the same time, parents
or those in a parental role are presumed to have an obligation to care ade-
quately for their children: they are not seen as having a right to choose
whether or not to provide that care, as they have the right to buy whichever
kind of car they like or none at all. Preventing crime, and operating the crim-
inal justice system more generally, traditionally are viewed as basic activities
of government. In general, it is expected that individuals are to be treated
as equals by the system, and that justice is ‘not for sale’. In both of these
areas there is considerable resistance to the idea of letting market values and
mechanisms play a central role in governance.
But, of course, the market does play a role in these areas. Babysitters and
nannies serve for pay. The demand for extra-family child care is large and
growing and there are many for-profit as well as not-for-profit providers.
Persons of wealth and social status are well known for getting a better break
from the criminal justice system than those towards the bottom of the social
order; they can, among other things, hire good lawyers. Also, there recently
has been considerable use of for-profit contractors to run prisons, and many
businesses and local communities hire their own private guards. While
presently the role played by the market in these areas is relatively small, there
is considerable debate about whether that role should be bigger or smaller.
Thus there is major dispute about how day-care providers should be regu-
lated, for example about the qualifications of carers, and about acceptable
ratios of carers to children. Day-care subsidy is another issue. The ability of
the rich to buy favorable verdicts, and the frequent inability of the poor to
obtain decent legal defense for serious crimes, has raised concerns about
the quality of justice dispensed by the criminal justice system. In both child
care and criminal justice markets are used, but no one is arguing that they
should be unfettered. On the other hand, it is not clear just where or how to
draw the lines.
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The governance of basic scientific research is another important area
where, presently, the market plays a relatively modest role, but there is con-
siderable debate about just what that role should be. The scientific commu-
nity long has argued that it is a mistake to have conjectures regarding likely
future practical application play a central role in the allocation of resources
to basic research. Rather, the dominant criterion ought to be scientific prom-
ise, which the scientists themselves are in the best position to judge, and
research findings ought to be published and open to anyone to test and use.
For-profit companies are not much given to support research under those
terms and groundrules. It long has been broadly accepted that funding basic
research is an appropriate mission of government. By and large governments
have provided funding for basic research under a regime of self-governance
by scientists, with universities the principal locus of the activity.
However, while open publication and open access traditionally have
been the norm in basic science, in recent years universities as well as business
firms have begun to patent the results where they can, and to require that
users take out licences and pay fees. And corporations now are important
sources of support for basic research in certain fields, with their profiting
from this activity tied to their ability to restrict access to results. There is a
growing debate about whether or not public funds should go into fields
of research that companies seem willing to support out of their own money,
and regarding whether it is a plus or a minus that university research results
increasingly are being patented. The debate can well be regarded as about
the scope and nature of the role markets ought to play in governing the basic
science enterprise.
Of course these three activities are not generally regarded as basically mar-
ket governed. But consider some sectors that most people do think of as
governed and organised through the market, for example pharmaceuticals or
airline services. The products of both industries are highly regulated, as are
some of the details of the operation of the firms in those industries. The R&D
of pharmaceutical companies draws heavily on publicly supported biomedical
research, and a significant portion of the sales of pharmaceuticals is funded by
various government programmes that support the provision of medical care.
The airlines depend on investments in airports, which in many cases are
publicly financed, and on a government-funded and -operated traffic control
system. Or think of automobiles that run on public roads, under a specialised
system of traffic law. Or agriculture.
As one reflects on these sectors and these activities, it becomes evident that
the provision of supportive and regulatory bodies of law, and the necessary
infrastructure, which are widely recognised as requisite tasks for government
in order to make markets work decently well, are to a considerable degree
sectorally specific. While often repressed in the current discussion, markets
need non market structures in order to operate.
I propose that almost all activities in modern economies are governed
through a mix of market and non-market mechanisms, with the relative
Market organisation 15
importance of markets, the constraints put on their workings, and the
strength and nature of non-market mechanisms varying from activity to
activity, and from sector to sector. My focus in this chapter is on the debates
about the mix.
Thus consider hospital services, another arena where the debate is intense.
The hospital sector contains numbers of both public and non-profit units, as
well as for-profit hospitals. Part of hospital revenues comes from private
patients and private insurance. Part comes from public programmes that sup-
port the care of persons in certain categories. Hospitals are subject to a num-
ber of different forms of regulation. Physicians, as a profession, play a major
role in determining what is done. In recent years, managed-care organisa-
tions and insurance companies also have played major roles in the hospital
governance structure. There is often bitter debate about the relative power
that these different parties and interests should play in the governing struc-
ture, as well as about the role of public finance in supporting the system.
Or, consider some of the issues surrounding the governance of the Inter-
net. Should the content of the Internet be regulated, and if so in what ways
and by whom? Should the Government require that the Internet be made
available on favorable terms to schools, and if so who should pay for it?
Other areas of dispute involve markets for things some people believe
should not be bought and sold, or in some cases should not be available at
all. Reflect on the controversy about the emerging market for kidneys and
ova, or about the decriminalisation of prostitution and drugs.
This already is a lengthy and diverse list of areas where the appropriate
role of market and non-market modes of governance is under dispute. But
let me stress their common properties. They all involve a particular class of
goods or services that do or arguably should show up in the GNP accounts,
because they employ scant resources to meet particular kinds of human
needs. And they all involve disputes about the appropriate structure of gov-
ernance, that is about the values and interests that are to count in the deter-
mination of what and how much should be provided and distributed, and
about who is to do the work under what regime of incentives and controls.
While there is overlap, I want to differentiate these kinds of economic
governance disputes from those that are central to macroeconomic policy; the
issues I am considering here are microeconomic. In some cases the issues I am
focusing on here are intertwined with policies concerned with income distri-
bution. However my focus is on disputes about the governance of particular
activities or sectors, with the question of who pays sometimes figuring as part
of the dispute, but the central issue is not income transfers per se.
Despite these commonalities, the issues I touched on above still would
appear to be very heterogeneous, and appearances here are not deceiving.
An important point I want to get in view is that the particular key issues of
governance, and the arguments about what markets can and cannot do well,
differ from activity to activity, and hence from sector to sector. However, a
principal purpose of this essay is to try to make some order of this apparent
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jumble of issues. Later in this chapter I develop a relatively small collection
of analytic categories which, I propose, encompasses a large share of the
issues at stake. But first I need to set the stage.
I begin by trying to place the current broad debate, which starts from a
degree of faith in the efficacy of markets that is almost unprecedented, in
some historical perspective. Then, in the following section, I consider the
various virtues that purportedly characterise market organisation and elevate
it over other kinds of governance structures, and raise some questions about
those arguments. The fourth section is concerned with ‘market failure’ the-
ory, and other broad theories that point towards the desirability of a
mixed economy.
In the penultimate section I return to the issues referred to above, and try
to bring order to them by proposing a set of categories into which, I argue,
most of them fit. Finally, a reprise.
The past as prologue
The presumption and the fact that markets play a pervasive role in the gov-
ernance and organisation of economic activity are relatively recent phenom-
ena. A significant expansion in the role of markets occurred first in Great
Britain around the beginning of the eighteenth century, and later spread to
continental Europe, and the United States, still later to Japan, and more
recently to large portions of the world. Of course certain kinds of markets
have existed from virtually the dawn of history, but until recently were
central in only a small portion of human activity. It is the pervasiveness of
markets and of the system that came to be called capitalism that are relatively
new on the historical time scale.
With the spread of markets – of production that was largely for sale on
markets, and of a context where either receipts from sales or wages garnered
on labour markets largely determined the access of an individual or family to
goods and services – a sphere of economic activity began to emerge in its own
right, as a system that was distinct from the broader society and polity. Thus
Adam Smith’s (1776) The Wealth of Nations is about a market economy,
influenced profoundly to be sure by the culture and governance of the nation
containing it, but as an object in its own right, and with its own basic rules
of operation. That book could not have been written a century earlier. And
today, of course, the standard economics textbooks draw a picture of an
economy that is quite separate from the rest of human activity.
From the time capitalism began to take on recognisable form, and students
of its operation began to write about it (with time these analysts came to be
called ‘economists’), the system has had its proponents and its opponents.
The balance of opinion about capitalism has swung back and forth over the
years, and at any time has varied from country to country.
While the British ‘classical school’ often is thought of as comprising strong
proponents of markets, as unencumbered as possible, and extended to as
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wide a range of human activity as possible, in fact that is not quite accurate.
Adam Smith’s enthusiasm for markets was nuanced, and he clearly saw a
downside. John Stuart Mill did not like certain aspects he saw of the rising
capitalism of mid nineteenth-century England (1961). The USA today is
regarded as the locus of almost unwashed enthusiasm for unfettered markets.
However, Alexander Hamilton, in his famous Report on Manufactures
(1791), argued that protection and subsidy were needed if American indus-
try were to survive and prosper. Many of the founders of the American Eco-
nomic Association (towards the end of the nineteenth century) were much
concerned about what they saw as the excesses of market capitalism, and
with devising policies to tame it.
Outside of the UK and the USA, and the cultures they have strongly influ-
enced, the enthusiasm traditionally has been even more muted, and the cli-
mate of opinion sometimes downright hostile. Indeed the socialist economic
tradition was to a considerable extent basically a negative reaction to market
capitalism. That tradition constituted a very roomy tent. On the one side one
can find the British Fabians who did not want to abolish markets (at least not
in the short run), but rather to regulate them in the public interest, and to
supplement markets with a variety of other institutions to deal with the
inequities they saw as inevitable in raw capitalism. On the other side stand
diverse scholars who were strongly hostile to the market system and who
proposed to completely replace it with something else; here one finds social-
ists as diverse as Robert Owen and Karl Marx.
Marx of course saw capitalism as a system of power. For him, political and
economic power were intertwined. It is no coincidence that, until recently,
nationalisation of heavy industry and, more generally, of the organisations that
provided the basic infrastructure for economic life was at the top of the agenda
for socialist parties, after they were able to attain and hold political power.
With all the enthusiasm today for market capitalism of a relatively exten-
sive and unrestricted sort, it is easy to forget that half a century ago some of
the most distinguished scholars were predicting capitalism’s demise. Between
1940 and 1950 Joseph Schumpeter published his classic Capitalism, Social-
ism, and Democracy, and Karl Polanyi his The Great Transformation. Both
saw capitalism as a system whose time had passed, the former with regret and
the latter with relief. The reasons for these predictions are, interestingly,
somewhat different.
For Schumpeter, the reasons were twofold. First of all, he argued that the
principal economic merit of capitalism had been the rapid and radical inno-
vation the system spurred and supported, which was the basic factor behind
the great improvements in living standards that had occurred under capital-
ism. However, he believed that, as a result of the advance of science, rapid
industrial innovation no longer required the hurly burly of competition,
but could proceed in a planned and orderly way. Thus capitalist economic
organisation no longer was needed for economic progress. At the same time
the professional managers of industry and the scientists in R&D had little
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zeal for keeping competitive capitalism going as a system: their careers
would be more secure and as comfortable under a different regime. This left
the defenders of capitalism even more vulnerable to the attacks of intellec-
tuals who saw many vices and few virtues in the system.
For Polanyi, market capitalism had been a disaster for the working classes
and, while since the late nineteenth-century wages had risen somewhat for
those who had jobs, the great depression showed that capitalism remained a
pernicious system. More, (and here Polanyi’s line is similar to that of Schum-
peter), the depression had weakened the support of the middle classes, and
even business, for the system, and was leading them to look to taming it or
transforming it so that it was less brutal.
Both authors saw the economic system of market capitalism as profoundly
influencing the nature of broader society and politics. Schumpeter saw the
effects as largely positive, as encouraging individual creativity, freedom and
independence. Indeed, he associated the institutions of modern science with
capitalism, and argued that liberal democracy was a fellow traveller, a posi-
tion very close to that of F. A. Hayek. For these reasons he viewed with regret
what he saw as the inevitable decline of capitalism.
Polanyi’s great book, on the other hand, put forth the argument that the
encroachment of markets on everyday life and, in particular, the commodi-
fication of labour and land had destroyed the co-operative and communal
aspects he saw as essential to a healthy civil society. He saw the defence of
capitalism against the pressures of working-class interests as a fundamental
aspect of political regimes under capitalism, so that a true democracy was
very difficult to achieve so long as capitalism held sway. On the other hand,
part of his argument as to why capitalism was dissolving involved precisely
the extension of democracy despite the resistance of capitalism’s defenders.
Neither author displayed any enthusiasm for the Soviet system that was
taking shape at the time. But both clearly forecasted an economic system that
involved far less competition among firms, and far more co-ordination,
much more government regulation of firms and particularly the labour mar-
ket, greater protection of the basic living standards of workers and more
planning than did the system that had come to be called capitalism.
It is apparent that the strong performance after the Second World War of
the European and American economies surprised many people, and changed
attitudes. Unemployment was low. The economic growth rate was high and
the lion’s share of the population experienced rising living standards.
It was widely recognised that post-war capitalism was structurally differ-
ent from that of pre-war days in a number of dimensions. The roles of gov-
ernment had expanded significantly. Public spending on education,
particularly higher education, had increased greatly, and so had government
support of R&D. There were major public investments in roads and other
infrastructure. Unemployment insurance now was widespread and in many
countries quite generous, as was social security. Many countries expanded
the scope of national health insurance, or instituted new programmes. Both
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France and the United Kingdom established an apparatus for centralised
economic planning, or at least indicative planning. The United States saw
the passing of a full employment act and the establishment of a President’s
Council of Economic Advisors.
How much these systems changes had to do with the strong performance
of the economies in the quarter century after the Second World War still is
an arguable matter. However, it is clear that many of the forecasts of Schum-
peter and Polanyi regarding systems change had come to pass.
One could ask whether the new system still was market capitalism. C. A. R.
Crosland asked that question in his 1956 opus The Future of Socialism, and
answered that the system was very different from what it had been,
and that it contained a number of elements long advocated by socialists, but
still was not socialism. In Beyond the Welfare State (1960), Gunnar Myrdal
also stressed the great change that had occurred and in effect took the posi-
tion, whatever it might be called, that most of the problems of the old
capitalism were resolved by the new system. Andrew Schonfield, in his
Modern Capitalism written in 1965, took essentially the same position.
American scholars put forth a distinctively pragmatic perspective on these
developments. Robert Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom in their great Politics,
Economics, and Welfare (1953) proposed that the tasks of modern economies
were complex and varied, and that different forms of governance and organ-
isation are appropriate to different ones. The book basically layed out the
wide range of different principles the United States used to organise different
kinds of activities. Daniel Bell’s The End of Ideology (1960) argued that in the
United States, at least, no one was still arguing about the pluses and minuses
of capitalism; rather, the discussion was about how to make it work well.
In the United States economists increasingly used the term ‘mixed econ-
omy’ and, when talking among themselves, ‘the neoclassical synthesis’. The
basic themes were well articulated in the 1960 report of the new Kennedy
administration’s Council of Economic Advisors, which contained a number
of the country’s best-known and most respected economists. Centerpiece in
the formulation was the Government’s role in managing the macro aspects
of the economy through fiscal and monetary policy; several years later the
Republican President Richard Nixon would say ‘We are all Keynesians’ (see
US Government, 1960, 1967). Market organisation was assumed to be the
basic way of governing and managing industry, broadly defined. However,
the theory of ‘market failures’, to use a term I will unpack later, was very
much part of the neoclassical synthesis. The provision of public goods, like
national security and scientific knowledge, required public support and in
some cases public undertaking. Externalities required regulation or a regime
of taxes and subsidies. Anti-trust policies needed to be pursued and natural
monopolies needed to be regulated. And the Government needed to proceed
actively to assure that the workings of the economic system did not generate
unrelieved poverty. There were only a few years between the Kennedy
administration’s first economic report and the ‘war on poverty’.
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These changes in economic policy or, more broadly, changes in the view of
what capitalism was and what was needed to make it effective did not go
unchallenged. By the middle or late 1970s there was considerable advocacy
for rolling back many of the changes or, at least, blocking further moves in
those directions. Mark Blyth has proposed, in his ‘Great Transformations’,
(2000), that there may be a natural cycle regarding popular opinion on the
appropriate level and kind of government regulation, and involvement more
generally, in capitalism, a cycle that involves both policies and ideologies,
with overshoot of the former leading to switches in the latter.
However, it is fair to say that the seachange in ideology on these matters
reflected in the rhetoric and the policies of the Margaret Thatcher and
Ronald Reagan administrations caught many people by surprise. The sharp
changes undoubtedly had many causes. One was the deterioration of the per-
formance of the American and European economies that set in during the
early 1970s. This was associated with a continuing rise in government spend-
ing as a fraction of GNP, and many argued that this, together with increased
government regulation, was a root cause of the economic problems. And
clearly the collapse of the Soviet economy bolstered the advocates of market
capitalism – of a relatively simple and raw variety.
The 1980s and 1990s saw a dramatic change in intellectual writings about
capitalism. Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw wrote about how the mar-
ketplace had won over government in the battle for The Commanding
Heights, and saw the outcome as a victory for the right cause, expressing few
qualms that the issues might be more complex than the ideological argu-
ments of the victors. Francis Fukuyama proclaimed The End of History and
the Last Man (1992), as a final victory for market capitalism (along with
liberal democracy).
And yet, for all the attempts to roll back the reforms of the early post-war
era and to return to a leaner and more basic capitalism, the actual systems
remain extraordinarily complex and variegated. The welfare state has
become a recognised part of modern capitalism, a mistaken idea in the minds
of some, a necessary complement to the industrial side of modern capitalism
to others, but certainly an arena of continuing policy argument. With grow-
ing recognition of the central role of technological advance in economic
growth, and of science to technological advance, the old industrial policy
debates have taken on new form, but the debates continue. The waves of
deregulation and privatisation that marked the 1980s have not ended the
debate about whether for-profit firms can be trusted in contexts where com-
petition is problematic or the good or service being provided is crucial to the
well-being of the society or polity.
In my view, however, while for the most part the contemporary discussion
of issues of macroeconomic policy has broken from the ideological narrowness
of the 1970s and 1980s, that is less true regarding problems of economic
organisation. Too much of the current discussion of how to govern economic
activity still proceeds within an intellectual frame that sees modern capitalism,
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and in particular market organisation of economic activity, as far simpler than
it actually is. I think it very important to get the complexity and variegation of
market organisation, and its limits, more clearly in view.
The case for market organisation: the perspective from economics
I have noted that, while recently there is fraying around the edges, over the
last twenty years belief in the efficacy of markets has been unusually wide and
deep by historical standards. Non-economists seem under the impression that
economists have built a theoretically rigorous and empirically well-supported
case for market organisation. In this section I argue that, in fact, the most
commonly cited theoretical argument can support little weight, the empirical
case is rough and ready, and the persuasive part of the argument is pragmatic
and qualitative rather than rigorous and quantitative. And, in my view at least,
the arguments for market organisation that are most compelling are quite
different from those contained in the standard textbook formulation.
Since at least the days of Adam Smith, the Anglo Saxon tradition of economic
analysis has touted the virtues of the ‘hidden hand’ – profit-oriented suppliers
striving for customer purchasers on a competitive market. For the most part
Smith’s argument was qualitative, and supported by a set of empirical cases
drawn from his own experiences and those of others. Also, in the present con-
text, it is important to remember that Smith was making his case for market
organisation partly as argument against a particular alternative – mercantilism.
Modern economics purports to tighten up the logic of the argument. The
theoretical case made for market organisation in contemporary economics
textbooks and treatises compares the performance of a stylised model market
economy against a theoretical norm of Pareto optimality. Pareto optimality is
a sophisticated notion of maximal economic efficiency. If the performance of
an economy is Pareto optimal, it is getting the maximal value of output from
the resources and technologies available, given the distribution of purchasing
power. (This is not the standard definition of Pareto optimality, but it is nearly
equivalent.) The textbook argument concludes that, given a package of
assumptions, a competitive market economy meets that norm. However,
while Nobel prizes have been awarded to economists for developing this
theory, I would argue that it is a non-starter as a case for real life market
organisation for several reasons.
The primary one, of course, is that the theoretical model of a market econ-
omy that satisfies the criterion of Pareto optimality is very far away from
actual market organisation. Strangely, the implications of this for the whole
broad argument have tended to be underplayed.
Even if one stays close to that theoretical formulation, almost all analysts
would admit the presence of a variety of ‘market failures’, a topic I take up
in the next section. Once these are taken into the model, the theoretical mar-
ket economy does not achieve Pareto optimality. And from there the whole
theoretical strategy of the case for markets unravels.
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It unravels because, unlike Smith’s discussion of the virtues of the hidden
hand, which did involve an explicit comparison, the contemporary theoreti-
cal textbook argument does not compare the performance of a (highly
abstracted) market-organised economy with the theoretical performance of
another (highly abstracted) kind of economic system. In particular, the argu-
ment is not that another kind of economic system could not also achieve
Pareto optimality. Of course, if market organisation does as well as is theo-
retically possible, there is no particular reason to consider an alternative.
However, once the optimality argument falls away, there would seem to be
no way to avoid comparing how market organisation does against alternative
structures, even though this may be very hard to do.
The task is made especially difficult by the fact, which I have been stress-
ing, that modern market capitalism (or any plausible alternative system) is
very complex and variegated. The argument I am developing clearly is that
it is exactly this flexibility which enables market organisation to work toler-
ably well in a wide variety of contexts. But then these factors absolutely need
to be taken into account in any analysis which compares market capitalism
against alternatives, or against some kind of an absolute scale.
There is also the question of the kind of performance attributes one should
use to evaluate market organisation and its alternatives. Much of modern
economic analysis is focused on economic efficiency – the value of the out-
put (given the distribution of purchasing power) that an economy is able to
achieve with given resources and technologies. While real life market
economies certainly do not achieve Pareto optimality, most economists
would argue that market organisation and competition often do seem to gen-
erate results that are moderately efficient. There are strong incentives for
firms to produce goods and services that customers want, or can be per-
suaded they want, and to produce them at as low financial cost as is possible.
There is a ‘dynamic’ version of, or supplement to, this efficiency argument.
Under many circumstances competitive market-organised economic sectors
seem to respond relatively quickly to changes in customer demands, input
supply conditions and technological opportunities. To the extent that pro-
ducing what customers value is treated as a plus, and so long as factor prices
roughly measure opportunity costs, there is a strong pragmatic case for mar-
ket capitalism on economic efficiency grounds, broadly defined, at least in
certain domains of activity.
But the question is ‘compared with what?’ and ‘in what context?’ It is
interesting that in wartime, and almost without protest, capitalist
economies have adopted centrally co-ordinated mechanisms of resource
allocation, procurement and rationing. The rationale has been that such
economic organisation was essential if production was to be allocated to the
highest priority needs, and conducted efficiently. And the experience with
wartime planning sometimes has led some analysts to propose that a num-
ber of the mechanisms used then would vastly increase economic efficiency
during peacetime.
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On the other hand, most knowledgeable analysts have argued against that
position, strongly. It is one thing to marshall an economy to concentrate on
a central set of demands over a short period of time. It is something else again
to have an economy behave reasonably efficiently and responsively in a con-
text of varied and changing demands, supply conditions and technological
opportunities, over a long time period. The experience with central planning
in the formerly communist countries, particularly after the era when build-
ing up standard economic infrastructure sufficed as a central goal, bears out
this argument.
However, I would propose that the argument behind the scenes here is
much more complex, and in fact different, from the standard textbook argu-
ment that profit maximising behaviour of firms in competitive market
contexts yields economically efficient results. It hinges on the multiplicity and
diversity of wants, resources and technologies in modern economies that,
experience shows, defy the information processing and resource allocating
capabilities of centrally planned and controlled systems, and also presumes
that the chances of appropriate responses to changed conditions are enhanced
when there are a number of competitive actors who can respond, again
a proposition consistent with experience. Many people find that case for
market organisation compelling, and in accord with the evidence both about
capitalist economies and about the old planned ones. That case, however, has
nothing to do with a theoretical argument about the Pareto optimality of a
stylised market economy, but rather rests on an empirically well-founded
belief that, in a complex and changing environment, decentralised market
systems work better than highly centralised ones.
Many observers have proposed that it is in dynamic long-run performance,
rather than in short-run efficiency, that market capitalism reveals its greatest
strength. As Marx and Schumpeter have stressed, capitalism has been a
remarkably powerful engine of economic progress. And here too one can
make a rather explicit comparison. Indeed a good case can be made that a
central reason for the collapse of the old communist economies was their
inability to keep up with and take advantage of the rapid technological
progress that was going on in market economies.
But, again, the characteristics and capabilities of market organisation that
contribute to technological progress are very different from those that relate
to static efficiency, and those of the normative textbook model. Indeed
Schumpeter made a great deal of those differences. The capitalism of his
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy was an effective engine of progress
because competition spurred innovation. This theory places high value on
pluralism and multiple rival sources of invention and innovation. However,
under this view of what socially valuable competition was all about, the pres-
ence of large firms, with R&D laboratories as well as some market power,
was welcomed, despite the fact that such a market structure diverged from
the purely competitive one associated with the static theorem about Pareto
optimality. More, the very process of competitive innovation was itself a
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source of efficiency differences across firms which, from a static perspective,
could be viewed as inefficiency in the system as a whole.
Earlier I noted that Schumpeter argued that as science had become more
powerful, the unruly and inefficient competition of capitalist systems would
no longer be needed for industrial innovation, which increasingly could be
planned. History has shown him to be very wrong on that point. However,
I would argue that the strong performance of market capitalist economies on
this front probably has as much to do with features of modern capitalist
economies which are absent from the economists’ standard model, as for
example public support of university research, as with those that are
included in that model.
In concluding this section it is relevant to recall that not only was Schum-
peter’s appreciation of the economic power of capitalism different from that
which was being articulated in the then-rising neoclassical economics
(although not inconsistent with views of earlier economists like Smith).
Schumpeter also admired the cultural, and the political, values and structures
that he saw induced and supported by capitalist economic organisation. On
the other hand, Polanyi detested what he thought capitalism did to people,
values and politics. It is apparent that the arguments for and against market
organisation, and capitalism more generally, are concerned with issues at
some distance from evaluations of performance on strictly economic grounds,
whatever the latter might mean. Both Schumpeter and Polanyi believed that
capitalism could not survive politically, at least in its raw form, because of
widespread distaste for its social consequences. Clearly many of the post
Second World War reforms were attempts to mitigate those consequences.
Which brings the discussion back to the question ‘What is modern capital-
ism?’. And what are the alternatives? Years ago it was reasonable to compare
capitalism and various aspects of its performance against communist systems,
but this is no longer a relevant comparison. Today no one is seriously propos-
ing an economic system that does not make extensive use of markets. The real
issues today relate to the mix of markets with other forms, in different eco-
nomic activities and sectors. And here, while a number of people have in effect
put forward the proposition ‘The more of market and the less of other things
the better’, I know of no convincing argument to support that proposition.
The positive case for a mixed economy
Why is there so much in the way of non-market elements in modern capital-
ist economies? Contemporary advocates of a purer form of capitalism argue
that it is all a mistake or partially the result of a conspiracy. My argument, of
course, is that these non-market elements are essential to make the economic
system work tolerably well, and to ensure the support of its basic structure
under democratic institutions.
In this section I consider three bodies of theorising that provide arguments
for a mixed economy. By far the best known is the economists’ theory of
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‘market failure’, in which limitations of market organisation provide reason
for market supplementation or the substitution in some cases of non-market
forms. Partly because it is so well known, and partly because its categories
and conceptions are developed and criticised in the this section following,
here I can be brief about this body of theory.
Rather, my focus is on two other bodies of theorising. One is concerned
with the essential roles of the state. The orientation here is not to the need
for the state or other non-market forms because markets occasionally fail,
but to functions that naturally fall to government, including those that gov-
ernment has to perform to enable other institutions to operate tolerably well.
The other body of theorising takes human society as basic, and is oriented to
the rights and obligations of individuals within society. Market organisation
can either help support this more fundamental structure or can be damaging
to it; within this framework the question of where markets should and
should not be admitted depends on how and where markets impinge on basic
social structure.
Market failure theory
Without question, most of the high-level argument about how to use market
organisation effectively, where market organisation needs to be supplemented
by other mechanisms, and where market organisation simply works poorly,
is conducted using the economists’ ‘market failure’ language. The standard
categories of market failure – public goods, externalities, monopoly problems,
information impactedness, and (in some treatments) income distribution
problems – serve to structure and constrain much of the policy discourse.
Indeed since the 1960s, when this theory became solidly incorporated in
mainline economics, almost every new president’s Council of Economic
Advisors has walked through basically this list in its maiden annual report to
Congress and the American people, as part of its articulation of the economic
policies its administration was proposing to implement.
Here I want to highlight several things about standard market failure the-
ory that I develop in the next section. In the first place, market failure almost
always is a matter of degree, not of kind. Or, from another point of view,
market failure is ubiquitous: markets always ‘fail’ to some extent, in one way
or another. This of course is an issue I flagged in the preceding section, where
I also pointed out that an implication was that an explicit evaluation of
organisational alternatives was needed before one could assess the implica-
tions regarding appropriate organisational form. Unfortunately, given the
present state of our knowledge, economists and social scientists do not have
the capability to engage in confident analysis of the likely performance of a
wide range of organisational alternatives, or even to analyse the complex
mixed market structures that have evolved in many sectors. But, on the other
hand, a number of sophisticated advocates of market organisation have
argued that the standard theory of market organisation, because it greatly
oversimplifies what actually goes on in real markets, far exaggerates the
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extent to which markets ‘fail’, because in fact particular markets have
evolved various procedures and structures that deal with problems which the
simpler theoretical structure would see as sources of market failure. It should
be clear that I have considerable sympathy for this point of view. By pre-
senting a drastically oversimplified model of market organisation, standard
economic theory blinds itself to the remarkable versatility of market organi-
sation, broadly defined. Conventional market failure theory takes attention
away from the remarkable diversity of markets.
However, by the way it is formulated, market failure theory carries a heavy
normative load to the effect that markets always are to be preferred to other
basic forms of organisation and governance, unless they are basically flawed in
some sense. Thus the only reason why government should provide for national
security and protect citizens from crime is that markets cannot do those jobs
well. Parents need to take care of children because of market failure.
The functions of the state
As one reflects on it, the argument that we need government simply because
markets sometimes ‘fail’ seems rather strange, or at least incomplete. Cannot
one make a positive case for government (or families for that matter), as a
form that is appropriate, even needed, in its own right?
And of course there is an ancient body of theorising that puts forward a
positive case for government. In much of its early incarnation, and some of its
more recent, the state is viewed as the structure through which an organic
community governs itself, and values are defined at the level of the commu-
nity. Reflect on Plato’s discussion in The Republic (1961), or Hegel’s discus-
sion, where the good state is defined in terms of justice and morality and the
quality of persons (1967). Under this conception of the relationships between
a collection of individuals and families and their state, the good of the whole
is by no means adequately judged in terms of the sum of the ‘happiness’ of the
individuals that comprise it. This notion is very much alive in discussions
about matters like the quality of justice in a society, or the aims of foreign pol-
icy. Arguments about how these activities should be governed involve beliefs
about appropriate collective values, or the values of the collective, that tran-
scend those of particular individuals. Under this theory, in these areas at least
the state is the natural vehicle of governance, rather than something that is
justified on grounds of market failure. In these areas the state may choose to
use markets, but the purpose being served is a public purpose, and the respon-
sibility for furthering it ultimately is a state responsibility.
It is important to keep this point of view in mind, because it plays a major
role in a number of areas of contemporary dispute about governance. As I
will propose shortly, in many of these areas the collective value argued to be
at stake involves basic community and human rights, which I want to treat as
a distinct body of theorising in its own right. Thus in the remainder of this
subsection, I focus on another strand of political philosophy, particularly
Anglo-American political philosophy.
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From at least the times of Hobbes and Locke, theories about the impor-
tance of the state have involved, centrally, the proposition that a strong state
is necessary for individuals to lead secure, decent and productive lives. Orig-
inally this body of theorising had little to do with economics, much less with
the role of the state in market economies. Thus Hobbes’s case for a strong
state to establish and enforce a clear body of law was posed in terms of the
need to avoid the ‘war of every man against every man’. While this case
involved security of property, that was not its central orientation. With
Locke, the orientation is more towards security of property, but his great
writings were before capitalism emerged as a recognisable economic system.
In The Wealth of Nations, Smith built on these ideas and specialised them
to the market economy he saw as working in Great Britain. He ascribed the
backwardness of countries like eighteenth-century China largely to the vul-
nerability of possessions to thieves or simply to being confiscated by those in
power. To have an incentive to produce for the market, craftsmen needed to
be confident that they would reap what they sowed. Trade required contracts
in which the traders had confidence, and that required a body of supporting
law and a tradition of law enforcement that would not simply obey the inter-
ests of the wealthy and powerful. I call this required political and legal struc-
ture ‘needed infrastructure‘.
In Smith’s day, not much physical infrastructure was necessary to make
markets work. There were roads and canals, which government could either
build and maintain itself or franchise to private parties. While Smith included
in his functions of government the support of education, his case assigned at
least as much importance to education as a factor supporting civil society as
the role he perceived formal education to play in the operation of the eco-
nomic system more narrowly defined.
As technology advanced and economic systems became more complex,
the physical and legal infrastructure needed for the effective operation of
market economies became more complex and variegated. Establishing the
telegraph and railroad systems required government action, if not necessar-
ily government finance and operation. With the emergence of the organic
chemical product industry and the industrial research laboratory in the last
part of the nineteenth century, effective patent law became important as a
precondition to profitable R&D in a number of industries. Education
became more important economically, and in industries like those producing
fine chemical products firms needed scientists with a doctoral level of expert-
ise. Earlier I briefly discussed the legal and physical infrastructure, provided
by government, that support the modern airline, pharmaceuticals and
automobile industries.
Now the question of what infrastructure has to be provided for markets to
work well, and what it is that markets themselves can be expected to provide,
often is not easily answered. However, ‘needed infrastructure’ provides a
point of view on some of the current argument about the role of non-market
structures in market-oriented economies that is different, I propose, from the
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modern theory of economists about conditions of market failure. Thus con-
sider activities like maintaining a system of contract law, building and main-
taining a road system, and supporting the development of basic scientific
knowledge. These activities can be viewed as public goods, in the sense of
market failure theory, with the market failure stemming from the fact that
their benefits are collective rather than individual, and hence that to profit
firms would have great difficulty collecting for their provision on a conven-
tional market. Or they can be considered as ‘needed infrastructure’, the pro-
vision of which is a function of governments. However, while the former
theory sees the reason for governmental provision or overview and control
in the inability of markets to do an adequate job, the latter sees provision
of such goods and services as a central responsibility of government, even
if they could be provided through market mechanisms. And where market
mechanisms in fact are used as part of the machinery for provision, the
latter perspective sees government as still responsible for overseeing the
operation, at least to some degree.
Support of primary and secondary education is an interesting case in point.
While many laypersons clearly consider education to provide a public good
and to be a responsibility of government, economists have trouble squaring
the former notion with their technical definition of a public good, and more
generally tend to struggle with the reason why government should be respon-
sible for education, in view of the large benefits to those who get the educa-
tion. While the notion that education yields externalities helps along their
analysis, that perspective would seem to justify some subsidy to education
but hardly the major governmental responsibility in the field that is the case
in most countries. It would seem that non-economists tend to place educa-
tion in the ‘infrastructure’ category, and hence have no trouble with the
notion that government is responsible for supporting it, and for governing
and monitoring education at least broadly, although some would argue that
private schools ought to play a significant role in provision.
Social cohesion and human rights
Education also is an example of the kind of goods and services that, under
the third body of theorising identified here, is considered a basic human
right, or right of citizenship, and thus which ought to be available to all,
independently of their money income or wealth or social status. Thus all
citizens ought to have the right to vote, to trial by jury, and to legal aid if they
cannot afford it on their own. Most societies recognise a similar right to an
education, up to some level at least. Access to these basics of citizenship are
seen as something that should not be rationed through markets, and for
which government has a fundamental responsibility.
The core arguments of modern welfare state theorists combine these ven-
erable arguments with a set of policies designed to shield individuals, and
society as a whole, from what they see as the ravages of raw capitalism. Thus
a set of economic rights have been added to the older political rights. This
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decoupling of access to a considerable range of goods and services from nor-
mal market process is the hallmark of the modern welfare state idea.
Above I noted the overlap between theories of the state that see collective
values as transcending individual values, and modern welfare state theories.
There is a difference, however, in that while the former tends to see certain
values as associated with the institution of the state per se, the latter sees
collective values as based on individual values, plus a notion of a shared
uncertain environment, plus extended empathy.
In any case, under this theory the governance argument is not about par-
ticular market failures but about the basic rights of humans in society, which
is not the same thing. This latter point of view of course poses the challeng-
ing question of how one draws up the list of things that should be available
to all, or rather how one makes the cut off. The rights to vote, to equal
protection under the law and to a basic education are on everyone’s list.
Unemployment and disability insurance, and at least a minimal level of
retirement income, have been provided to all citizens in all high-income
countries, and are not now controversial. But should medical care be on that
list, and if so what level of care? Adequate extra family child care? It is not
clear how we are to go about answering these questions. But it is clear that
the answers are not readily posed in terms of resolutions of market failures.
It also is clear that, from this perspective, the notion of a society as simply
a collection of people and families who have their own independent wants
and purposes misunderstands what human societies are. ‘Solidarity’ is a word
often used by advocates of this position. From another (sometimes closely
related) tradition we all are our brothers’ keepers.
From that point of view, many of the market failure concepts of traditional
modern economics take on a very different light. Most importantly, in my
view, there is a major difference in how one conceptualises public goods. As
a salient example, one can ask whether the care and well-being of children
create a public good. From the standard perspective in economics, the answer
certainly is no. From a more communal position, every child is one of our
children. The well-being of every child is a concern of all of us. The general
welfare of children in our society is something we all should be concerned
about. From this point of view, child welfare certainly is a public good. More
generally, from this perspective the governance and administration of eco-
nomic activity need to be arranged so as to support a just and equitable
society, which is the most public of public goods.
A synthetic perspective
In this section I try to bring together the three theoretical strands just dis-
cussed, to develop an analytic mapping of the kinds of activities and sectors
where the appropriate role of the market and other governing structures is a
matter of controversy. In developing my mapping of issues, I take two things
for granted.
30 Richard R. Nelson
First, there are numerous activities and sectors where governance through
market organisation is generally regarded as unproblematical. This is not to
deny that there is any regulatory structure involved or, in some cases, supple-
mentary non-market activity. However, no one seems to be suggesting that
markets are an inappropriate basic governing mode, or arguing for a radically
different governing structure. Textile production, automobile manufacture,
restaurants, haircuts, house building, all would seem good examples. The list
is long and broad.
But, second, I also take for granted that there are many activities for which
markets are generally not regarded as the appropriate basic governing struc-
ture, and in fact we use alternatives. Some market activity may be involved,
but in an ancillary way, and there is widespread agreement that if market
principles and mechanisms became dominant, there would be a problem.
The two examples I used at the start of this essay seem apt: child care by the
family, and police and criminal justice more broadly. I suspect few would
argue that governments do not have a basic responsibility for assuring the
adequacy of national security or the regional water supply. Organised reli-
gion and little league baseball are activities where I suspect many people
would reject a central role either by government or by for-profit firms. Most
would agree that elections and particular pieces of legislation ought not to
be for sale.
The categories I develop below are strongly influenced by the standard list
in the economists’ market failure theory. However, recognition of the central
limitations of that theory, and the integration into the discussion of the other
two strands of analysis that I introduced in the preceding section, yield (I
believe) a richer characterisation of the reasons why and the arenas wherein
many people are arguing that simple market structures need to be supple-
mented by ancillary mechanisms in order to be acceptable, or even fenced
out. I focus particularly on areas and issues that seem to mark terrain that is
strongly contested.
Latent public goods
Economists use the public good concept to flag a class of goods and services
where the benefits are collective and communal rather than individual and
private. Under this body of conceptualisation, a pure public good has two
attributes. One is that, unlike a standard private good like a peanut butter
sandwich, which can benefit only one consumer (although it can be split and
shared), a public good provides atmospheric benefits that all can enjoy. In the
language of economists, pure public goods are non-rivalrous in use. Your ben-
efiting from a public good in no way diminishes my ability to so benefit. The
second attribute is that, if the good or service is provided at all, there is no way
to deny access to any person, or to require direct payment for access. National
security is a standard example of a public good. Scientific knowledge often is
used as another example. For a neighbourhood, the quality of the access roads
has strong public good properties.
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There are several things to note about this conceptualisation. As I have
stressed on several occasions, publicness generally is a matter of degree, in
both dimensions. A defence force may protect some regions, but not others,
and given a resource constraint, defence of one area may be at the expense
of another. Thus defence is not completely atmospheric or non-rivalrous in
use. On the other hand, if one lives in a protected region, protection cannot
be withheld if a person does not pay up, although a person can be placed in
gaol for not paying taxes. In contrast, scientific knowledge does seem truly
to be non-rivalrous in use; you and I can use the same fact or understanding
at the same time. However, the creator of that knowledge may be able to
patent it, and to sue us for using it without paying a licence fee.
Laypersons have tended to associate the concept of the public good with
the impossibility or undesirability of making those who benefit pay directly
for use, and to recognise that adequate provision of goods or services so
characterised requires some kind of collective procurement machinery.
Sometimes this can be provided through non- governmental organisations,
like churches, or community voluntary organisations, which are financed
through donations. Thus many suburban neighbourhoods have neighbour-
hood associations which collectively decide on road maintenance, and col-
lect dues from members. But for large-scale public goods of this type we
generally rely on governments.
Generally there is no real alternative. Absent some mechanism for collec-
tive decision making, or for collecting taxes, and nothing or next to nothing
would be provided. There may be dispute about the magnitude and allocation
of public spending, about who should pay, and about how procurement or
provision should be arranged, but the principle of governmental determina-
tion of the spending on large-scale pure public goods is not in serious dispute.
However, there is a significant collection of goods and services that are
non-rivalrous in use, or nearly non-rivalrous, in that the cost of making them
available to additional users is very small, but where access can be denied, or
users made to pay up before they gain access. I have called this class ‘latent
public goods’. Prominent on the list of latent public goods I would include
those that are or which provide information or knowledge: science, technol-
ogy, databases, TV signals. To a considerable extent these are marked by non-
rivalrousness in use, but access can be barred to those who do not pay a fee.
Parks and roads also have the characteristics of latent public goods. Their use
is non-rivalrous, at least up to the point where they become crowded. But
under appropriate institutional arrangements, for-profit suppliers can make
money providing them by requiring their users pay up at a level that covers
average cost plus a margin for profit. This is a real option.
For market enthusiasts, this generally is the preferred way of organising
and governing these activities. However, while sometimes overlooked in the
discussion, there is a downside to governing an activity with latent public
good properties in this way, because some users and uses where the good or
service has significant value almost surely will be shut out, even though the
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real incremental cost of that use is zero or close to zero. The cost of this
exclusion may be, or may be deemed to be, modest, or it may be very large.
On the other hand, collective demand machinery may be put in place as
part of the governance mechanism. The decision about how much and what
kind to procure may be made publicly, the good or service procured using
public funds, and access made free or with nominal use charge. Such a col-
lective demand-side governance mechanism avoids the costs of limiting
access to a latent good or service where the real cost of extending service is
zero or small. But it does involve the real cost of putting in place and oper-
ating collective decision-making machinery, where there may be little agree-
ment, and little objective basis for deciding, how much to provide. There also
is the fractious issue of who is to pay the taxes.
I believe that a number of the current arguments about the appropriate
roles of markets, and of public funding, involve latent public goods. The
funding of basic science is one of the more interesting and important of these
issues, and I will consider it in more detail in the next section.
Goods and services that ‘ought to be public’
I return now to the remark I made earlier that many laypersons have a
conception of the public good that differs significantly from the technical
concept of economists. For many laypersons, public goods are what we fund
publicly and make generally available. In cases like defence, this usage
squares with the technical concept of public goods used by economists. But
in many instances, it does not, at least not immediately. I gave primary and
secondary education as an example.
Clearly there is a lot of private benefit for those who are getting an educa-
tion. Some economists, therefore, have used education as an example of a ‘pub-
licly funded private good’. Most economists are comfortable with the notion
that education can yield significant positive ‘externalities’, through enhancing
the legitimate earnings’ potential of people who otherwise might be tempted
to crime, and in the form of the benefits to all of us of a better informed
citizenry. This provides an explanation that makes economists comfortable as
to why there should be public subsidy of education. But it would appear that
few economists are comfortable, at least at first thought, with the notion that
education provides a public good, in their technical sense of the term.
However, I want to argue that, if one broadens one’s conception of the
values involved, education has some strong public good properties. Thus the
effects of a better informed citizenry certainly can be regarded as atmos-
pheric. Also, in the eyes of many people a good education available to all is
necessary for there to be equality, or near equality, of opportunity in a soci-
ety, and hence free public education contributes to the fairness of a society.
People clearly do care about the characteristics of the society in which they
live. And to the extent that they do, education provides an atmospheric
public good, at the same time as it provides a private good with externalities.
From that same point of view, the quality of the criminal justice system
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can be considered a public good, with equality of access to it a necessary
condition for a just society.
Modern societies fund publicly, and provide free or highly subsidised
access to a variety of goods and services where extending the use to more
persons and uses definitely is costly. Economists, while often strongly sym-
pathetic to the idea of positive public policies to equalise incomes, or at least
put a floor under living standards, generally have had considerable difficulty
in rationalising the furthering of these objectives by selecting certain goods
and services and making them ‘publicly’ available, in contrast with simply
redistributing money income. I am proposing that the focus on particular
goods and services makes sense, if certain of them can be particularly associ-
ated with the standards of justice in a society or with meeting basic human
needs, and which hence should not be rationed by the market.
However, it is not at all clear just how one identifies and limits this class.
The arguments for including a right to vote (but remember the old Poll Tax),
a right to equality of access to the criminal justice system, to a decent educa-
tion and to at least a floor level of general living standards are clear enough.
So, too, the case for covering the costs of standard medical care for people
who cannot afford it, and of assuring the availability of health insurance
that covers very costly procedures. But why have many societies opted to
remove a payment requirement for even relatively well-to-do people for even
relatively low-cost and routine medical services? Should university-level
education be on the list?
I believe my conceptualisation here of what the argument is all about is
basically correct. But I do not see a clear way of deciding in particular cases;
nor, I believe, does anyone else. That is why the debates about removing or
weakening market bars to access to services like medical care or day care
often are so fractious. Removing a good or service from the realm of gover-
nance through customer decisions as to whether or not to spend their own
money means not only that public money is required, but that public deci-
sions need to be made regarding who will have access at what terms. I return
to this issue in the next section.
The externalities’ problem: bringing broader interests to the governing structure
The notion of economists externalities is meant to refer to by-products of eco-
nomic activity that have negative or positive consequences which are not
reflected in the prices or other benefits and costs perceived by those who
engage in the externalities-generating activity. Environmental contamination is
an obvious example of a negative ‘externality’, and a clear case where there is
a value at stake in the operations of an activity, with no one to represent and
fight for it, at least in the simple model of market governance put forward
in economic textbooks. In a famous article written some time ago, Ronald
Coase argued that, if property rights are clear and strong, and the number of
interested parties relatively small, markets can in fact deal with such problems.
Those who value clean air or water can simply ‘buy’ behaviour that respects
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those values from the potential polluter. The problem arises when those who
care about the values which could be neglected are dispersed. In that case some
kind of collective action machinery is needed to bring them in. A good way to
think about regulation, or a tax on pollution, is to see these measures as the
result of governmental actions that have brought in a broader range of inter-
ests to the governing structure of an activity or sector.
But the general problem here is to delineate the range of interests which
should be represented, their relative influence and the mechanisms through
which they operate to make their values felt. The latter can range from pub-
lic interest advertising or boycotts, which can proceed without direct access
to governmental machinery, to lawsuits which involve general governmental
apparatus, to particular pieces of special regulation and associated control
machinery. Much of the public controversy is about the latter.
It is conventional in economics to think of the costs of an externality as
objective, and in principle at least measurable, and amenable to having a
market-based value placed on them. However, in many cases this is not
quite the case. The concerns about the ‘externality’ are held by particular
groups, and may be quite subjective. Consider the interests of certain
groups in preserving particular species or particular wilderness areas. Or
consider regulation or prohibition of the sale of drugs or guns. This can be
rationalised as dealing with an externality. However, it is apparent that
many people strongly believe that drugs should be prohibited not because
they feel particularly threatened by drug-related crime, but because they
consider drug use, by anybody, to be wrong. Or reflect on prohibitions on
prostitution.
To a large extent, prohibitions on certain activities, which economists
might be inclined to rationalise as attempts to deal with externalities, reflect
notions on the part of some people and groups regarding what is appropri-
ate activity and what is not. A large part of the argument in this arena is about
which values, and whose values, are to count, and through what mechanisms.
It is hard to identify an activity, or a sector, where there are not some values
at stake that go beyond the direct interests of the customers, and of the sup-
pliers. The question, of course, is where to draw the line.
The issue of uneven expertise and agency
Economists have become very interested recently in how asymmetric infor-
mation, in particular differences in the information held by buyer and seller,
complicate the workings of markets. I propose that a number of the current
controversies about the efficacy of market organisation, about regulation
of markets, and about alternatives to market supply, are connected with
the asymmetric information problem. In particular, they are associated
with difficulties that the user of a service has in assessing the quality and
appropriateness of what is provided.
This problem clearly is fundamental in the arena of medical care. In view
of the physician’s expertise regarding diagnosis and prescription, and the
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obvious dependence of patients on the use of that expertise in their interests,
the medical community long has professed that while physicians sell their
services on the market they most emphatically do not try to maximise their
profits, but rather prescribe in the patients’ interests. The credibility of that
claim is open to question, but professional ethics clearly can have an influ-
ence on behaviour that tends to be neglected in standard models of market
governance. To further complicate matters, with the rise of insurance, third-
party payers found themselves in a position of doubting whether physicians
paid enough attention to costs, and worrying about whether physicians, in
fact, weren’t trying to maximise their own incomes. These multi-interest
potential conflicts, in a context where the expertise resides largely with the
physician, lies at the heart of several current controversies regarding how to
govern the medical care system.
The question of how parents can assess the quality of a child-care centre,
and the care their child actually is getting, is a fundamental one in the current
controversies regarding regulation of day care. The question of whether par-
ents, and children, can assess educational alternatives effectively, or whether
professional teachers and education administrators know best, is a non-trivial
one in the current discussion about vouchers. The question of whether for-
profit companies will manage prisons effectively and humanely, or whether
their interest in profits will lead them to behave in undesirable ways, is
central to the controversy about the contracting-out of prison services.
In some cases the issue here shows up in debates about necessary regula-
tion and the mechanisms for regulation enforcement. In other cases the
debate is about the proposition that, in circumstances where users cannot
make an effective judgement about what they are getting, market organisa-
tion, with providers having a strong interest in profits, is an inferior way to
govern an activity. There is a tacit, sometimes explicit, presumption that
provision by a government agency, or by a not-for-profit organisation, is a
better way to go under those circumstances. Of course, whether or not this
is so is an open question.
Tension between competition, and co-operation and co-ordination
Competition is an enormously energising force in many areas of human activ-
ity, but not necessarily in all. On the other hand, in some areas of activity
co-operation and co-ordination among the actors providing goods and serv-
ices are extremely important, and competition is undesirable or worse.
Market organisation of supply is well suited to fostering competition.
Indeed, there is not much to argue for for-profit unregulated organisation of
supply in contexts where competition is not desirable or is unlikely to be sus-
tained (as in the case of natural monopolies). The other side of the coin is
that, where considerable competition is desirable, there may be a strong case
for opting for market supply. Thus advocates of school vouchers also tend to
advocate letting for-profit schools compete for students. Much of the argu-
ment for the deregulation of public utilities, and for employing private
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contractors more widely to provide goods and services funded or mandated
under government programmes, has been associated with the advocacy of
greater competition.
Up to a point at least, market organisation of supply is not incompatible
with co-operation and co-ordination among the suppliers regarding certain
matters. Thus, in several manufacturing sectors where for-profit firms are the
principal suppliers, various co-operative ‘pre-competitive’ R&D arrange-
ments have been made. In many industries, firms that otherwise compete
have managed to agree to standards of various sorts. It might be noted, how-
ever, that government agencies or other government bodies with an interest
in or responsibility for the industries in question often have played a key role
in organising such co-operation.
In some sectors, like those providing telephone services, or those producing
and distributing electricity, the advantages of co-ordination among the differ-
ent parts of the overall system are very great. Under regimes of regulated
private supply, or government ownership of supply, where competition is sup-
pressed or constrained, co-ordination was easy to achieve. Under deregulation,
it clearly is a gamble whether rivalrous companies can be induced or forced to
co-operate and co-ordinate on vital matters, while remaining competitors.
Thus there may be a real tension between allowing local telephone companies
to set up competitive long-distance phone services, on the one hand, and
requiring them to grant local access to other long-distance services, on the
other. Getting managed health-care organisations to share patient information
when a customer shifts from one to another has not proved easy.
The question of how to make co-operation and co-ordination on certain
matters compatible with competition on others is a tricky one in market-
organised sectors. The need for co-operation and co-ordination, plus the
proposition that competition is not needed as part of the governing struc-
ture, or is positively harmful, is often used to argue that market organisation
and governance are not appropriate in a particular activity or sector.
The problem of potentially coercive power
American economists are inclined to rationalise the use of antitrust to pre-
vent undue market power from arising, and of regulation to deal with cases
where there is natural monopoly, on the grounds that monopolists tend to
charge too high a price. It is clear, however, that much of the force behind
the policies to break up or rein in monopolies, or regulate them closely, has
to do with people’s concerns that arise when private bodies gain consider-
able power over their lives, a matter which may involve but also may tran-
scend being forced to pay monopoly prices. Economists are inclined to
rationalise the fact that governments have responsibility for national secu-
rity and the criminal justice system to the fact that these activities yield ‘pub-
lic goods’. But it probably is at least as relevant that there is near-consensus
that it would be highly dangerous to place the power over these activities in
private hands.
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These propositions may strike some liberals in the Anglo-American tradi-
tion as shocking. The heart of that position has been that strong government
is the dominant danger to individual freedoms, and that placing activities
under market governance, therefore, serves to increase freedom. The tacit
assumptions here, of course, are: first, that concentrations of private power
will not in general arise under market governance; and, second, that when
they do they are less threatening than government power to individual free-
doms. However, I propose that, in many areas, that is just what the debate
regarding the appropriate roles of market and non-market elements in the
governance of an activity is all about.
Much of the current debate is proceeding in two distinct, if overlapping,
arenas. There is, first, the issue of how to govern what used to be called
public utilities – activities like the telephone service, electricity generation and
distribution, urban water supply, the railroads’ system and urban mass trans-
port. As noted, these used to be regarded as ‘natural monopolies’. In the United
States traditionally they were left in private hands but tightly regulated; in other
countries they often were governed as ‘public enterprises’. The widespread
move towards deregulation and privatisation represented a strong shift in
the direction of market governance of these activities. As I noted above, where
competition has emerged in these sectors, some non-trivial co-ordination
problems have developed as well. And where competition has not proved sus-
tainable, there are serious questions regarding how to control private power.
The other arena involves services for which the government still is respon-
sible and accountable, but which under the movement towards privatisation,
increasingly are provided through private contractors. Clearly it is appropri-
ate that the police system should procure uniforms and weapons through the
market. The question is whether it is appropriate for the management of
activities like prisons to be contracted out, and what kind of controls there
should be on private police forces.
Reprise
Many years ago, F. A. Hayek argued that economic systems are very com-
plex, that effective ones are the result of a time-consuming evolutionary
process that selected on institutions that worked, and that humans never
could fully comprehend or consciously design an effective economic system.
Hayek’s observations were meant to warn against trying to build a commu-
nist economic system from a theoretical design, and were a forecast that any
attempt to do so almost surely would fail. He proved to be correct.
Of course, the referent of Hayek’s proposition about the complexity of
economic systems was the capitalist system, as it had developed by the early
post-Second World War period. Thus, his comments would seem to be as
germane to trying to build a capitalist economic system from scratch as they
are to trying to build a communist one. And history seems to bear out that
proposition (see Hayek 1967, 1973).
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Almost all of the economies that used to profess communism, but recently
have attempted to reform towards market capitalism, continue to struggle,
and some (Russia, for example) are doing very badly. The original prescrip-
tion given to them for developing an effective form of market capitalism
was a relatively simple one: establish a body of law that respects private
property and enables transactions to proceed smoothly; privatise the organ-
isations that produce goods and services, and encourage these new firms to
seek out markets and try to make money; establish a financial system that
funds companies which have promising prospects for profit making and
keeps money out of the hands of others; keep government spending and
involvement in the economy more generally low; and adopt macroeconomic
policies that avoid inflation. There also was a reminder that government
needed to ensure the provision of basic public goods and infrastructure, and
to maintain some kind of a safety net for the unfortunate. However, estab-
lishing a regime of private firms and markets was assigned first priority. It
is apparent that this simple prescription has proved insufficient to guide
effective transformation.
Of course, it can be argued that the problem is not so much not knowing
what is needed, as not having the will to do what is needed. However, fol-
lowing Hayek’s logic, there are good reason to believe that, at their best, the
economists’ models of how capitalism works can provide only a very rough
guide to how to design and build. They can point in the right directions, but
getting it right inevitably requires a lot of trial, error, and try-again learning.
Good theories can help if they point broadly in the right directions, and
provide useful interpretations for what goes right and what goes wrong. But
theories can hinder efforts at reform when they point in the wrong direc-
tion, or provide misleading interpretations of the problems that arise in the
course of reform. By their nature, theories simplify and abstract. But over-
simplification, and abstraction that leaves out essential elements, can be a
real problem.
The burden of this essay has been that the standard theory of capitalist eco-
nomic organisation which today is used to guide policy is much too simpli-
fied. By missing the complexity, the variegation and the limits of markets,
and the wide variety of non-market mechanisms that mark modern capital-
ist economies, and enable them to work as well as they do, they often hinder
efforts at reform.
Of course, the focus of this essay has not been on building capitalism from
scratch, as has been the challenge in the old communist states, but rather on
dealing with the new challenges facing advanced and largely successful capi-
talist economies. A point implicit in the basic argument I have developed,
that I now want to make explicit, is this. Economic systems are always evolv-
ing. They always are facing new problems, challenges and opportunities,
some generated internally (as today’s new technologies), some coming from
external forces. Thus they always are in the process of trying to reform them-
selves. This reforming is never ending, but it tends to come in waves.
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Thus the period after the Second World War was one of dramatic reform
of capitalist systems, driven by a broadly accepted theory that raw capitalism
just was not working, economically or politically, and that there was a need
to build a truly mixed economy. A number of commentators argued that the
wave of reform overshot. We went through another wave of reform in the
1980s under the theory that a purer and simpler form of capitalism would
work much better. We may have overshot here too.
In any case, I think we need a better conceptualisation of what modern
capitalist economic organisation is and how it works than today is common
currency to guide our reforms in the early twenty-first century. A good part
of that understanding, I am arguing, involves an appreciation of the com-
plexities and limits of markets.
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Introduction
In this paper I develop a critique of certain approaches to markets and firm
behaviour in economics and economic sociology. There are two main targets
of the critique. The first concerns some common approaches to markets and
the nature of firms in relation to them. Here I argue that the diverse uses of the
term ‘market’ in contemporary lay and academic discourse cause confusion.
Also problematic in both mainstream and institutional economics is the
tendency to treat market exchange as the atomic structure of all economic
processes, and as the default form of economic co-ordination, so that any other
forms of organisation are either marginalised or treated as problematic excep-
tions. The second target of critique concerns literature on the socially embed-
ded character of economic processes, on the nature of networks, and the role
of trust. While largely endorsing the importance attached to these factors in
recent literature, I argue that their treatment has suffered frequently from
being idealist, both in the sense of underestimating material aspects of eco-
nomic life and in presenting an overly benign view which underestimates the
instrumentality of most economic relations. Finally, I conclude with a reminder
of the political significance of explanations of markets and competition.
The multiple meanings of ‘market’1
If we are to discuss market relations and competition, we need to be clear on
what the former involve. However, such is the variety of uses of the term
‘market’ that it is important to distinguish them if we are not to talk at
crossed purposes. As Maureen Mackintosh observes, these are rarely distin-
guished, so that people regularly slide unknowingly between quite different
uses of the term, sometimes within one sentence, while imagining that they
are talking about the same thing (Mackintosh, 1990; see also White, 1993).
These conceptual slides are a feature of both lay and academic–scientific
usages of the term, and are found in both liberal and radical economic
theory. In everyday usage the shifts are often innocuous. Polysemy is not nec-
essarily a problem, and the scope and subtleties of everyday usage are worth
2
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treating with respect. By comparison, attempts to analyse and codify the tacit
understandings involved are bound to seem lumbering and unsubtle. Never-
theless, the ideological influence of the discourse of markets in the shape of
‘neo-liberal fatalism’ is too important for the conceptual slides to be ignored.
While the variety of different uses of ‘market’ and ‘markets’ is confusing,
many of the uses have contexts in which they identify something significant.
The problems come when authors apply them outside those contexts, par-
ticularly where explanatory weight is transferred unknowingly from one
referent of ‘market’ to another. On occasion, the conceptual confusion can
have disastrous effects; Mackintosh found a World Bank report offering
diagnoses and prescriptions for poor countries to have ‘at least three differ-
ent meanings floating in the text’ (Mackintosh, 1990).2 I shall attempt to take
further her strategy of distinguishing different senses.
A ‘core definition’
One of the few theorists to problematise the definition of markets is Geof-
frey Hodgson (1988). For him, a market is ‘a set of social institutions in
which a large number of commodity exchanges of a specific type regularly
take place, and to some extent are facilitated by those institutions’ (p. 174).
A market therefore includes not only commodity exchanges themselves and
the associated transfers of money and property rights, but the practices and
setting which enable such exchanges to be made in a regular and organised
fashion. One might add that markets are also normally competitive to some
degree. I take this as a core definition of a market, while noting that other
uses may have some validity.
The institutionalisation of commodity exchanges, referred to by Hodgson,
emphasises that markets are not spontaneous products of exchange activity
but are socially constructed – and as Abolafia (1996) adds, constructed by
skilled and specialised actors. Hodgson further distinguishes market
exchanges from exchanges of commodities made outside markets through
some other sphere of activity – or non-market exchanges (1988, p. 177). An
example of the latter would be occasional commodity exchanges between
firms linked together by complementary asset specificities that have devel-
oped over long periods. Such exchanges are a significant feature of market
economies, though highly elastic concepts of markets allow the difference
between them and market exchanges to pass unnoticed.3
Inclusiveness
Concepts of ‘the market’ differ in their degree of inclusiveness. Markets may
be defined narrowly in terms of routinised buying and selling under com-
petitive conditions, or inclusively to embrace not only exchange but the pro-
duction and consumption of the exchanged goods, and the particular
property relations that hold therein. Accordingly, for a fruit and vegetable
market we could adopt a restricted focus, ignoring what buyers and sellers
do outside of the moment of exchange, or we could take a more inclusive
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view, examining how the sellers get their produce, how the supply chain is
organised, even going back into production, and on the other side, how cus-
tomers are differentiated into individual and institutional buyers and how
their purchasing behaviour is related to things like income and ability to save.
Many abstract discussions of ‘the market’ slide between restricted and
inclusive versions (Hodgson, 1999, p. 177). The basis for the powers or
forms of behaviour commonly attributed to markets are consequently often
ambiguous: is it markets in the restricted sense that give rise to the effects of
interest, or markets when mediating between particular kinds of producers,
with certain kinds of property relations, and particular kinds of consumers?
Since markets can co-exist with different property relations and systems of
production, we cannot expect to read off an inclusive account from a
restricted focus. This is of critical importance in political economy for under-
standing and evaluating market economies, and for identifying the sources of
competitiveness. Restricted accounts of markets exclude major contextual
influences which explain behaviour. On the other hand, a more inclusive
view which takes in those influences is going beyond exchange into produc-
tion and consumption. Thus price competition in buying and selling, identi-
fiable in the restricted view, differs from competition through product and
process innovation, identifiable in the inclusive view. (These correspond to
‘weak’ and ‘strong’ competition, respectively, to use Storper and Walker’s
1989 distinction.) The dynamism of capitalist economies is not a conse-
quence simply of markets in the restricted sense, but of capital, obliged to
accumulate in order to survive, and liberated from the ties which bind petty
commodity producers. Hence this slide from a restricted to an inclusive sense
of ‘market’ also enables the term ‘market economy’ to serve as a euphemism
for capitalism.
Marshallian demand–supply diagrams provide restricted views of markets,
marginalising the social relations of production and the processes of pro-
duction and consumption on which demand and supply depend. As Maurice
Dobb pointed out in 1937, this treats production and consumption as the
creature of price rather than vice versa. Moreover, the static equilibrium
approach, with its conflation of ex-ante and ex-post quantities, treats markets
as closed systems. Instead of tracing the aetiology of actual markets in an
inclusive sense, taking into account the semi-autonomous evolutionary
dynamics of production and consumption, this approach attributes change
either to an exogenous black box (technologies and preferences) or to the
endogenous variable of price signals.
Production and market ‘optics’
The problems regarding inclusiveness are frequently combined with those of
broader conceptual frameworks. In practice, decisions about what is included
are largely determined on the Left by a ‘production optic’, in which production
and capital are generally treated as prior to exchange, thereby marginalising
markets, and on the Right by a ‘market optic’ which swallows up production
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in exchange. In the market optic of mainstream economics, the whole economy
becomes ‘the market’ in the singular, or ‘market system’.4 Moreover, this
positive prioritising of markets is coupled with and frequently slides into a
normative preference for markets as a form of economic organisation.
Economies are about the provisioning of societies, and hence are necessarily
about production. While they necessarily involve production as a transhistori-
cal feature, they only contingently involve market exchange as a specific mode
of co-ordination of divisions of labour. Arguably markets in the restricted sense
may be good at stimulating production, but certainly they produce nothing
themselves. The illusion that they can is further present in the assertion that
firms can either make things or get them from the market (the ‘make or buy’
decision). While this is true, in fact the existence of a market for inputs is, of
course, dependent on the existence of other producers making those inputs.
Markets are not an alternative to production or to firms or ‘hierarachies’ but a
mode of co-ordination of the division of labour. Enterprises or hierarchies are
usually involved not only in co-ordination but in production; they are there-
fore not merely an alternative mode of co-ordination, as is often assumed.
Production and exchange are therefore not alternatives such that more of
one means less of the other: a vertically disintegrated form of industrial
organisation involves no less production than a vertically integrated one,
even though it involves more market co-ordination. Nor should markets and
firms be seen simply as alternative forms of economic organisation where
one can be substituted for another. In fact, they are generally mutually
dependent in their development: a developed market economy requires
large-scale commodity production, and firms themselves are leading con-
structors of markets (and of non-market exchange)5 (Auerbach, 1988). Mar-
ket and authoritative co-ordination therefore develop together and it is their
combination which is the important thing to explain (Hodgson, 1999).
However, numerous theorists adopt a market optic in which firms repre-
sent a problem to be explained whereas markets are a natural phenomenon.
While Coase’s much celebrated question regarding why firms exist identifies
a difficulty for those within the market optic, it is itself also thoroughly
trapped within it. For Coase and followers, the firm is defined negatively in
relation to the market, being distinguished and defined by the absence of
the price mechanism, where the latter’s absence becomes a problem to be
explained. The popularity of negative definitions of firms reveals the
strength of normative and positive presumptions in favour of market co-
ordination, a presumption which of course is also implicitly against state
or collective control. There is also something else that is strange about
emphasising negative definitions of firms: it is rather like saying that the dif-
ference between cooking and eating is that cooking is defined by the absence
of eating, and to understand cooking it is that absence which we must
explain. True, the negative definition is accompanied by a positive one: firms
co-ordinate by means of authority rather than the price mechanism. But this
is not all that most firms do: what is distinctive is that, like cooks, they are
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co-ordinating production rather than exchange. And of course, without
production for exchange, there would be little need for markets.
Indeed it is the fact of being involved in production that makes firms
require non-market co-ordination; insofar as production is always of specific
commodities – whether goods or services – whose use-value properties
require specific inputs and production processes, where that specificity is in
use-value, or engineering terms; for example, involving getting the ingredi-
ents of the cake right and the temperatures used in production right. Thus
even though the goal of capitalist production is exchange-value, the firm’s
co-ordination and planning have to take strict account of use-value con-
straints. Whatever the prices of the inputs, the good to be sold cannot be
successfully made unless those ratios and processes are correct. Of course,
producers of commodities have to be responsive to the exchange-value of
their inputs and outputs, and the sufficient conditions of successful business
are set in exchange-value terms, but for producers of goods and services the
means to those ends have to satisfy use-value constraints.
The market optic has not only a presumption in favour of market co-ordi-
nation but also a market individualist presumption. The fact that production
is not generally carried out by individual producers, but by producers acting
in concert, therefore becomes an awkward one. (Coase reflected on both
possibilities.) But provisioning requires production, and as social beings we
quite naturally co-operate in production; while examples of primitive com-
munism have been widely recorded, instances of primitive individualism
have not, for of course the latter would be too precarious to be sustainable.
It is entirely unsurprising that, throughout history, humans, as social animals,
have co-operated in their productive activities. It is also entirely unsurprising
that given the specific historical origins of capitalism in competition in early
markets and expropriation of land there arose a class of people unable to
produce for themselves and hence obliged to produce under the direction of
others. The existence of firms is not a puzzle. What would be deeply puzzling
would be precisely a market economy of individual commodity producers
instead of firms.
(It could be objected that it is naive to take the idea of markets producing
things as anything more than a shorthand: no one seriously imagines that
exchanging things actually produces anything and it is obviously the whole
‘market system’ that is meant here, including producers – or rather, ‘hierar-
chies’. However, the concept of ‘the market’ or ‘the market system’ here is
not merely an inclusive one which already encompasses production, for as
we have seen the market optic barely acknowledges production, reducing it
to ‘supply’ or ‘transactions’, and has difficulty conceptualising anything that
does not involve or approximate exchange. The shorthand would not be
suspect if liberal economists took production seriously and if the belief that
exchange, or change in ownership, actually created anything new were
not so common in actual economic behaviour. The illusion is particularly
strong in the more liberalised capitalist economies, where it is evident in the
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pursuit and celebration of takeovers. In such cases we have markets without
production – the buying and selling of existing commodities or property,
including companies, without adding anything to the existing stock of goods
and services. Treating this as equivalent to productive activity is a disastrous
error, though it might facilitate – or inhibit – subsequent production, and
might affect efficiency. The confusion is echoed further in the Thatcherite
practice of encouraging share ownership – i.e. rentiers – as a way of encour-
aging entrepreneurship: whereas entrepreneurs are celebrated precisely for
producing something which didn’t already exist, rentiers can earn an income
without producing anything. There are important arguments about the
benefits of market exchange in terms of their effect on production and the
efficient allocation of resources, but it remains the case that exchange itself
produces nothing. There is a curious fetishisation of the power of markets
here, which attributes to a mode of co-ordination a power which is actually
dependent on another sphere of the economy. It is the liberal celebrants of
‘the market’ who are fooled by their own shorthand.)
Further grounds for concern over the difference between inclusive and
restricted analyses of markets relate to the ideological uses which can be
made by slides between the two or attempts to pass off one as the other. For
liberal economics, the market optic and the use of a restricted analysis of
markets as if it were actually an inclusive analysis marginalise social relations
and present capitalism in neutral guise, merely as a market economy, as if it
were not significantly different from non-capitalist market economies of
petty commodity production. In Marxism, matters are reversed, with the
behaviour of market forces under capitalism being taken as condemning
markets operating outside capitalism.
In the Marxist account, commodities are merely ‘thrown’ on the market,
and the role of exchange is limited to realising the value of commodities and
completing the circuit of capital. Allocational effects are of no interest. By
contrast, the market optic focuses on the allocational effects, and either ignores
production and its social relations or conceives of them as a sphere of transac-
tions or exchanges; or else it reduces production to ‘supply’ (which fails to
distinguish between produced goods and unproduced goods such as land).
The market as ether: imaginary and latent markets
Concepts of imaginary, latent or implicit markets figure prominently in
mainstream economics. It should be noted that these are not the same as
abstract (i.e. one-sided, selective) concepts of real markets (in which com-
modities and property rights are traded) for whereas the latter already exist,
imaginary markets are only a possibility. Hodgson (1988, p. 81) notes how
Arrow and Debreu assume ‘that a market exists for the exchange of every
possible commodity on every possible date in every possible state of nature’.
This is an extraordinary usage, for it means almost the opposite of what it
says: namely that such a market hardly exists and can only be imagined.
What this concept of market seems to involve is a representation of
46 Andrew Sayer
economies as consisting of a vast array of opportunity costs, where the goods
whose use or non-use have those opportunity costs could be exchanged for
money in markets. In this kind of view the market ‘is seen as an ether in
which individual and subjective preferences relate to each other, leading to
the physical exchange of goods and services’ (Hodgson, 1988, pp. 177–8).
The ether is the latent or imaginary market, and again actual markets are seen
as their natural consequence, unless somehow blocked.
Once everything is seen as having a price, notional or real, then it is tempt-
ing to look upon the range of resources and projects in society as one big
market. A loaf of bread, a picture, a house, a field, a letter, a haircut, a motor-
way, a worker, a conversation – all these things and countless others might
be thought of as having a price which someone might possibly be prepared
to pay for them, though even under capitalism, some of them may never be
offered for sale. In some economies few or no goods are exchanged in real
markets at all, and, as many have pointed out, including Marx, it is absurdly
ahistorical (and often ethnocentric) to project the concept of ‘the market’
onto non-market economies, and therefore quite accurate to term that kind
of economics ‘bourgeois’.6
However, while Marxism’s critique of this way of thinking is still powerful,
it does not excuse its failure to note that, even if there are no real markets,
there is an array of opportunity costs regarding the use of resources, includ-
ing labour power. That there are always opportunity costs is a non-trivial
transhistorical fact about all economies. In simple economies, and in many
situations in advanced economies, opportunity costs are transparent enough
to be estimated and be evaluated in real terms (i.e. in terms of use-values
through practical judgement; see O’Neill, 1994), without the aid of money
and prices. The notion of an economy as an array of opportunity costs is a use-
ful one, but since the existence of such an array is only contingently related to
real markets, it is both absurd and tendentious to refer to it as ‘the market’.
Real markets are just one form in which those opportunity costs sometimes
get reflected.
We could say that the notion of the market as ether refers to ‘implicit mar-
kets’, but this still tendentiously suggests that real markets are the normal form
of economic organisation, and, if absent, are held back by pre-modern con-
ventions and practices, ill-defined property rights and state restrictions, and are
just waiting to be ‘freed’, whereupon economic benefits are supposed to fol-
low. In this way, the conceptual slide from imaginary to actual markets is
closely associated with negative judgements of non-market production and
modes of co-ordination as causes of economic backwardness, and it has the
effect of legitimising policies for the development of actual markets. Thus com-
modity production is assumed by the World Bank to be superior to subsistence
production and state regulation, despite the plentiful evidence that marketisa-
tion in developing countries offers no guarantees of development (Sen, 1987;
Mackintosh, 1990). In liberal economics, ‘the market’ is privileged both nor-
matively as the best form of economic organisation and positively as the key to
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how actual economies work, indeed the image of the former colours its vision
of the latter. Economies which lack markets or have only a few are judged neg-
atively, not only because they lack mechanisms which allegedly bring benefits,
but because they do not fit with mainstream economics’ market optic. Further,
‘the market’ or ‘markets’ are given powers and authority of their own and
treated as if they were unitary actors. In a sense markets do condense all the
demands and offers made, not only in a single market but in others in which
the same and other actors participate, and across which resources are allocated.
Yet, as noted earlier, market prices are not merely neutral reflections of demand
and supply but reflect the balances of power in many arenas. ‘You cannot buck
the market’, a slogan beloved of Margaret Thatcher, was another way of say-
ing that ‘might is right’, regardless of how the might is distributed.
The ideological notion of latent or implicit markets which only need free-
ing figures strongly in neo-liberal rhetoric, and contrasts strikingly with the
view, associated with Polanyi and others, that markets are social constructions
whose birth is difficult and requires considerable regulation and involvement
by the state and other institutions to achieve (Polanyi, 1944; Marquand,
1988). The experience of the post-communist countries weighs heavily in
support of Polanyi. The liberal underestimation or denial of this institutional
support is partly derived from the elision of the difference between the poten-
tial or imaginary and the actual in its concept of ‘the market’.
Through its fetishisation of markets, the market optic attributes to markets
in the root sense powers which are contingently rather than necessarily asso-
ciated with them, such as responsibility for competitiveness. While markets
do indeed provide incentives and sanctions which encourage competitive
behaviour, whether the latter occurs depends on other features, such as tech-
nological possibilities, spatial monopolies and organisational learning and
strategy, which take us into the spheres of production and use/consumption.
Economic discourse – including radical political economy – is plagued by
elisions among these different concepts of market. Uses of ‘the market’ in the
singular are particularly slippery, referring either to a specific real market, or
to the whole system of such markets throughout the economy, or sometimes
to the allegedly latent ‘market’ discussed above. The second of these three
uses – the system of real markets – has some logic in that markets are inter-
dependent, such that changes in a particular market (for example, the oil
market or the mortgage market) have effects – ‘market forces’ – which ripple
through entire economies, indeed round the world. This notion of ‘the
market’ in the singular, as a pervasive system of particular interlinked markets,
fits better with the perspective of the final consumer, having money and able
to spend it on anything, than the seller who is stuck in a particular market with
the particular commodities he or she has to sell (Offe and Heinze, 1992). The
holder of money can roam across many markets, as if they were one big mar-
ket;7 indeed many retail markets have coalesced to such an extent that they
offer thousands of products in a single location and institutional setting. Once
again, while the many meanings of ‘market’ can cause considerable confusion,
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there are often contexts in which particular uses contain a valuable insight. In
developing a critique of the discourse of markets we have to recognise these
insights as well as attack the conceptual elisions.8
Embeddedness, trust, networks and markets
‘Embeddedness’, ‘trust’ and ‘networks’ are perhaps the most distinctive
terms in the new economic sociology. They identify dimensions of economic
organisation which most economists have chosen to ignore. Insofar as these
dimensions are necessary conditions for economic activity rather than
merely contingent associations, abstracting from them is likely to mislead.
Moreover, the argument is not only that these dimensions are universal
features of economic activity, but that in their more highly developed forms
they can benefit economic performance, and that, conversely, where they are
limited, performance suffers. This, as Ronald Dore argued in 1983, posed a
fundamental challenge to the liberal individualist view of capitalism, which
regarded the narrow pursuit of individual self-interest as sufficient for suc-
cess and embeddedness and networks as frictions, or ‘conspiracies against the
public’. Dore (1983) argued that the success of Japanese capitalism, with its
strongly embedded economic relations, involving long-term commitments
among firms and between large firms and their key workers, demonstrated
that the liberal model of capitalism was faulty. There was not one capitalism
but several kinds, none of which was to be regarded as the norm, and the
more embedded and regulated Rhenish and Japanese capitalisms were look-
ing stronger than the Anglo-American neo-liberal versions. This, of course,
has been music to the ears of social democrats. Now, however, since the
bursting of Japan’s bubble economy in the early 1990s, the alternative model
is under threat from more liberalised economic pressures and may yet give
way to the liberal model.
My argument is that while embeddedness, networks and trust are indeed
important aspects of economic organisation, theorising about them has
tended to idealise them somewhat. The focus on embeddedness can inadver-
tently produce an overly benign view of economic relations and processes, in
showing that practices hitherto seen as governed purely by narrow self-inter-
est, or ‘the icy waters of egotistical calculation’ as Marx put it, are actually
embedded in relations of trust, in which there are shared norms and various
forms of reciprocity. While this is true, Marx and the other theorists of self-
interest, economic power and impersonal system mechanisms were not
wrong either. Such embedding is often strongly adapted to the system pres-
sures of market forces, and indeed may be cultivated to enhance the pursuit
of self-interest. As authors such as Massey et al. (1996) and  McDowell
(1997) point out, the social embedding of economic activity often involves
relations of domination, some of them based on gender, class or race. The
metaphor of embeddedness sounds soft and comforting, and possibly sends
our critical faculties to sleep, but what it describes can, on occasion, be harsh
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and oppressive. Further, at the same time as it highlights apparently softer
versions of capitalism, it has little or nothing to say about issues of distribu-
tion and inequality, and the literature on embeddedness and networks often
amounts to merely a sophisticated form of boosterism.
The comforting view of embedding is reinforced by the enthusiasm of
cultural political economy for networks. As Ash Amin and Jerzy Hausner
(1997, p. 13) note:
There is a creeping tendency in the socio-economics literature to privilege the
qualities of networks over those of markets and hierarchies. Relations within and
across networks are seen to be somehow more reciprocal and more egalitarian,
because they rely on interaction. Nothing could be further from the truth. Not
all networks are non-hierarchical, mutually beneficial or discursive . . . .9
Further, it is not only that strongly embedded economic systems are not
necessarily benign, but that they may also prove to be less robust than is com-
monly supposed. The embedded character of economies refers to their
incorporation into the subjective and informal relations of the lifeworld. But
modern economies have also developed ‘systems’, in Habermas’s sense – par-
ticularly markets and bureaucracies – which have mechanisms that go
beyond those of the lifeworld and that produce unintended effects which
operate ‘behind actors backs’ (Habermas, 1987). A strongly embedded capi-
talist economy may involve more negotiation and collaboration than a min-
imally embedded one, but the former is not immune to market forces. When
a system crisis strikes – like that experienced recently in East Asia – the local
forms of embedding may provide some resistance, but they also form some
of the conduits along which market pressures – such as those that follow
from a collapse of the currency – flow. Sometimes the pressures can sweep
the networks away.
Furthermore, stable forms of embedding, including networks and regula-
tions, are not necessarily the product of a free consensus. They may represent
an uneasy compromise between interests which would interact differently,
given the chance. Consequently, agents such as companies may sometimes use
a crisis as an opportunity to escape onerous conventions and commitments –
most typically with reference to organised labour – which arose in the context
of the balance of power obtaining in more prosperous times. In other words,
we need to remember the dialectic of regime of accumulation and mode of
regulation, or forces and relations of production. As may turn out to be the
case in Japan or Europe, forms of embedding of economic relations which
hitherto worked successfully may not survive severe system crises.
Thus networks do not necessarily fuse the self-interest of different actors
into a harmonious and egalitarian whole but may be characterised by
inequalities of power, strategic coalitions, dissembling and opportunistic col-
laboration. However good the networking, however strong the reliance on
information and trust, economic survival for capitalist firms depends on
costs and cash, though extraordinarily this literature says remarkably little
about these factors: the bottom line remains the bottom line.
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We can amplify these points in relation to trust. Recent social and political
economic theory has been very taken with the role of trust in economic rela-
tions, often in reaction against neo-liberal exaggerations of the sufficiency of
self-interest and contract in producing successful economic performance (for
example, Fox, 1974; Luhmann, 1979; Baier, 1994; Fukuyama, 1995; Misz-
tal, 1996; Sztompa, 1999). While mainstream economic theory’s emphasis
on self-interest has led it to ignore or overlook the role of trust in economic
relationships, the significance of trust can also be overestimated, especially
where markets and competitive economic behaviour are concerned.
Trust differs from mere confidence or expectations of consistency in that it
involves social relations and has a moral dimension.10 Trust is relational: it is
always dependent on trustworthiness, and the latter involves a sense of moral
obligation. In most of the literature trustworthiness is mentioned only rarely
or in passing, as if trust were dependent only on a unilateral act of will by peo-
ple in the role of trustors. But the relational character of trust is one of the fea-
tures which distinguishes it from mere confidence or expectation. I expect my
computer to continue working, but it does do so not because it knows it ought
to behave properly – it is simply reliable. However, I trust the service engineer
to make every effort to repair it not only because s/he is competent to do so
but because s/he has a sense of obligation towards me as a customer, or at least
as a person, who, other things being equal, should be treated properly. It
would only be a slight exaggeration to say that trust is the dependent variable,
and trustworthiness or probity the independent variable. Hence the over-
whelming emphasis on the former rather than the latter is peculiar, especially
as trust relations can be initiated by the trustee (‘trust me’).11
Exaggerating the importance of trust produces analyses which are idealist in
both senses of the term – i.e. attributing to ideas powers which often have more
to do with material circumstances, and exaggerating the role of moral influ-
ences on economic behaviour relative to power and interest. Here we note two
cautions – derived from Durkheim and Marx – against idealist accounts.
While Durkheim famously demonstrated the moral presuppositions of
contractual relationships, he rightly treated these as conditions or material
causes rather than as efficient causes; and he acknowledged that contractual
relationships arise because the parties to them need each other (1933, p.
160). Co-operation occurs among firms in similar or related lines of business
not simply because they trust one another but because they recognise that it
is sometimes in their self-interest to do so. For example, among competing
suppliers, there may be times when orders outstrip the capabilities of any sin-
gle supplier and so the suppliers must either co-operate and share the order
or risk losing out altogether. At another time, those same firms may compete
directly for the same business. A certain amount of competition for business
among such firms is tolerated, provided it is not deemed to be unfair. Espe-
cially among small businesses, there may be more or less tacit agreement to
take turns in getting contracts (see Whitaker, 1994, for analyses of examples
of such behaviour in Japanese industrial districts).
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The more firms need each other the more they are likely to develop trust
relations beyond a base level of generalised probity to a level where they put
considerable trust in each other. Though ‘high trust relations’ may result,
they have an instrumental rationale. They also have a material basis as they
do not arise independently of series of acts and investments that tie the for-
tunes of the parties together through complementary asset specificities and
mutual lock-in. Such long-term relations between firms may even include, at
least on a small scale, elements of gift relationships, insofar as each party
takes its turn to invest time and money in the relationship. However, such
practices are always instrumental – directed to economic goals rather than to
the relationship itself – and subject to the discipline of the bottom line. The
threat of exit may even be used to develop a long-term relationship.
It is therefore probably an exaggeration to argue, as Granovetter (1998)
does, that members of industrial groups see themselves as belonging to a
particular moral community; rather, they recognise the overlaps in their
self-interest, reinforced as they usually are by various forms of interlocking
shareholding and directorships.12 Even where industrial groups originate
from kinship networks, as many do, these are likely to be characterised by
power asymmetries as well as by a sense of moral obligation.
Marx’s comments on trust and economic behaviour in market economies (in
the Notes on James Mill’s Elements of Political Economy) are generally com-
patible with these remarks, though he does make the typically caustic comment
that ‘the basis of trust in economics is mistrust’ (Marx, 1975, p. 265).
This is provocative of course, but not so different from the tendency to
assume universal malfeasance on the part of actors in some of the more
Hobbesian contemporary mainstream economic literature, except that Marx
saw mistrust as context-dependent and historically specific rather than a
transhistorical feature of the human condition. What Marx had in mind here
in particular were credit relations. In simple market exchange involving
straightforward one-off transactions, obligations among people are settled
the instant the transaction is done, and it is the value of the money (and the
goods) rather than the people that has to be trusted to last into the future.
While market actors have the option of exit according to their self-interest,
in non-market economies reciprocity is the norm and individuals have to
trust one another and/or find ways of making the recalcitrant reciprocate.
Reciprocity and gift relations are extended in time: as the alternating obliga-
tions between actors stretch into the future, so they have to trust one another
to act responsibly in the future. (This implies that trust is backed up by
implied resort to sanctions in the event of malfeasance.) Of course, not all
commodity exchanges in capitalism are simple. Since credit relations extend
over time, collateral or the assurances of others with appropriate capital are
needed. When we trust someone, by definition we do not have to calculate
the risks of them defaulting; but where credit relations are concerned, such
calculations are standard and a condition of credit being extended. The
debtor is mistrusted unless she has money or collateral. For example, legal
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requirements regarding banks’ cash reserves are based on mistrust, but are
intended to ensure the trustworthiness of the banking system.
Combining the insights of Durkheim and Marx, we need to avoid the
extremes of both assuming a universal propensity for malfeasance, and of
underestimating the extent to which trust (and trustworthiness) is limited by
self-interest and opportunism. Aside from trust, dissembling and wheeling
and dealing are common in both markets and networks; within certain limits,
they are expected and excused. In a market situation, trust, by definition, does
not extend to trusting customers or suppliers never to use the option of exit.
It is generally understood that any mutual commitments are always condi-
tional upon an ability to maintain quality, profitability and competitiveness.
In view of the general recognition of the need to economise and remain prof-
itable, a certain level of dissembling is expected and excused (for example,
buyer A dissembles to keep the goodwill of supplier B while secretly negoti-
ating to buy from C instead). Networks, too, allow for exit, and need be
underpinned by no assumptions of loyalty beyond what self-interest requires.
Further, what appears to indicate trust and trustworthiness may in fact be
largely a consequence of domination or lack of alternatives, or simple mutual
dependence. As Annette Baier (199413) points out, trust can be part of rela-
tions of domination instead of relations among equals, for the dominant trust
the subaltern to behave as their status befits them. This is a common situa-
tion in both inter-firm and employment relations. Similarly, where certain
economic relations are concentrated within particular ethnic groups, that
may itself be a product of domination within the group or within-group asset
specificities rather than simply trust (Sanghera, 1998).
Trust or lack of trust may sometimes be mistakenly invoked to explain
situations which have more to do with material circumstances. As philoso-
phers note, ought implies can. Someone may fail to engage in an economic
relationship not because they lack trust or are themselves untrustworthy, but
because they lack the material resources to do so. Thus, lack of success
in developing markets, as is being experienced in some post-communist
countries, may have less to do with lack of trust than a lack of material
preconditions for the development of firms and markets.14
Idealist accounts of trust in economic life need also to be tempered by ref-
erence to the way in which high-trust and low-trust relations have different
institutional supports. Long-term high-trust relationships tend to be associ-
ated not merely with certain cultural traditions such as forms of kinship rela-
tions (pace Granovetter, 1998, for example), but are backed up with
institutional, legal and financial circumstances that influence the timescale
over which rates of profit matter and the degree to which firms are exposed
to short-term pressures, and the scope for voice relative to exit. Moreover,
while culture influences economic behaviour, it is itself subject to economic
influences, and of course not just any cultural influences can survive in a cap-
italist context. For example, while Japanese ‘company familism’ corresponds
to certain traditional cultural forms favouring ‘groupism’, many observers
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argue that it was cultivated instrumentally as a way of controlling labour in
the 1950s onwards, following earlier industrial unrest and high rates of
labour turnover (Ichiyo, 1984; Cusumano, 1985; Eccleston, 1989). More-
over, the vertically-disintegrated keiretsu groups owe their success in large
part to their ability to take advantage of the wage gradient between large and
small firms, thereby lowering costs below those of their more vertically inte-
grated foreign competitors, and to the way in which they allow large firms
to dominate suppliers without being tied to them by ownership (Williams et
al., 1994). Again, this is not to deny cultural differences and their influence
over economic behaviour, but rather to argue that, equally, they are not
themselves immune to capitalist instrumental influences.
Conclusion
‘Disciplinary imperialism’ drives sociologists to emphasise culture, embed-
ding, trust and voice at the expense of choice, self-interest and exit, and it
drives economists to do the opposite. To do justice to the range of influences
present in economic life we need to refuse the temptations of disciplinary
imperialism and to adopt instead a post-disciplinary standpoint where expla-
nations are evaluated on their own merits, not according to whether they
advance the ambitions and preoccupations of one’s favoured discipline
(Sayer, 2000).
Although the foregoing critique is very much an academic one in its con-
cern for the adequacy of explanations, it is certainly not without social and
political significance. The market optic and its positive and normative pre-
sumption in favour of markets both mystifies and promotes unfettered capi-
talist dynamics and social relations. These issues are especially significant
given the prevalence of neo-liberal dogmatism and fatalism, which are driv-
ing a particular model of economic development liable to increase insecurity
by strengthening disembedding effects, while passing it off as the only work-
able model. At the same time, while recent literature in economic sociology
and institutional and evolutionary economics has noted how more strongly
embedded and regulated forms of capitalism moderate those effects, we must
avoid an overly benign view of embedding which allows us to overlook the
persistence of forces creating inequality and insecurity.
Notes
1 This section (pp. 41–9) is a development of earlier work (chapter 4 of Sayer, 1995)
which comes to conclusions similar to those of Boyer’s 1997 essay on markets. See
also the 1997 collection edited by Carrier.
2 These are: ‘the market’, denoting exchange of goods and services, including labour
power, for-profit and private ownership; secondly, abstract models of markets
constructed by economists; and, thirdly, different ways of buying or selling, i.e. the
concrete or real markets studied mostly by anthropologists and geographers.
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3 Since in practice there is usually a possibility of the buyer choosing to exit and ‘go
to the market’, there is a continuum between non-market, or non-competitive,
exchanges and market exchanges.
4 Thus even Teece and Pisano, who are critical of neo-classical economics’ silence
on firms, write: ‘While the price system supposedly co-ordinates the economy,
managers co-ordinate or integrate inside the firm’ (1998, p. 198), which implies
that the economy is just the market, and firms are somehow outside the economy!
This is not to deny that some parts of their essay do indeed escape from the mar-
ket optic, but their deference to Coase prevents the escape from being complete.
5 To be sure, when they do construct them, by persuading others to buy their prod-
ucts and setting up the means of regularised exchange for them to do so, they cre-
ate something which goes beyond their control. This is, first, because other firms
also help to construct them, usually in competition and hence often in ways which
challenge the original firm’s interests, and, second, since the new market becomes
linked to others between which money can be switched and substitutions of prod-
ucts made. The market is not necessarily already ‘out there’.
6 The exchange model of social action is also congenial to those who want to make
individual ‘choice’ the organising principle of economic behaviour, rather than
production or social organisation. For example, J. Buchanan defines the market
as an institutional process ‘within which individuals interact, one with another, in
pursuit of their separate individual objectives, whatever these may be’ (cited in
Brown and Harrison, 1978, p. 87). Insofar as this need not involve the exchange
of money for commodities and the exchange of property rights, the ‘market’ here
is imaginary and metaphorical.
7 However, buyers employed by firms generally have far more constraints on what
they buy, being limited by the use-value requirements of their firm’s line of business.
8 These senses of ‘market’ do not exhaust the range of uses. Others include ‘the
market’ as referring to actual and potential demand for a particular product, as
in ‘the market for mobile phones is vast’. Another is the restriction of the term
‘the market(s)’ to refer specifically to certain capital markets and markets in other
financial products, rather than just any market.
9 See Amin and Thrift (1995) for further reflections on the political implications of
networks.
10 As Maclagan points out, while trust may appear to be related primarily to moral
behaviour rather than competence, sometimes lack of competence may be seen as
morally reprehensible (Maclagan, 1998, p. 57).
11 It is an exaggeration to the extent that it overlooks the fact that the act of placing
trust in others encourages the behaviour on which it depends, and vice versa. Mis-
trusting others who in fact are trustworthy is insulting – a refusal to recognise
their integrity and potential. It can therefore be argued that from a moral point
of view, we have a responsibility not only to be trustworthy, but to respect oth-
ers’ moral qualities by trusting them (Fox, 1974).
12 Granovetter (1998) draws a parallel between industrial groups and the concept
of ‘moral economy’, but the former are primarily about interlocked self-interest,
not obligations according to what is morally right or wrong. All economies are in
some respects moral economies, but this is not one of those respects.
13 As Baier also points out, while the term ‘trust’ connotes goodness and reciproc-
ity, in practice it is possible for trust to be placed in individuals and institutions
which do not deserve it (Baier, 1994). Also, production in a sector may become
Markets, embeddedness and trust 55
more efficient when it moves from a position of rough equality among producers
to one of domination of the many by the few through the organisation of supply
chains. The replacement of trust by domination may improve rather than damage
economic performance.
14 I am grateful to Ivaylo Vassilev for contributing to discussions on this point. Iron-
ically, some of the most successful business people may be the least trustworthy
members of such societies, Also, insofar as trust is a problem, the post-communist
societies may be suffering less from a lack of trust in market situations, than from
a lack of trust in the state, for example in its ability to collect and use taxes
efficiently and without corruption (Rothstein, no date). Again it is the extent of
trustworthiness that creates the problem.
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Introduction
Whether as an explanation of decision making or as a guide to making
decisions, rational choice theory is not very interesting. What is called ‘a
decision’ is merely the logical precipitate of the premisses: everything that
might be regarded as a determinant of choice is already in place, and assumed
to be known (if only as a probability distribution) to the chooser. Within
choice theory agents make no decisions. Now this should not be a source of
complaint, for, paradoxical as it may seem, choice theory is not about deci-
sion making. Its purpose is to provide an essential element in constructing
theories of equilibrium, and equilibrium in economics is routinely defined as
a state of affairs in which there are no decisions to be made. In fact, analysis
often proceeds – notably in the Arrow–Debreu model – directly from basic
data to equilibrium allocations.
When choices are deduced, only the premisses matter; and so it is the expla-
nation of those determinants – and why they, and only they, are determinants
– that deserves attention. One might therefore have expected economists to
have shared Herbert Simon’s view (1976: xii) that the premisses should be the
unit of analysis; but even though it is standard practice to explain differences
in behaviour, including changes in behaviour over time, by differences in the
premisses from which behaviour is deduced – usually differences in opportu-
nity sets, and often with specific emphasis on incentive structures – these dif-
ferences are not themselves investigated. The reason is that decision premisses
are assumed to reflect precisely the fundamentals of economic analysis; they
are therefore innocuous. (There are a few exceptions, such as the theory of
speculative bubbles.) Consequently it is not accidental that few economists
pay specific attention to organisational forms, because in equilibrium models
any organisational structure must be transparent to the basic data; and it is
notable that orthodox and quasi-orthodox economists who have tried to
explain why firms, as organisations, exist have taken care to isolate their
explanations from the theory of production, which continues to be directly
based on the supposedly fundamental data of the economy. As Coase (1991,




a firm, running a business’. In a rational choice equilibrium, running a
business is a trivial activity: production functions are public knowledge, and
productive skills are incorporated in the specification of inputs.
Simon, however, believes that decision premisses are problematical and
yet capable of investigation by observation and experiment, and further-
more that organisational design is a significant influence on the premisses
that are used in various parts of an organisation. To understand organisa-
tional behaviour, therefore, it is not sufficient to postulate rationality in the
peculiarly restricted sense that is used in much economic theory (though it
is normally appropriate to postulate intelligent and purposive behaviour);
one needs to investigate the procedures by which occasions for decision are
identified, options are sought and examined, and choices made; and this
investigation should pay particular attention to the premisses which guide
these procedures.
In this chapter my primary concern is not the firm but the individual,
though there is a need to consider the activities of firms. But this brief excur-
sion into organisational design is not irrelevant, because in considering the
individual as decision maker particular attention has to be paid to the ways
in which individual knowledge is organised, and to the decision premisses
which shape both the development and use of that individual knowledge. In
accordance with the title, I give some emphasis to the influence of markets
on the growth and use of individual knowledge and also note how knowl-
edge within firms may benefit from market relationships. I begin by identi-
fying some basic elements of human cognition to provide a credible
psychological basis for economic reasoning.
Cognition and the growth of knowledge
The principle of biological evolution is genetic selection for features which
contribute to inclusive fitness. These features include both physical and
behavioural characteristics in a sorting process which necessarily extends over
very many generations. The standard biological model therefore assumes a
stable selection environment, and implies the possibility of extinction if there
is an unfavourable environmental change; we should not therefore be sur-
prised that only a very small proportion of the species which have appeared
on earth have survived, or that species are disappearing at a high rate in the
present era of environmental change, much of it the result, sometimes
intended and sometimes not, of human activity. Our own species is not
exempt from the possibility of extinction; but it does have a biological advan-
tage in our distinctive, though limited, capability to recognise significant
change and to develop new behaviours in response. This potential for learn-
ing may itself be interpreted as a biological adaptation to environments in
which change is too rapid or too transitory to allow adequate genetic response
through mutation and selection (Schlicht, 2000); it provides some real
options to cope with the unexpected.
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This capability is not well represented by the economic concept of ration-
ality, because its crucial feature is the cognitive potential to create new
localised structures of classification and premisses for decision making, which
in relation to the economic concept is pre-rational. The possibility of individ-
ual adaptation does not arise from the presence within the brain of a general
purpose programme for system-wide optimisation or a universal strategy set
in the game-theoretic sense of sequences of conditional actions that can be
applied to all situations – which seems to be the conception tacitly underlying
rational choice theory, especially when extended to rational expectations;
instead an architecture of the brain which is appropriate for distributed
programming allows sensory inputs to be assembled into distinctive patterns,
each of which triggers effective actions, in the process of interaction with
specific environments.
There are two linked evolutionary reasons for this architecture. The first
is that genetic evolution proceeds by successive adaptations, each step of
which has to be compatible with survival, and the step-by-step construction
of a general problem-solving programme would entail many stages in which
the use of the incomplete system would be likely to lead to disastrous mis-
takes. The second reason is that brain tissue has particularly high energy
requirements, and the emergence of homo sapiens has been marked by a very
substantial increase in brain size, and a consequent need to economise on
energy demands. We should not therefore be surprised that a potential for
multiple cognitive systems, each adapted to a limited function, and switched
on only when required, was the naturally selected pathway to improved cog-
nition, rather than a central processing system which would need to be per-
manently engaged. The division of labour is a fundamental principle of
development, in the brain as well as in society; and the evolved network
architecture of the brain made such a division possible.
These capabilities for adaptation were well advanced before the develop-
ment of consciousness; and consciousness appears to have emerged, as one
might expect, from this architecture and the functions that it supports. If the
unconscious brain collects impressions into categories, and associates each
category with a particular action, it is natural that consciousness should begin
with awareness of some of these categories, and in particular with a percep-
tion that one of the categories presently employed is inadequate or linked to
actions which are not effective. (The resemblance to the Carnegie language
of aspirations and achievements is not accidental.) The response to dissatis-
faction is then a search for better ways of ordering sensory impressions or for
better connections between impressions and actions. We consciously try to
make sense of our environment by imposing patterns upon it, seeking
to improve upon tacit skills by codification, or by giving conscious direction
to a process which remains beyond any detailed conscious control; and it is
one of the most remarkable features of modern formal economics that its
models of human behaviour make no reference to this characteristic activity
of pattern making, both conscious and unconscious – even though modern
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formal economics is itself an impressive example of the drive to impose
patterns. Consequently what is called ‘rationality’ within modern economics
is a rather small, if important, part of human cognition, and makes a limited,
if important, contribution to the explanation of human behaviour.
The two stages of development of human cognition which have just been
outlined were presented as an evolutionary hypothesis in an early paper writ-
ten by Alfred Marshall (1994) for a Cambridge discussion group. The signif-
icance of that paper for both the content and method of Marshall’s
subsequent work as an economist was identified by Tiziano Raffaelli (1994);
and it has been suggested (Butler, 1991) that the motivation for writing it was
supplied by a double crisis of religious and mathematical faith, the common
feature of which was the perceived failure of axiomatic reasoning to guaran-
tee empirical truth. The mathematical crisis was precipitated by the inven-
tion of non-Euclidean geometry: the point was not that Euclidean reasoning
was wrong, or even inapplicable, but that its applicability was not ensured by
the irrefutability of its logic. As Ziman (1978, p. 99) warns us, ‘scientific
knowledge cannot be justified or validated by logic alone’. This was also the
lesson of Marshall’s later encounter with Cournot’s argument that falling
costs entail monopoly – a lesson that was entirely lost amid the reinvention
of Cournot’s logic in the 1930s. Marshall’s response was to apply Darwin’s
principles to sketch an evolutionary account of the growth of knowledge as
structures of relationships. Caution in applying the patterns of axiomatic rea-
soning which had proved inadequate, and use of the evolutionary principles
of the organisation of knowledge are persistent characteristics of his work as
an economist.
More than a century earlier, David Hume had shown that it is impossible
to prove any general empirical proposition, and turned to the question of
how people acquired what we call knowledge. Marshall appears not to have
read Hume’s philosophical work – though he had studied Kant’s response to
it – nor Adam Smith’s remarkable development of it in his psychological the-
ory of the growth of science (1980), but he was later to make the connection
with Smith’s best-known application of his theory. As I have observed, the
basic, and very powerful, skill of human cognition is the creation and appli-
cation of patterns (of which logical reasoning is a special case); and Smith
characterises scientific activity as the invention of ‘connecting principles’
which provide a credible account of relationships between phenomena. For
this cognitive skill to be put to effective use it is important that people should
be both sensitive to patterns and motivated to seek out or manufacture pat-
terns. Not the least of the merits of Smith’s analysis is the attention he gives
to motivation, and what that motivation is. The driving force is the link
between cognition and emotion.
Smith begins by identifying three human emotions: surprise, wonder
(what we might now call perplexity) and admiration. An event or impression
which does not conform to our expectations is surprising, and surprise causes
discomfort. If we can find no way of accommodating it to our cognitive
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categories we are conscious of a failure to understand, which is at least
disconcerting and may be dangerous; we therefore feel an urgent need to
find a new way of making sense of our environment. ‘Wonder, therefore, and
not any expectation of advantage from its discoveries, is the first principle
which prompts mankind to the study of Philosophy, of that science which
pretends to lay open the concealed connections that unite the various
appearances of nature’ (Smith, 1980, p. 51). From an evolutionary perspec-
tive, we can easily see that the emotive power of ‘wonder’, in Smith’s sense,
might sometimes be much more effective than ‘an expectation of advantage’
in promoting fitness-enhancing cognitive activity and thus improving adap-
tation to novel circumstances.
If we are successful, either through our own efforts or by adapting means
which are already being used by someone else, in creating a new cognitive
structure that seems to make sense, then our feeling of relief produces admi-
ration in proportion to the discomfort, providing reinforcement to our new
cognitive skill. Thus ‘the repose and tranquillity of the imagination is the ulti-
mate end of Philosophy’ (Smith, 1980, p. 61); and because this repose and
tranquillity rests on human inventions, rather than revelations of the princi-
ples that are actually in operation – even, Smith observes, when the inven-
tion has been made by Newton – it is always liable to further disturbance,
which stimulates further invention. Hayek (1952) was later to note that the
categories we use to order sensory impressions may differ substantially from
the categories which have been developed to accommodate the development
of corresponding scientific knowledge, and suggested an evolutionary expla-
nation which is compatible with the argument of this section.
In a recent paper, Ekkehard Schlicht (2000) has associated both the moti-
vation to resolve difficulties by inventing new patterns, and the criteria by
which possible new patterns are assessed, with an aesthetic sense which, he
suggests, often seems to take priority over more strictly instrumental con-
cerns; as in Smith’s analysis, an emotive drive may be more powerful than
the prospect of practical benefits. Indeed, when people are consciously
searching for a theory which will account for some puzzling phenomenon,
or for an effective product design, they often work on the principle that ‘if
it looks right, it is right’. Schlicht provides some examples from modern
science; and Smith’s detailed account of the succession of cosmological the-
ories incorporates repeated attention to the significance of aesthetic criteria,
for example in the desire of Copernicus to incorporate the heavenly bodies
within ‘a new system, that these, the noblest works of nature, might no
longer appear devoid of that harmony and proportion which discover them-
selves in her meanest productions’ (Smith, 1980, p. 71). In explaining the tri-
umph of Newtonian physics, Smith (p. 105) recognised the rhetorical power
of its aesthetic appeal; and in his Lectures on Rhetoric he used this appeal in
recommending that, in giving an account of some system, one should ‘lay
down certain principles . . . from which we account for the several phenom-
ena, connecting all together by the same chain’ because ‘the Newtonian
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method is undoubtedly the more philosophical, and in every science . . . is
vastly more ingenious and engaging’ (Smith, 1983, p. 146). The incentives
which both Smith and Schlicht emphasise do not coincide with the incentives
to which economists typically give priority, though the latter may comple-
ment them; but they still appear to be important incentives to scientific inves-
tigation. In this, as in other aspects of its practice, science is still an art.
Smith went on to observe that as science progresses it tends to divide into
specialisms, and these specialisms encourage attention to details which would
otherwise not be noticed. Closer observation increases the chance of perceiv-
ing anomalies which provoke efforts to modify or replace patterns that would
be acceptable to the non-expert; thus the division of labour within science
leads to increases in scientific knowledge. Smith (1976a) founded his theory
of economic development on this principle, in an exemplary demonstration
of ‘the Newtonian method’. We can now see that what underlies the unique
potential of the division of labour within human society, in comparison with
specialisation within any other species, is the architecture of the evolved
human brain, which is capable in principle of forming any of an enormous
variety of networks, far more than any single brain can actually sustain. By
appropriate specialisation, therefore, a human community can generate far
more knowledge than any single person is capable of. Marshall combined
Smith’s principle of the division of labour with Darwin’s emphasis on varia-
tion in response to environmental differences, which had already been incor-
porated in Marshall’s evolutionary hypothesis and underlay his insistence on
the importance of variety among the firms in each industry. Economic devel-
opment is the result of the division of labour, supplemented by variation
within each field of knowledge, exploiting the capacity of the human brain to
develop new cognitive networks and motivated by the human desire to make
sense (and not just money) by imposing patterns. Marshall (1920, pp. 138–9)
not only insisted on the importance of organisation as an aid to knowledge:
he insisted on the distinctive contributions of different forms of organisation,
for different connections are appropriate for different purposes.
Institutions
A necessary consequence of this process is the increasing interdependence of
human society. Most of the knowledge and the skill that each person needs
is held by others; and knowledge and skills are rarely re-usable without cost
by those who do not already possess them. The lowest costs are typically
incurred in acquiring knowledge within familiar fields from those who seem
to be more knowledgeable, or by adopting the practices of those who seem
to perform better. Willingness to borrow ideas and methods from others is
a familiar human characteristic, explicable by its survival value (Schlicht,
2000). Nor is it difficult to understand why we should so often converge on
a few models, as Smith realised; his psychological theory of science gives due
attention to the factors affecting the diffusion of each cosmological system.
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Our cognitive limitations provide the incentives to borrow; the cognitive
limitations of others, by impelling them to make and use patterns rather than
attempting to optimise by using information that we cannot observe, make
it easier to understand their rules of behaviour (Heiner, 1983); and our
shared characteristics help us to imagine ourselves in someone else’s situa-
tion and to tailor actions and communications to their perceptions, as Smith
showed in both his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1976b) and his Lectures on
Rhetoric (1983).
When we converge on rules for deciding how to behave, the shared con-
ventions and procedures may be called ‘institutions’; and our understanding
of institutions is enhanced if we begin with an appreciation of human cogni-
tion, and the consequent advantages of adopting other people’s procedures
that seem to work for them, even when our actions have no effect on anyone
else (Choi, 1993), rather than by postulating games between people without
cognitive limitations. Schlicht’s focus is on the conventions that facilitate
interaction, and in particular on the criteria for a good rule, and this leads him
to emphasise the importance of ‘evaluations of an aesthetic kind, relating to
formal features like symmetry, analogy, or good continuity’ (Schlicht, 2000,
p. 35). Such aesthetic evaluations are also important in choosing good rules
for our private procedural rationality. As Schlicht points out, these features
are not relevant to anyone who is deemed capable of optimising everything
except the use of scant cognitive resources, but in a changing environment
optimisation on each separate occasion is not a sensible objective, even by the
criterion of overall optimisation. We may recall Schumpeter’s proposition
(1943, p. 83) that ‘[a] system . . . that at every given point of time fully utilizes
its possibilities to the best advantage may yet in the long run be inferior to a
system that does so at no given point of time, because the latter’s failure to do
so may be a condition for the level or speed of long-run performance’. Schum-
peter applied this proposition to ‘any system, economic or other’; it is a
proposition about uncertainty and discovery, which is as applicable to the
individual as to the economy; indeed it is its applicability to the individual that
underlies its application to the economy.
Schlicht identifies imitation (which is rarely a precise copy) as an effective
mechanism for coping with changes which do not last long enough to permit
adaptation at the genetic level, but long enough for knowledge which has
been acquired by individual pattern making to be re-usable by others at rel-
atively moderate cost. Sometimes this re-use may be formally organised.
Frank Knight (1921), having defined ‘uncertainty’ as a situation in which no
existing pattern or procedure is sufficient, and ‘the entrepreneur’ as some-
one who is willing to impose an interpretative framework on that situation,
then suggests that an entrepreneur may find it quite easy to persuade people
to accept his offer of employment rather than attempt to cope with uncer-
tainty on their own. (Their motivation may well correspond to that on which
Smith based his theory of scientific development.) The entrepreneur there-
fore exercises authority within his firm precisely in Barnard’s sense (1938,
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p. 163), which locates the decision about which communications are author-
itative with the recipient, not the source.
However, our analysis should indicate that authority is by no means
restricted to hierarchical relationships, or even to relationships within for-
mal organisations. Anyone whose instructions, advice, or example we
accept in any particular context is a figure of authority within that context;
and we would find it very hard to manage our lives without many such
authorities. It is important to recognise the source of both institutions and
authority in individual efforts to cope with individual cognitive problems
and the urge to make sense of the complexity of our environment, because
it provides a basis for understanding why the emergence of institutions
which serve to co-ordinate interactions is often much easier than would be
suggested by the multiplicity of equilibria in many game-theoretic models,
and why people should be much readier to accept subordinate roles in
organisations than might be expected from a model populated by cogni-
tively self-sufficient agents. It also explains the effectiveness of marketing
institutions which match cognitive needs.
Markets
A great deal of effort has been devoted by economists to examining the effi-
ciency of exchange. However, it is not often that this examination begins by
posing the question in an appropriately cognitive form: to what extent can
the problems of differentiated knowledge be resolved through the exchange
of knowledge which is embodied in goods and services? To do so immedi-
ately raises questions about the design of goods and services and also about
the arrangements for exchange – or, in other words, about the working of
markets. These are not necessarily distinct questions, for as Marshall (1919,
p. 181) observed,
[p]roduction and marketing are parts of the single process of adjustment of sup-
ply to demand. The division between them is on lines which are seldom sharply
defined: the lines vary from one class of business to another, and each is liable
to modification by any large change in the resources of production, transport or
the communication of intelligence.
New products may require the creation of new market institutions, and the
possibility of creating new market institutions may suggest product redesign.
I adopt Ménard’s definition of a market as ‘a specific institutional arrange-
ment consisting of rules or conventions that make possible a large number of
voluntary transfers of property rights on a regular basis’ (1995, p. 170); and
my focus is on the ways that these rules or conventions reduce the costs of
transactions by simplifying cognitive tasks. We should also recognise the
importance of transfers of knowledge that is not embodied in goods or serv-
ices, and of arrangements for the development of knowledge, for these
aspects of co-ordination are also often dependent on the working of markets.
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The markets to be considered are not, of course, the unanalysed markets of
so much microeconomic – and of almost all macroeconomic – theory.
The failure to analyse markets as institutional arrangements which structure
processes is a natural, and almost inevitable, consequence of choosing to start
the analysis of exchange with perfect competition, for competition cannot be
perfect unless every potential buyer has equal and costless access to every
seller, and vice versa. The moment that one provides any structure to these
market relationships competition is no longer perfect. The methodological
necessity of avoiding structure accounts for the extraordinary status of the
‘auctioneer’ as the organiser of the perfect market (for which Walras has
received undeserved blame): the auctioneer has neither preferences nor
motivation, consumes no resources, is able to communicate with everyone
without ever establishing any kind of personal contact and without cost to
either party, and never makes a mistake; most extraordinary of all, the auc-
tioneer is a monopolist who is trusted by everyone never to exploit his posi-
tion, and always justifies this trust. Exactly the same characteristics are
attributed to the ‘social planner’, who is subject to the same methodological
necessity. Walrasian models are therefore dangerous guides to policy.
Since these perfect markets deliver efficient allocations without cost, it is
not surprising that economists found some difficulty in explaining the exis-
tence of firms, which used resources in doing what the auctioneer did for
nothing; nor is it surprising that Coase found it necessary to assume that eco-
nomic agents, if not the auctioneer, incurred some costs in using markets. If
Coase had been better trained in economic theory, he might have realised
that costs of using markets would be difficult to reconcile with perfect com-
petition, and responded by following Joan Robinson (1933) into her world
of monopolies; if, however, he had been less well trained, or alternatively
had been more familiar with the work of earlier economists, he might have
addressed to markets the question that he posed about firms: if they cost
something to operate, why are people willing to incur these costs? Markets
should be explained, not assumed.
The route to an explanation was provided by Carl Menger (1976), who set
out to analyse the structure of an economy as an increasingly complex system
for meeting human needs. Beginning with goods which can be directly applied
to their owners’ needs, he introduced what was to become a characteristically
Austrian concern with indirect ways of meeting these needs, such as making
machines to make tools for growing crops which can then be turned into food.
In this analytical system, the exchange of what one already possesses for some-
thing which can be used in the production chain is itself an indirect way of
meeting needs. It is therefore not surprising, though it is significant, that
Menger introduced exchange at the opposite end of the range from what had
become the standard practice, with simple bilateral deals, and that he also
recognised that making a deal incurs costs. A model of isolated exchanges but
no market creates the possibility of explaining markets as a means for reduc-
ing the costs of exchange when there is a demand for multiple exchanges.
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In Menger’s theoretical sequence it is the next step that is crucial. Rather
than exchanging what they already have, some people may begin to use what
they already have in the production of goods which are intended to be
exchanged; and if that plan is successful, it may be worth while acquiring
additional goods, not for use, but as inputs into regular production.
Exchange now becomes an essential part of the business of improving one’s
condition, and the efficiency of the exchange process itself becomes a con-
straint on this improvement, and therefore a matter for attention. If the cre-
ation of a market can improve the efficiency of exchange, it is, in Menger’s
terms, a good of higher order, and its value is derived, in the first instance,
from the value of the exchanges that it makes possible through this improve-
ment in efficiency – and ultimately by the value of the indirect contribution
that it makes to satisfying human needs.
The most obvious means of improving the efficiency of exchange is
through the development of a generally accepted medium of exchange,
which removes the need for direct barter. Menger concentrates on money,
because it exemplifies the emergence of a pervasive institution as a result of
individual initiative and the readiness of people to copy behaviour that seems
to work effectively for others. In the course of developing this argument, he
does, however, point out that goods differ substantially in their marketabil-
ity – that is, in the costs which must be incurred in the process of exchange.
Unless the producer has some special advantage, commodity production will
be concentrated on goods with relatively high marketability, though, in
accordance with Marshall’s observation, a change in product design or pro-
duction methods may be undertaken in order to improve marketability (can-
ning and refrigeration provide two important examples). However, there are
always some costs of exchange. Here the importance of indirect methods
again comes to the fore, because the costs of achieving a single sale can often
be substantially reduced by appropriate investment – by creating a set of
institutions which constitute a market. The customer might pay for this
investment, but would naturally need to be compensated by a lower price;
and it is usually the producer who expects to be most dependent on particu-
lar categories of exchange who has the greater incentive to develop proce-
dures which will facilitate exchange within those particular categories – in
other words, to create a special market. Casson (1982, p. 163), who has
given particular attention to the firm as market maker, provides a convenient
summary of the obstacles to trade, and of the ways in which the producer
may seek to overcome them: all these ways reduce the customer’s cost of
making a single transaction (and often the producer’s cost of a single trans-
action) by a substantial initial commitment of resources.
The obstacles to trade discussed by Casson are primarily the result of defi-
ciencies of knowledge; and so are the costs invoked by Coase (1937) to
explain the creation of firms – though Coase did not see that firms make
markets as well as goods. Both require knowledge to be organised; this is a
cognitive issue, to be handled by procedural, not substantive, rationality.
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Costs per transaction are reduced by the development of a set of conventions
about the way in which that transaction is to be carried out, including, for
example, the location, the provision of information, opportunities to inspect
or try out the product, standards for product characteristics, methods of pay-
ment, provision for servicing, and the commitments that are implicit in the
deal. Because of the standard use of preference functions in consumer the-
ory, it is important to mention that the use of money prices simplifies the
assessment of each potential purchase; the ‘measuring rod of money’ is
among the most important of conventions. The effect of these institutions is
to ease the cognitive task of making a satisfactory purchase (and also the cog-
nitive task of making a satisfactory sale). This cannot be achieved without a
cognitive investment, and though the cost of this may fall mainly on the pro-
ducer, customers must develop their own new routines. Everyone has to
learn how to shop in a supermarket, how to buy through mail order, how to
buy PEPs or ISAs, and now how to use the Internet effectively. This learning
produces potentially re-usable knowledge; consequently everyone who
makes this cognitive investment experiences the equivalent of what Penrose
(1959) called ‘the receding managerial limit’ as new capabilities become
embedded in new patterns of behaviour which release cognitive resources for
other tasks, especially tasks that can incorporate the new routines. On the
other hand, significant changes in institutional arrangements, such as the
replacement of PEPs by ISAs and, on a much larger scale, the development
of internet markets, impose new cognitive burdens.
The importance of simplifying the customer’s cognitive task is illustrated
by considering those markets in which many customers are willing to go to a
good deal of trouble to get what they want, and where the common practice
of supplier-fixed price does not apply. Three outstanding examples are the
markets for houses, cars and many collectables. Here there are two powerful
incentives for the customer to incur substantial transaction costs: purchases
typically involve a substantial outlay, and they have substantial implications
for the customer’s style of living, and even for self-image. Such cognitive
structures as lifestyle and self-image are a natural consequence of the pattern-
making characteristics of the human brain which have been considered ear-
lier, and the maintenance of these structures will normally be a major
objective. It is therefore worth taking a good deal of trouble to ensure that
any major purchase is compatible with the relevant patterns – or, occasion-
ally, that an available purchase has sufficient appeal to justify some modifi-
cation of those patterns. Rules for making such decisions have a substantial
aesthetic component, even when the opinions of family, friends, colleagues,
or neighbours are not of direct concern.
When there is substantial diversity among customers, the greatest reduction
in transaction costs for a particular group may be achieved by the creation of
sub-markets in which the rules and conventions, as well as the products, are
precisely adapted to that group. This is yet another instance of the effects of
the division of labour, which as always is limited by the extent of the market;
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but the extent of the market is influenced by the incremental cost of transact-
ing in it. Firms, like individuals, differ in their capabilities, including their
capabilities in devising institutional arrangements that are appropriate for
particular groups of potential customers, and these differences are reflected in
what they attempt and (even more) in what they achieve. But thinking of the
ways in which firms can develop arrangements that enable them to sell more
easily should not distract our attention from the contribution of these
arrangements to the firm’s knowledge about its business. They are an impor-
tant part of what Marshall called its external organisation; and we have
already drawn attention to the pervasive importance of externally organised
knowledge to augment our own cognitive skills.
Market institutions are an important part of consumers’ external organi-
sation: the rules and conventions form part of their interpretative system
and their framework for decision making. How we decide is not without
influence on what we decide; and the power of market-making firms to
shape the way that we decide seems to be well appreciated in many busi-
nesses, as is manifest in a brief observation of marketing strategy. This power
is often attenuated by the efforts of rivals; as Hayek (1948, p. 106) pointed
out, competition is a ‘process of formation of opinion’, or, in the language
used earlier, a means of deciding whose communications will be provision-
ally accepted as authoritative. There is no choice without a framework, and
as in Penrose’s theory, the routinisation of procedures makes possible the
acquisition or creation of new knowledge and new skills. If the process of
transacting is easy, we can concentrate on what to transact, and how to
develop new skills as consumers – or indeed as humans. Our cognitive
resources, like the productive and managerial resources of the Penrosian
firm, are capable of development, and when developed may deliver new
productive services; we have therefore an incentive to learn about the pos-
sibilities and the opportunities (Penrose 1959, p. 77) – what we might call
their ‘option value’. We may be encouraged to do so by the recognition that
the array of markets which we can use without much effort also has an
option value for us: they allow us relatively easy access to a wide range of
other people’s capabilities.
We should not forget that the greater part of the value of transactions
within a modern economy has no direct reference to final customers at all;
and the same incentive to reduce the costs of individual transactions by sub-
stantial investment in developing appropriate institutions applies here. Busi-
ness customers may have stronger incentives than do their suppliers to
simplify the process of transacting, and this may not merely be a matter for
the purchasing department, for production is closely linked with purchasing
as well as marketing. Arrangements with suppliers may reduce the costs asso-
ciated with production, and modifications to product and process may sim-
plify relationships with suppliers. Amid the flurry of excitement about
e-commerce, there have been several predictions that its impact may be
greater on relations between businesses than on retailing; if this is so, it will
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be because of changes in the handling of transactions and also because of
associated changes in the internal operations of firms.
Conclusion
We make sense of our situation by constructing order; the quality and appli-
cability of our knowledge capital, as of physical capital, depend on its
structure. But even in our private lives we are not dependent on our own
resources: our common mental architecture makes it possible to connect to
external knowledge capital, though by no means to all of it. Market relation-
ships provide links that make possible the construction of additional knowl-
edge and, by allowing many activities to be guided by rules and conventions,
provide scope for imagination. Co-ordination by institutional arrangements
defines boundaries, which should not lightly be assumed to match the funda-
mental data – this is not known anyway; but from a cognitive perspective
it also defines a space to think within those boundaries, and even to make
selective forays across them. The history of human development is one of
discovering ways of circumventing the limits apparently imposed by the cog-
nitive capacity of each individual, by an increasing division of cognitive labour
and by developing procedures which enable us to make new combinations
from the results of that division.
Market institutions not only release cognitive resources for the develop-
ment of both consumer and organisational capital and therefore of new
consumer demands and new productive opportunities which create new con-
texts for competition: particular institutional structures will encourage these
developments to take particular forms. A study of the competitive process
requires a study of the institutions within which it is channelled, and also of
attempts to modify those institutions in ways that will favour the modifiers,
not always with the effects intended. (Co-operative retail societies pioneered
the development of supermarkets.) Indeed, we should not forget that much
economic activity is devoted to the provision of market institutions and to
the extension of market institutions to new classes of goods and services,
illustrated by the diverse histories of Marks & Spencer, Tesco and many
providers of financial services, and also to the creation of new markets based
on new institutional arrangements. The latter has recently appeared so
important in its scale and possible effects that it has often been labelled ‘the
new economy’. We now have clear evidence that the creation of new institu-
tions to gain competitive advantage may be very costly and that success is
problematic; the new economy has not produced a new economics.
As with any innovation, acceptance depends on a combination of continu-
ity and novelty that matches the perception of the customer, and it is easy to
get this combination wrong. The competitive process combines ex-ante
selection of what to offer and how to provide it by each competitor, based
on premisses which are not a simple reflection of the basic data, but are
defined from ‘the imagined deemed possible’ (Shackle, 1979, p. 26), and
70 Brian J. Loasby
ex-post selection by customers who have their own notions about what will
fit their own perceived needs. These notions are the product of cognitive,
emotional and aesthetic factors, and change over time; the study of ‘the
active consumer’ (Bianchi, 1998) is closely complementary to the study of
competitive markets.
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Introduction
A challenge to the new economic sociology is that central economic processes
should become the focus of theoretical and empirical sociological analysis.
This chapter makes some steps towards analysing competition in that light,
partly because competition is often assumed to be the market force of all
market forces. The central argument made is both that competition processes
are co-instituted with markets (including end markets), and that market
processes are in turn co-instituted with industrial divisions of labour. Thus,
it is suggested that an excessive burden of explanatory expectation is placed
on competitive processes within markets, as the dynamic of capitalist
economies. Indeed, I argue here that many conceptions of competition
suffer from this ‘tilt towards the market’ as the sole or primary dynamic force
behind economic growth, to the exclusion or at least sidelining of comple-
mentary but at least equally significant dynamics within the realm of
production, such as capital accumulation. After all, to put it at its weakest,
competition may stimulate but cannot deliver growth, and in some models
of competition, the outcome is merely the efficient allocation of existing
resources through transparent price setting, a static equilibrium model.
The chapter begins with an examination of some of the few empirically
based studies of competition, suggesting that they often are developed for
overtly normative or prescriptive purposes. It then returns to analyse some
of the early Weberian conceptions of competition, upon which to build an
economic sociology of competitive processes. After contrasting the seminal
concept of ‘instituted economic process’ with the other and more widely
adopted Polanyan legacy of ‘embeddedness’, the chapter explores competi-
tion as an instituted economic process in five dimensions: the co-institution
of competitive processes and markets; relations of power and mutual
dependence between classes of economic agent; the formation of units of
competition; the formation of scales of competition; and the development
of formal and informal norms of competition. The chapter then provides
an exemplification of this analytical framework through a schematic
analysis of changing forms of competition in the historical development
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of UK food supermarkets. The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that
competitive processes are a result of processes of transformation wider than
intra-market dynamics.
Empirico-normative views of competition
Leaving aside neo-classical views of ‘perfect competition’, this much acclaimed
market force has attracted surprisingly few empirical ‘competition studies’ to
complement those in the field of innovation. There is a wide range of con-
ceptions of what constitutes competition: static efficiency of resource alloca-
tion: dynamic efficiency of innovation and adaptation; and Schumpeterian
creative destruction. But many of these conceptions are what might be called
‘empirico-normative’, stating as much what ought to be as what is. A classic
instance of this is the work of Porter, which comprises the more overtly pre-
scriptive (1985) with empirico-normative analysis (1998a, b). ‘Competition is
dynamic and rests on innovation and the search for strategic difference’
(Porter, 1998a, p. 209) is a proposition that rolls together statements about
what competition is, empirically and optimally, into what amounts to a defi-
nition. Clusters of interconnected firms are seen to provide optimal competi-
tive conditions for strategic differentiation, with the Porter diamond being
used as a strategic tool for achieving the best combination of its four facets:
factor inputs, supply chain networks, demand conditions, and regulatory
frameworks and infrastructure. In this way, clusters are seen as being capable
of going beyond static efficiency competition, beyond cost-reduction compe-
tition, and onwards and upwards to optimal forms of competition based on
strategic differentiation.1 Low barriers to entry into clusters, levels of ‘social
capital’ ensuring free flows of information, absence of formal contractual
requirements resulting from a level of common purpose, combined with an
exactly right dose of rivalry in the cluster,2 are thus empirical characteristics,
ones given the normative seal of approval. Empirical cases, such as the birth of
the Medtronics’ pacemaker cluster in Minneapolis, are thus woven into the
narrative as ‘exemplary’ events as much as evidential demonstration.
Cartels are bad (they ‘undermine economic value’) while clusters are good
(‘open’, ‘facilitating’, 1998a, p. 227). The best kinds of clusters are to be
found mostly in the USA, where the greatest number provide the greatest
synergies arising from overlapping clusters, whereas in developing countries
clusters tend to be too centralised around a few dominant players, are often
state supported, and are ‘hub-and-spoke networks’ (1998a, p. 231). Japan is
castigated for following such a model, exacerbated by a metropol-centric and
overdirected bias. Given this fusion of the empirical and the normative
‘[c]luster theory emphasises not market share but dynamic improvement.
This results in a positive sum underlying view of competition, in which
productivity improvements and trade expand the market’ (1998a, p. 249).
There exists empirically an optimal kind of competition and its effects are
unreservedly benign.
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Two examples of theorisation of competition which are clearly empirically
based but nonetheless attached to an advocacy of particular forms of com-
petition can be found in the work of Best (1990), on the one hand, and in a
network of researchers clustered around the Applied Economics Department
and the ESRC Centre for Business Research at Cambridge University, on the
other. In an historical analysis of different forms of competition, Best argues
that changing forms of competition are the outcome of complex interactions
between industrial divisions and productive organisation, on the one hand,
and formal competition regulatory systems, on the other. Thus, in the USA
the multi-divisional Chandlerian corporation involved a form of competition
in which Big Business mass production responded to conditions of oversup-
ply by further increasing supply to achieve greater market share in shrinking
market conditions, and by market expansion, ‘democratic consumption’, in
growth conditions. The regulatory framework provided by corporation law
and Sherman’s Anti-Trust Law had the unintended consequence of accelerat-
ing acquisition and consolidation by criminalising inter-firm co-operation.
By contrast the ‘New Competition’, which involves strategic differentia-
tion, organisational superiority and continuous innovation in a shifting com-
petitive environment, emerges when inter-firm relationships across the
production chain are facilitated by consultative co-ordination. A balance is
struck between sectoral inter-firm co-operation on prices to enable competi-
tion for innovation potential. And there is an enabling and supportive policy
framework and infrastructure subverting the dichotomy between market and
hierarchy which sustains a ‘balance between co-operation and competition’
(Best, 1990, p. 267). The particular form of the keiretsu in Japan as they
evolved during the 1970s was thus once more an industrial and productive
organisation in interaction with a competition regulatory environment. Best
argues strongly that this development was an unintended consequence of an
institutional countervailance between MITI and the Free Trade Commission,
preventing either the dominance of centralised and directive planning or the
imposition of US-style competition law.
United States industrial regulatory policy had presumed the idea of perfect mar-
kets and defined inter-firm co-operation as collusion against the public interest.
Japanese industrial policy, in contrast, has been based on the presupposition that
a mix of inter-firm competition and co-operation can promote international
competitiveness. (Best, 1990, p. 201)
The ‘Third Italy’ provides another example of a complex interaction
between trade associations, consortia and municipally sustained tax and ‘social
capital’ infrastructure facilitating collective Schumpeterian competition for
strategic sectoral advantage, also balancing competition and co-operation. It is
clear, from this account, that for Best ‘the purpose of strategic industrial policy
is to promote Schumpeterian competition and (collective) entrepreneurial
firms’, and that ‘[t]his means, in part, shaping competition and affecting the
form that competition takes in order to enhance economic performance’
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(1990, pp. 265–6). The empirical analysis is one in which particular historical
forms of industrial division and organisation generate distinctive forms of
competition (focusing on productivity cost reduction, on market share, or on
strategic differentiation, innovation and comparative organisational advan-
tage). These forms of industrial organisation and competition are then
sustained by and, in their turn influence formal institutional competition reg-
ulation. In Best’s work there is a strong sense, too, that the New Competition
is both historically and normatively superior to an antecedent and moribund
Big Business corporation form of competition.3
The ‘Cambridge network’ has likewise produced a number of comparative
studies of competitive and co-operative behaviour, combining legal, eco-
nomic, sociological and management perspectives. Lane (1997) demonstrated
how different technical and quality norms operating in markets in Germany
and Britain effectively provide a distinctive basis for collaboration and com-
petition in the former by establishing industry-wide common standards. In
Britain, in contrast, in the absence of specified quality and technical standards,
quality and cost can more easily become opposing objectives of competition.
Likewise, contractual law, a propensity to litigate, and the fostering of trust
have been analysed as being central to different forms of inter-firm relations
which fundamentally affect the nature and focus of competitive forces in
Britain, Germany and Italy. Institutional and legal infrastructures thus form
part of the essential basis for co-operative productive systems which enhance
their innovation capacity and hence their competitiveness (Deakin and
Wilkinson, 1995; Arighetti et al., 1997; Deakin, Lane and Wilkinson, 1997).
Complementary to Best’s analysis of the role of competition regulation, these
authors also demonstrate how regulation policy in the USA followed eco-
nomic fashion, first the Chicago School, then game-theoretical and principal-
agent theories, to shape a particular kind of competition environment
through key legal cases. They contrast this with the regulatory environments
in the UK and at the European Commission levels (Deakin, Goodwin and
Hughes, 1997), and suggest ways in which these differently affect competitive
behaviour.4 This body of work, which places a central emphasis on formal and
contractual institutions and the way they shape competitive and interfirm
relations, also shares a common normative standpoint, both by providing an
effective critique of regulatory models assuming atomistic competition, and in
promoting a view that ‘co-operation between firms is a necessary productive
feature of productive innovation and competitive success’ (Deakin et al.,
1997, p. 339). The comparative study, therefore, provides an important lever
of judgement for critiquing ‘the broad orientation of systems of competition
law which continue to privilege models of industry based on atomistic com-
petition’ (p. 362).
Drawing this introductory discussion to a close, it is clear that in this field of
empirical analysis, some important if partial analyses have been made. These
far surpass the prescriptive and normatively motivated account of competition
by Porter, and even more so the formal models of ‘perfect competition’. Best
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gives the most comprehensive theoretical basis for an analysis, embracing
the historical development of industrial organisation, in parallel with formal
institutional regulatory regimes. But that analysis leads towards a more
normative account of the virtues of Schumpeterian collective entrepreneurship
of the New Competition. The ‘Cambridge network’ provides significant
additional perspectives, emphasising especially formal institutional conditions
for co-operatively based competition. But, lacking Best’s perspective on
industrial organisation and, especially, consideration of power relations in
vertically organised supply chains, the analysis of co-operation also tends to be
normatively laden.
Towards an instituted economic process approach
If one looks hard enough, it is generally possible to find antecedents for most
ideas, and the early formulations of a synthetic discipline of economic soci-
ology do provide some initial pointers to an instituted economic process
view of competition. ‘A market may be said to exist wherever there is com-
petition, even if only unilateral, for opportunities of exchange among a plu-
rality of potential parties’ (Weber 1968, p. 635).
Swedberg (1994, 1998) has argued that Weber enlarges a conception of
markets beyond their status as simple vehicles for exchange by distinctively
pairing exchange with competition as a prerequisite for the existence of
markets, but he still leaves much to be done analytically. In particular, com-
petition is here defined fairly restrictively in terms of a struggle over oppor-
tunities for exchange. That struggle is one into which power directly enters.
Indeed, for Weber economic competition is a form of ‘peaceful conflict’,
whereby attempts are made to ‘gain control over opportunities and advan-
tages which are also desired by others’ and which take place ‘in exchange
relationships, bound . . . by the order governing the market’ (Weber, 1968,
p. 38). Although not clearly stated, Weber clearly intends that competition
here involves winners and losers, and thereby a process of ‘social selection’
(1968, pp. 38–40). In this view of competition as a pacific power struggle,
however, it appears that the power exercised within the market and through
the exchange process is not explicable by the market or exchange relations
alone. To found a notion of relative powers, it is necessary to include the
sphere of production and the differential capacities to create and own
wealth.5 Moreover, Weber’s action-oriented approach is undoubtedly an
obstacle to an analysis of the power relations that arise from industrial
divisions, such as those between capital and labour, between primary and
secondary producers, or between retailers and manufacturers, retailers and
consumers. The ‘elemental’ description of a market as a plurality of buyers
confronting a plurality of sellers (Weber, 1968, p. 635; Swedberg, 1998,
pp. 42–3) already makes important assumptions about their separation into
two classes of economic agent which is difficult to account for in terms of
actor-oriented agency.
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Nonetheless, Weber’s ideas of economic competition as ‘pacified’ struggle
and of exchange as one that obeys rules of calculation embodied in market
organisation anticipate some notion of normalised or instituted competitive
process. Moreover, as Swedberg has commented, Weber hesitated in Econ-
omy and Society to take this view of economic competition in exchange to
develop a theory of price, restrained by fear of transgression into the field of
economics and marginal utility theory. But he privately acknowledged that
the logic of his position would be to view real price formation as an empiri-
cal process resulting from the economic struggles between actors (Swedberg,
1998, p. 44). This, were it to be developed further, provides intimations of
an instituted economic process (IEP) account of price and price formation,
through ‘economically normalised’ competitive struggle. What this signifi-
cantly shares with an IEP approach is that core economic processes, such as
price and competition, as well as markets, are seen as ‘normalised’ ipso facto
for being economic, and that the ‘rationality’ of markets and market agents
is itself a consequence of normalisation.
The notion of economic processes as instituted was first explicitly formu-
lated by Karl Polanyi, and in order to weigh its full significance it is first nec-
essary to disentangle it from the concept of embeddedness for which Polanyi
is much better known, as well as from its pair dis-embeddedness which,
equally, has found less favour. It should be emphasised that this is an attempt
to develop the notion of IEP from the rather confused and, tangled usage
within Polanyi’s own work, on the one hand, and on the other, to suggest that
Polanyi had in embryo a much more radical agenda than the subsequent
appropriation of embeddedness, notably by Granovetter (1985, 1992 and
with McGuire, 1998), has given it. The concept of embeddedness carries with
it the idea that economic relations are moulded and shaped by the social rela-
tions and contexts within which those relations occur (Polanyi, 1944, pp. 46,
49; 1957, p. 250).6 Thus, in the terms of the above discussion of legal and
contractual institutions, the concept might be used to say that transactions
are ‘embedded’ in such a societal framework. Granovetter, however, appro-
priated the concept for the purpose of developing a more actor-oriented
approach, with embeddedness referring to ‘dense and stable networks of
relations, shared understandings, and political coalitions’ (Granovetter,
1985, p. 501). And he argued that trust and co-operative relations developed
through ‘concrete personal relations and the obligations inherent in them . . .
quite apart from institutional arrangements’ (1985, p. 495). In more recent
work, this type of analysis is taken to an extreme in which, at a more macro
level than in his previous work, small-scale interpersonal networks, even
conspiracy between a handful of people, were seen as constructing the over-
all industrial structure, including the competitive relations, of the electricity
supply industry in the USA.7 Moreover, this perspective is applied to indus-
trial organisation more generally, by arguing that
processes and relationships once shaped by individuals became institutionalised
in more formal organisations, institutional alliances, standardised practices, and
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industry norms. As in other industries . . . such patterns become embedded as
norms, unless and until an industry-wide crisis occurs. (Granovetter and
McGuire, 1998, p. 168)
Callon (1998) extends this notion in an actor network context, suggesting
that the idea of embeddedness is one which means, firstly, that all levels of
analysis are reduced to ‘the network of interactions’ in which individuals are
involved,8 and, secondly, that as such networks bind economic, social, politi-
cal, cultural, technological and material aspects together, there is in principle
no distinct sphere of the economic that can be analysed as such. Indeed, in this
conception of embeddedness, Callon argues that we are now increasingly
living in ‘hot’ situations where it becomes difficult to ‘frame’ the economic
into a distinct sphere of economic calculation, and there is a continuous
‘overflowing’ into networks too fluid for economic calculation.9 Only in
‘cold’ situations, when markets are discrete, framed, and immune from exces-
sive externalities, are Coasian or other economically rational calculations
possible. Thus, the idea of embeddedness here invoked suggests the continu-
ous and overwhelmingly invasive presence of incalculable externalities in
market interactions.
In tracing this lineage of the concept of embeddedness, its latent potential
for sociologising the economy out of existence, and of dissolving institutions
of price, capital, competition, industrial division of labour, supply, demand,
market, etc., into emergent networks of interpersonal relations becomes
manifest. This seems quite remote from Polanyi’s original intention and
usage. Indeed, analysing the development of the ‘self-regulating market’ in
The Great Transformation, Polanyi suggested very forcefully that during the
industrial revolution all factors became commodities (including, notably,
land, labour and money). That was a key historical moment when economic
institutions became dis-embedded or even entailed a reverse embedding of
society into the economy. It is that formulation which gives such a different
reading to the concept of embeddedness:
Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are
embedded in the economic system . . . For once the economic system is organ-
ised in separate institutions, based on specific motives and conferring special sta-
tus, society must be shaped in such a manner as to allow that system to function
according to its own laws . . . A market economy can function only in a market
society. (Polanyi, 1944, p. 57)
The commodification of labour, in particular its separation from preced-
ing modes of subsistence living, and the development of urbanisation, meant
that many more social interactions were mediated by money exchanges and
price, and as such became economically instituted. That was the intent of the
more general formulations Polanyi later gave (1957, p. 250) where he stated:
The instituting of the economic process vests that process with unity and stabil-
ity; it produces a structure with a definite function in society; it shifts the place of
the process in society, thus adding significance to its history; it centres interest on
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values, motives and policy . . . The study of the shifting place occupied by the
economy in society is therefore no other than the study of the manner in which
the economic process is instituted at different times and places.
When speaking of motives, values and policy as also instituted, he adopts for-
mulae akin to a notion of habitus where ‘no individual economic motives
need come into play’ (Polanyi, 1944, p. 49), because social organisation ‘runs
in its ruts’, and the motive for gain, in becoming generalised in tandem with
a commodified economy, is one of those ruts (Polanyi, 1944, pp. 41–2).
The central consequences that can be drawn out of this approach are three-
fold. First, given that economic process is an instituted process, open to de-
and re-institution, it is socially, comparatively and historically variable. That
applies to capital, labour, price mechanisms, markets – as well as to economic
motives. It fundamentally underpins a notion of varieties of capitalism. Sec-
ond, rather than talking of instituted economic processes and their context as
socially ‘embedding’, the specificity of economic instituted processes can be
seen to find their ‘place’ in different articulations with legal, political and civic
institutions. So there is no question of the economic being dissolved in the
social, or vice versa, as with an over-sociologised view of embeddedness.
Rather there is mutual conditioning between, for example, competition law
and industrial organisation (as with Best). Third, and likewise, an IEP
approach opens up the possibility of running through from micro to macro,
from the motive for gain to the Gold Standard, and the articulation between
different scales of instituted process. Thus, for Polanyi, both the motive for
gain and the Gold Standard are prime examples of the instituted economic
process, the former very likely being articulated with all kinds of networks
of interdependences at the micro-social level (in the manner of Granovetter);
the latter being a transnational, trans-societal, instituted economic process,
relatively dis-embedded from such micro-social networks.
Competition as instituted economic process
Developing an IEP approach in relation to competition will involve looking
at a number of different dimensions, under the basic assumption that
competition, far from being a universal or natural law of the market, is insti-
tuted differently in different historical and comparative circumstances. The
focus becomes the study of competition in its varied modes of institution,
and competition, being multi-dimensional, needs to be analysed as a complex
phenomenon. In many ways, this section is programmatic, to be followed by
the next, where the rise of UK supermarkets will be used as an illustrative
example of a multi-dimensional reconfiguration of competition.
Markets and forms of competition are mutually instituted
The starting point for an understanding of competition as an instituted eco-
nomic process is that it is manifest in market exchanges, as indeed we saw
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Weber suggest. So even empirical examples of ‘perfect competition’ à la
Samuelson can be discovered, as Garcia (1986) has demonstrated for a straw-
berry market, near Paris, in Sologne. She showed that in this market there
was relative equality between buyers and sellers; unrestricted entry into the
market; homogeneity of the product; and transparency or near perfect infor-
mation. But unlike a view of embeddedness,10 this market was the effect of a
quite distinct process of institution which involved a number of different
preconditions. First, it required the elimination of one form of trading insti-
tution (the itinerant merchant–grower) and its replacement by a comput-
erised local auction. Second, the growers’ association attracted the assistance
of the central and the local state in the funding of the market institutions,
such as the central collection hall for display of produce and an electronic
terminal and screen system. Third, homogeneity of product was ensured
through collective quality regulation and a common grading system, adopted
by the growers. And, last but not least, a balance of power with purchasers
was achieved as a result of the formation of a growers’ association. Buyer–
supplier equality was, somewhat precariously, facilitated by the particular
patterns of land ownership among growers, and relatively small-scale retail-
ers or market traders coming from Paris. In other words, the balance of
power, or equality between buyers and sellers, pre-supposed special social
and economic characteristics of both sets of agents. In short, the form of
competition, so-called ‘perfect competition’, was instituted – but only under
quite special social and historical circumstances.
In a more general way, it can be seen that the formation of the broad cat-
egories of labour, product and capital markets, each with its own distinctive
competitive processes,11 is itself the outcome of instituted economic process.
The institutions of a stockmarket, for example, involve quite distinct, and
historically changing, processes of competition, as can be seen from various
developments and possibilities of European or cross-Atlantic merger, along-
side distinctive rules for trading, and formal regulation.
Comparing distinct European labour markets, it is clear that different
quality and pricing institutions for labour, and different frameworks for reg-
ulating long-term, short-term, temporary and part time contracts, funda-
mentally condition the forms of competition within labour markets (Harvey,
2000; Harvey et al., forthcoming). A conclusion from these works is that the
labour contract, the commodity purchased and hence the exchange between
capital and labour are radically differently instituted in differing countries.
Moreover, such differences have led to major political debates about the
competitiveness of ‘high social cost’ and ‘low social cost’ labour. However,
given the radical incommensurability between what is being purchased in
two disparate labour markets; given the ‘indirect’ competition via product
markets; and given exchange-rate fluctuations, it is clear that there an
absence of ‘normalised’ competition at this level. There are no overarching
instituted measures in the absence of a common currency. So, from an IEP
perspective, the indirect competition between diverse labour markets via
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product markets and institutional forms of fluctuating exchange rates and
monetary institutions exemplifies the institutedness of competition. I return
to this point in considering different instituted scales of competition.
Asymmetric power and mutual dependence
Competition generally takes place within the same class of economic agent,
but not between classes of economic agent, and the formation of such classes
is itself a result of instituted economic process. Thus, to continue with labour
markets, the focus of competition is among employers (capital) and among
employees (labour), across an exchange relationship, as a consequence of
the formation of two distinct classes of economic agent performing distinct
economic functions.12 But competition does not occur between labour and
capital.13 The exchange relation is characterised by mutual dependence (own-
ers of capital need labour; people are, in varying ways, obliged to sell their
labour) and asymmetrical power relations. The kind of power wielded by
capital (degree of concentration, domination in the market, etc.) is different
from the kind of power wielded by labour (from individual sale through
to various forms of countervailing association). In this exchange relation,
the nature of competition as affected by concentration or organisation of
capital on one side of this power equation affects the opportunities of
exchange, just as the nature of competition on the other side of the equation
can be affected by forms of association and by labour market institutions of
the kind suggested above.
But the more general proposition that competition applies within and not
between classes of economic agent is also applicable to exchange relations
between retailers and consumers, retailers and manufacturers, manufacturers
and primary producers, and so on. Each of these pairs can be seen as classes of
economic agent, historically instituted, and performing distinct economic func-
tions. New classes, still in the process of institutionalisation as is the case with
the emergence of e-commerce, can fundamentally restructure the configuration
of existing exchange relations, thereby instituting new forms of competition.
I explain later how the emergence of powerful supermarkets has affected
the structure of exchange relations, and hence of forms of competition.
Thus, as with capital and labour, retailers as one class of economic agent
can be seen to compete with retailers, but not with farmers or manufacturers
or consumers, as other classes of economic agent. Vertical exchange relations
along a supply chain are significantly affected by the shifts in asymmetrical
power relations, as will be seen. But those power relations must be distin-
guished from competitive relations. Consequently, in so far as retailers and
manufacturers, for example, are mutually dependent and in asymmetrical
power relations, it is important to consider that if competition does not occur
across classes of economic agent, nor does co-operation in the sense of uncon-
strained mutual co-operation between similar equals. It becomes important
to distinguish co-operation between members of the same class of economic
agent (trade associations, employers federations, trades unions, etc.) from
82 Mark Harvey
forms of concertation that occur within exchange relations characterised by
mutual dependence and power asymmetry, a form of economic constraint
(retailers have to acquire goods from manufacturers, manufacturers have to
find a way to market). For co-operation between economic agents of the
same class, Richardsonian notions of complementarity of dissimilar capabil-
ities (Richardson, 1972) may be appropriate, and Marshallian districts can be
taken as empirical examples (Best, 1990;14 Dei Ottati, 1994).
It should be stressed that there are two aspects to power asymmetry: on
the one side, relative balance or position as a consequence of size and levels
of concentration within one of two economic classes party to the exchanges,
and, on the other, the nature of the power wielded. Thus, as a result of con-
centration, retailers may control and shape access to market. But this is a very
different type of power or capacity from that involved in the productive
capacity of manufacturers. In terms of instituted economic process, there-
fore, one could contrast the power of food retailers in the UK in relation to
food manufacturers with the power of motor manufacturers and franchised
retail outlets. These two instituted exchange relations affect fundamentally
the nature of the competition, the pricing mechanisms – and also the power
of consumers in relation to either of those two arrangements.
Referring back to Best’s historical analysis of changing forms of competi-
tion with changing patterns of industrial organisation, that can now be
reformulated in an IEP perspective where the development and differentia-
tion of classes of economic agent, within a given sector of production, affect
the nature of competition within those classes, not least because differentia-
tion affects the nature of power asymmetries and mutual dependences
between classes of economic agent. To return also to Weber, the way power
enters into economic exchanges is centrally through the asymmetry and
mutual dependences of trading relations between differently constituted
classes of economic agent.
Units of competition and the ‘channelling’ of competition
If competition is variously instituted by the formation of markets and by the
configuration of different classes of economic agent, then a further dimension
of the shaping of competition arises from the institution of different units of
competition, from individuals to firms, supply chains, or clusters of firms. The
formation of different units of competition should be distinguished from the
formation of different scales of competition, which are discussed below, the
former concerning primarily the competitive entities within a given market,
the latter the scale of the markets themselves – local, regional, national or
global. So, to emphasise the distinction, transnational corporations can com-
pete with each other, but at various different scales of competition in differ-
ent markets.15 The assumption of much competition regulation is that the firm
is the only unit of competition, and the objective of such regulation is to insti-
tute norms of competition for firm behaviour, in specified markets. Indeed,
in many instituted markets, firms can be the central and dominant units of
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competition, and there are degrees of ‘atomism’ in this respect, depending on
the levels of repeat trading or formal and informal partner relations between
firms within different economic classes (Fulconis, 1999).
But, in many contemporary product markets, the competing units are inte-
grated supply chains, networks or clusters, each of which can be orchestrated
by the dominant power within it. The locus of power within the supply
chain, and the degree of integration of the supply chain, fundamentally affect
where the competition is channelled, and, as I argue below, what form the
competition takes in terms of cost reduction, product differentiation, inno-
vation capability, logistical efficiency, or whatever. Thus Nike has been seen
as exemplifying a ‘buyer-driven’ supply chain, where the design and market-
ing node of the supply chain and its associated brand marque form the dom-
inant power. This in turn affects the nature of the competition and its locus
and focus in relation to other competitors, such as Reebok and Adidas (Ger-
effi and Korzenewiecz, 1994). But power can equally be situated upstream,
as in the case of Monsanto and the biotechnology of seed manufacturing,
‘mid-stream’ as in the case of motor-manufacturers, or downstream, as in the
case of UK food supermarkets or many clothing retailers. Thus, in as much
as supply chains, or other less linear inter-firm entities, produce outputs for
given product markets, they can become in Polanyan terms relatively normal
and stabilised forms of industrial organisation, reflecting also a normalisa-
tion over periods of time of power asymmetries within them in the markets
in which they operate. There is a consequent channelling of competition and
also a focus of competition on different product aspects (novelty, style, mar-
que, quality, freshness, convenience, price, reliability, etc.). Equally, such
inter-firm organisations create a halo of competition, again at certain loci of
the supply chain, between insiders and outsiders.
Scales of competition
From an IEP perspective different scales of markets can be seen to be the
results of historical processes of institution,16 rather than any pre-given frame-
works, and as a consequence are intimately connected with the development
of the sizes of firms, the lengths of supply chains, as well as with national and
supranational organisations such as NAFTA or the European Union. More-
over, different scales overlay each other, rather than necessarily replacing
each other, so that competition, as it were, plays in different registers at the
same time. When Krugman (1994, p. 44) argues that ‘competitiveness is a
meaningless word when applied to national economies’ he is in effect argu-
ing that the kind of competition which occurs between firms does not occur
between nations or at different scales. That seems to be self-evident. It does
appear to be meaningless if a nation is treated as a mega-firm producing a
bundle of commodities traded in a multitude of markets at all different scales
competing with other such mega-firms. But in so far as nations, in their capac-
ity to set incentives for foreign direct investment or regulatory environments
for trading, or infrastructural support for education, or any number of other
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distinctive and formative institutional measures,17 can affect the ensemble of
nationally active economic agents, it is clear that there is a form of competi-
tion distinctive to nations as a class of economic agent. Similarly the forma-
tion of supranational scales, such as NAFTA or the EU involve distinctive
competitive regulatory frameworks which can accentuate market integration
over other competitive criteria such as market share, inter-firm vertical con-
straint, or cartelisation (Anderman, 1997; Deakin, Goodwin and Hughes,
1997). So the institution of different overlaying scales of markets is a histor-
ical process which generates new forms of competition at different registers.
To continue the musical metaphor, there is no presumption of harmony
between scales, and the emergence of new scales can be discordant in relation
to ‘normal’ forms of competition at other scales.
Norms and formal institutions of competition
The arguments of Best (1990) and Deakin, Goodwin and Hughes (1997) that
formal normative institutions regulating competition evolve in relation to
organisations of units of competition as they in turn evolve,18 suggest a com-
plex interaction between formal frameworks and informal norms of competi-
tive process. Regulation can thus stimulate vertical integration at the expense
of inter-firm co-operation, but in circumstances where stockmarkets as a main
feature of capital markets can also lead to more predatory merger and acqui-
sition processes than in economies where long-term banking finance plays a
greater role. Particular firm–market structures can become normalised over
quite long periods, and thereby establish norms of competition. During
processes of restructuration of industrial organisation, or, for example, shifts
in the location of power along supply chains, these norms become destabilised,
and as the market is re-formed ‘abnormal’ or market destabilising turbulence
occurs. Examples of how one competitive configuration replaces another are
given below, but there is a sense in which such processes of institution involve
the supersession of one mode of competition by another, rather than compe-
tition between one productive system and another. But, equally, different and
conflicting modes of competition can continue to exist side by side: ‘New
Competition’ is far from having driven out ‘Old Competition’. In speaking
of ‘norms’ of competition, therefore, and of the co-evolution of formal regu-
latory and non-formal norms of competition, there is no presumption of a
functionalist process of mutual adaptation.
From the above discussion of different dimensions of competition as
instituted economic process, it is clear that competition is complex, multi-
dimensional and variable, both historically and comparatively. Changes in the
nature of the competitive process in terms of how ‘atomistic’ or firm-oriented
it is co-varies often with changes in the object or focus of the competitive
process. Under specific, possibly unusual, empirical conditions, purely narrow
price competition for homogenous products and high levels of transparency,
under conditions of relative equality, may occur. But to do so, infrastructural
conditions, and particular market rules, need to be instituted. There is
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indirect competition between labour markets and product markets, product
markets and capital markets, and the relationship between these different
markets is open to variable historical processes of institution and reconfigu-
ration. Different forms of competition operate at different scales of competi-
tion, so that competition is operating in several registers simultaneously. And,
finally, there is a complex interaction between formal norms of competition
enshrined in competition regulation and the non-formal norms of competi-
tion occurring in relatively stable, often quite long-term, market formations.
To illustrate this multi-dimensionality, and the process of de-institution and
re-institution of different forms of competition, discussion now turns to the
effects of the changes in the UK food retailing market.
UK supermarkets and changing forms of competition19
During the course of the twentieth century, UK multiple retailers have
grown from having roughly ten per cent of the market share of the food
market to over 85 per cent. In a first phase, multiple retailers established an
integrated national market for food retailing (Jefferys, 1954). In a second
phase, from the early 1970s, but accelerating through the 1980s, the small
handful of major retailers established a commanding share, and two, Tesco
and Sainsbury, contested for market leadership (Wrigley and Lowe, 1996).
As a mark of their power, these two market the highest supermarket own-
label proportion of goods of any food retailers – in many product ranges
well over 50 per cent and in key ranges up to 100 per cent. This is a story
of growth as much as of competition, and competition between these rivals
alone would be insufficient to explain the structural changes that have
taken place.
In terms of the IEP approach developed above, this rise to power of super-
markets can be seen to have fundamentally altered all dimensions of compe-
tition, and the forms of competition, within this sector, by
● instituting new market forms for consumer markets and intermediate
markets;
● altering the asymmetrical power relations, changing the structure of
mutual dependences and forming new units of competition between sup-
ply chains;
● re-channelling competition, giving it a new locus and focus;
● changing the distributed nature of innovation, and also the innovation
process and style; and
● provoking a conflict between an ‘old-style’ regulatory regime relating to
earlier forms of competition and the new norms of competition.
The significance of this change arises from the combination of all of these
processes, but, for analytical purposes, each will be briefly separately dis-
cussed below.
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The institution of new markets
The new supermarkets fundamentally restructured the end market, by creat-
ing the comprehensive one-stop-shop food and household provisions’ retail-
ing outlet. The essential characteristic of these retail outlets is that they trade
in total ranges of commodities. The competition is between traders in the
totality of the ranges and services they have on offer, rather than in specific
product to product competition. Consequently, through either out-of-town or
town-based superstores, they aggregate demand over distinctive catchment
areas, and adapt product ranges to the socio-economic characteristics of those
areas. They also effectively eliminated wholesale markets as intermediary
markets, and thus eradicated the forms of competition typical of those mar-
kets by bypassing them. The typical instituted form of those wholesale markets
was to operate as spot markets, with very short-term, price-focused and
market-clearing competition. The structure of trading had been for a large
plurality of primary producers to supply a relatively small number of whole-
salers who traded with a large plurality of retailers on a commission basis.
From the mid-1980s, supermarkets centralised their purchasing activities,
bought direct from primary producers, with whom they established relatively
long-term, often exclusive, trading relations.
New asymmetric power relations of mutual dependence, new units of competition
The concentration of power in the hands of two or three major multiples has
resulted in a radical shift in power in relation to at least three other classes
of economic agent: consumers, primary producers, and food manufacturers
and processors. In relation to consumers, the operation of catchment areas,
in which one major store is locationally strongly advantaged in respect of a
large number of consumers can create a quasi-monopoly position. Rein-
forced through various ‘loyalty card’ electronic point of sale (Eftpos)
schemes, the result is that 70 per cent of the majority of shoppers’ grocery
purchases is undertaken regularly in one store.
In relation to brand manufacturers, major international companies, with
global presence, are constrained to produce own-label products under super-
market specification. In short, where competition does occur between own-
label and branded goods, retailers are in a powerful position to set the terms
of that competition.
But perhaps it is in relation to own-label producers that the most conspic-
uous changes have taken place. As a consequence of the development of
own-label manufacture, five or six major own-label manufacturers supply the
bulk of all own label produce to a similar number of retail multiples, creat-
ing a complex interlocking matrix of exclusive trade in relation to particular
products and product ranges. Typically, one of the large own-label manufac-
turers will have a number of factory units, each dedicated to the exclusive
supply to one of the major multiples. For example, one company provides all
the lasagne, each under a different specification and design, to the top five
retailers. Or, for pizzas, two manufacturers supply one retailer with different
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segments of the pizza market, also on an exclusive basis. This type of
‘multiple and criss-crossing monopsony’ between relatively low numbers of
trading partners on either side of the exchange, means that competition is
reduced significantly between own-label manufacturers, and orchestrated at
the retail–consumer end through the retailers’ integration of the ranges of
products that they obtain from manufacturers. Moreover, retailers audit and
specify the suppliers used by the own-label manufacturers and, in cases of
long-term relations, operate on the basis of ‘open accounts’. This ‘monop-
sonistic matrix’ is not easily described in terms of vertical constraint or quasi-
vertical integration, in as much as they any given own-label manufacturer has
a number of exclusive relations with retailers, and vice versa.
In relation to primary producers of fresh produce, direct purchase has led
to a massive concentration of the supply base, and long-term, often exclusive,
trading relationships between retailers and primary producers. The effect of
this is to relocate competition from a process occurring between large num-
bers of primary producers, to competition within a periphery of contingent
suppliers striving to become established in the core of long-term stable suppli-
ers. The competition thus changes in nature, from a focus essentially on price
to a focus on the capacity to produce consistently to the specification of super-
markets, across a differentiated product range and quality, over the long term.
Overall the effect of this shift in asymmetrical power is to create new
forms of mutual dependence, of locked-in long-term trading relationships. It
is clear that this is not a form of co-operation between similar economic
agents under conditions of complementarity, but a form of co-ordination,
often involving high levels of trust and also of mutual recognition of where
the power lies. As a result, new units of competition have been developed
which have displaced the old. In terms of definition of the market, there is a
sense in which the residual independent small retailers are not being elimi-
nated through competition with supermarkets (Competition Commission,
2000), strictu sensu, but are being superseded by a different form of retail
organisation, with competition now occurring between superstore compa-
nies each with its particular supply chain, logistical system and productive
innovation capabilities.
The re-channelling of competition
As a result of the formation of new market organisation and new units of
competition, it can be seen that competition is squeezed to the ends and the
peripheries of the supply chains, on the one hand, and between rival super-
market chains at a national scale, on the other. Within the supply chains,
competition is replaced by the power to transmit and displace competitive
pressures downwards from the ‘front end’. So, within the units there is not
so much direct competition between equivalent economic agents (own-label
manufacturers, primary core exclusive suppliers), as an exercise in relative
power to displace competitive pressure from the front end, subject to the
constraints of maintaining trust and partnership.
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New forms of innovation and distributed innovation process
The development of these new units of competition has involved, pari passu,
the development of both new forms of organisation and innovation process,
distributed across different agents within, and intersecting with, the supply
chain. A striking example of such a process might be the way in which a major
supermarket orchestrated the development and introduction of biological
pest controls in southern Spain with a biotechnology company, which pro-
duced the beneficial pests, the tomato growers, and the training and techni-
cal support bodies in the region. It is obvious that such an innovation process
requiring co-ordination between a number of diverse agents by a retailer
involves a quite different form of trading relationship between those agents
than in earlier retailing epochs. An equally striking example is the way in
which retailers combine with an exclusive own-label manufacturer, TV chefs,
and chic metropolitan restaurants, to deliver a constant stream of fashion-
following-and-setting products onto the supermarket shelf. The own-label
exclusive trading relationship, by giving secure market access to the manu-
facturers, and rapid lines of communication, reduces the time from concept
to market from about two years to as little as four weeks. Consequently,
compared to the typical innovation style of a major branded manufacturer
normally launching four or five new products per year, who has to secure
market access and presence through advertising and many other sunken costs,
the own-label manufacturer normally launches over 1,000 products, many of
them with a short lifecycle. In this latter style of innovation, the new prod-
ucts are effectively creating a new consumer food market, of different
demand characteristics, rather than simply copying and undercutting
branded products within the same market segment.
Conflict between formal and non-formal norms of competition
In 1999 the Office of Fair Trading referred the grocery retailing sector to the
Competition Commission, to determine whether a monopoly existed within
the sector, whether a monopoly situation was being exploited, and whether
the monopoly, if it existed, operated against the public interest. The terms
and formal norms of the competition inquiry were based on assumptions
about the nature of competition which belong to a different structure of mar-
kets and organisation of economic agents, still largely concerned with price
competition, measured by ‘the shopping basket’ (Office of Fair Trading,
1997). Thus, the problem was identified in terms of whether competition
existed ‘in catchment areas where consumers have little choice of supermar-
kets’ and that their ‘power may become exploitative’ in relation to their sup-
pliers (in reference to the Competition Commission, November 1999). Yet,
on the one hand, superstores require catchment areas, which, if not exclu-
sive, provide a secure breadth and depth of aggregate demand. Clusters of
small independent retailers offering similar products in close proximity in a
given highstreet reflects a particular organisation of the retail market, and a
similar geographical arrangement for superstores would be unsustainable.
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On the other, supply chains dominated and orchestrated by retailers, with
long-term insiders and contingent outsiders, comprise the basis on which
supermarkets have developed the distributed capacity to deliver an entirely
new product range and style of product innovation. We have seen how the
perhaps bizarre matrix of trade between own-label manufacturers and large
retail multiples defies normal categories of cartelisation, vertical constraint
or integration. Thus, we are witnessing a conflict between new instituted
non-formal norms of competition and existing, ‘anachronistic’ formal norms
of competition (Competition Commission, 2000). That is not to say, of
course, that the outcome of the conflict is one in which the ‘new’ will prevail
over the ‘anachronistic’, especially if the latter facilitates the entry into the
market of a new discount-oriented, price-focused, retail model following
Wal-Mart’s acquisition of Asda.
Conclusion
The rise in the relative power of UK supermarkets has been given as an
example of how the restructuration of a sector has resulted in new forms of
competition as an instituted economic process. This analysis of forms of com-
petition in terms of a number of interrelated dimensions has focused on the
processes of the institution of competition, rather than classifying or defining
types of competition. The interest of the case of UK supermarkets is not so
much that it represents the result of a particular historical institution of com-
petition (which may or may not last, spread or contract), as that it reveals
processes of transformation from one form of competition to another, and the
dynamics of that transformation. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this
analysis is that a particular norm of instituted competitive process is the out-
come of this multi-dimensional restructuration, rather than the outcome of
competition itself. A process of competition is the historical result of the trans-
formations of markets, the formation of new units of competition and of new
scales of markets, the re-shaping and creating of new classes of economic
agent with new asymmetries of power and mutual dependence, and an inter-
action between formal and non-formal norms of competition, rather than
an independent, sui generis, dynamic force. With varieties of capitalism go
varieties of competition, and explanations must look to dynamics and
processes of variation.
Notes
1 ‘Ultimately, rivalry must evolve beyond cost to include differentiation’ (Porter,
1998a, p. 213).
2 ‘Viewing a group of companies and institutions as a cluster highlights opportuni-
ties for co-ordination and mutual improvement in areas of common concern
without threatening or distorting competition or limiting the intensity of rivalry’
(Porter, 1998a, p. 205).
3 This view has been further developed in an analysis of the historical comparative
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advantage held by regionally developed capabilities, and new modes of productive
organisation exemplified by Boston’s Route 128 (Best, 2001). See also chapter 9,
this volume.
4 The focus is also on vertical constraint in supply chains, the subject of further dis-
cussion below.
5 To take another classical sociologist, Simmel, it is possible to envisage forms of
competition which, far from acting to the detriment of others, simply spur oth-
ers to produce greater variety (Swedberg 1994, p. 272). That conception is one
which almost presupposes growth, an expanding market, which does not reside
in efficient allocation of existing resources, with some losers and some gainers. In
ways which seem to foreshadow Porter’s ‘positive sum’ world of potential win-
ners, this ‘benign’ and ‘emulatory’ competition in exchange relies on productive
capacities for growth lying outside exchange.
6 ‘The human economy, then, is embedded and enmeshed in institutions economic
and non-economic’ (Polanyi, 1957, p. 250). Note here the ambiguity of human
economy being embedded in economic institutions.
7 ‘The electric utility industry was born not out of Benthamite Equations or opti-
mising rationality, but longstanding friendships, similar experiences, common
dependencies, corporate interlocks, and active creation of new social relations.
Samuel Insull and his circle of collaborators socially constructed their firms in
similar ways, and then promoted a system of industry governance and template
diffusion. They drew upon their local and national contacts to re-frame the mar-
ket and the political system in ways that pressured utility firms toward technical,
organisational, economic and legal conformity’ (Granovetter and McGuire,
1998, p. 167).
8 ‘The actor’s ontology is variable: his or her objectives, interests, will and thus
identity are caught up in a process of continual reconfiguration, a process that is
intimately related to the constant reconfiguration of the network of interactions
in which he or she is involved’ (Callon, 1998, pp. 252–3).
9 ‘In this “hot” world, which is becoming increasingly difficult to cool down, the
work of economists is becoming ever more arduous because the actors they are
tracking are faced by non-calculable decisions’ (Callon, 1998, p. 263). He argues
that societies are increasingly ‘hot’ in this sense, because of the role of rapid inno-
vation, and in a quite technoscientific deterministic fashion suggests that what
makes societies ‘hot’ is that ‘technosciences . . . cause entanglements and net-
works of interdependencies to proliferate at their leisure – the market must be
constantly reformed and built up from scratch’ (ibid., p. 266).
10 ‘The anonymous market of neo-classical models is virtually non-existent . . . Trans-
actions of all kinds are rife with social connections . . . ’ (Granovetter, 1985, p. 495).
11 As suggested in a preliminary way by Swedberg (1994, pp. 273–4)
12 Most notably analysed by Marx, Capital, Vol. 1.
13 This is not to say, of course, that capital and labour factor inputs cannot be
substituted for one another on occasions, depending on the relative costs of such
factor inputs.
14 Best characterises the Marshallian district as one of static complementarities,
as against New Competition dynamic complementarities arising from continual
mutual enhancement of dissimilar but complementary capabilities (1990, p. 235).
15 To stress the multi-dimensional aspect of such competition, there can be different
scales of product, labour, and capital market competition at play simultaneously.
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16 Braudel’s 1982 work exemplifies a long duration approach to the historical for-
mation of different scales of market formation.
17 For example the International Institute of Management Development’s World
Competitiveness Yearbook (2000) uses a battery of different measures to rank
nations in terms of how nations provide ‘firms with an environment that sustains
the domestic and global competitiveness of the firms operating in their borders’.
18 And indeed as a response to shifts in dominant economic orthodoxies.
19 This illustrative example is based on research undertaken between 1997 and
2000 which used the tomato as an empirical probe to explore the relationships
occurring in supply chains and markets, and the way these shaped innovation
processes. Interviews were conducted along the length of the chain, and in the
networks surrounding different nodes of the chain. Seed manufacturers, biotech-
nology companies, scientists, own label and brand manufacturers, supermarkets,
wholesale markets, logistics companies, importers, and a number of other key
players were interviewed during the course of this research.
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Introduction
The contemporary ‘cultural turn’ in thinking about economic processes has
been deeply bound up with narratives of ‘dematerialisation’. We might start
from Veblenesque stories of status symbols, and proceed through semiotic
stories of ideologies and codes, through tales of post-industrial societies and
service economies, through post-Fordist segmentation and lifestyling and
finally on to knowledge, information or ‘weightless’ economies, ‘new
economies’, global brands and digital commodities. Indeed, Mark Poster’s
What’s the Matter with the Internet? (2001) declares a turn into ‘linguistic
capitalism’, and his title clearly identifies the issue at hand: the dubious mat-
eriality of contemporary social reality. The story is always the same: the
processes, factors and outputs of economic processes are to be understood –
increasingly – in terms of meanings, signs and cultural processes.
‘Dematerialisation’, however, rests on a dubious distinction that has
plagued much social theory: the distinction between objects and signs. This
distinction equates ‘materiality’ with the physicality, or physical properties, of
goods and social objects. It then contrasts this physicality with a ‘something
else’ – meanings, signs, culture, desires, identities, services, information or
knowledge. These are then regarded, firstly, as non-physical (hence having
quite different kinds of social properties); secondly, as additive (a later accre-
tion or layering of physical reality); and, finally, as historical (things have
become more immaterial, or immaterial things have become more socio-
economically central today).
The argument proposed in this chapter is that characterisations of ‘new
economy’ that are based on the idea of dematerialisation are problematic
because the distinction on which they are based misrepresents the issue of
materiality. A historical account of socio-economic change which argues that
‘things’ have become ‘less material’ assumes that they were somehow more,
or more transparently, material in the past, an argument that is contested by
most research in areas such as sociology of consumption, material culture and
science and technology studies. Indeed, as the next section argues, notions of
materiality based in the object–sign distinction are generally not properly
5
Markets, materiality and the ‘new economy’
Don Slater
social or historical accounts at all: they are propounded in relation to ethical,
philosophical and methodological concerns. What is required is a more
adequate social ontology: an account of what I will call ‘processes of materi-
alisation’, of the social processes by which things come to be treated as things
in the social world – whether they are commodities, brands, technologies,
or information.
From this perspective, ‘materiality’ is not a matter of physicality but rather
of what might be called ‘social thingness’, rather close to the Durkheimian
notion of ‘social facts’: under what conditions are we able to treat things in
the world as objects – durable, stable, external to individuals, with determi-
nate properties and relations to other objects? In answering this kind of ques-
tion, we cannot look to the a priori physicality of things to guarantee their
social materiality; nor does the meaningfulness of things necessarily render
them unstable or immaterial. To the contrary, this question points us to the
social processes and conditions through which things are stabilised as social
materialities, or destabilised, reconfigured, problematised. If ‘dematerialisa-
tion’ has any meaning it is not as a condition of becoming ‘merely a sign’;
rather it is a condition in which the social agencies and processes that previ-
ously held an object stable – held it together as both physical entity and as
meaning, inseparably – no longer do so. And it is the reasons for the changes
in these conditions – not supposed changes in the nature of social objects
themselves – that needs to be understood.
Hence, the third section of the chapter tries to think through current
socio-economic changes – such as the idea of a ‘new economy’ – in terms of
transformations in these conditions of stability and instability, in the
processes of materialisation that characterise the contemporary landscape.
This might be called an exercise in ‘commercial ontology’: how might we
understand the changing materialisations of transactable objects? How might
we understand the conditions of their materialisation in terms of stability and
destabilisation? The conclusion will be that many widespread claims about
‘new economy’ may well be correct, but only if we abandon the notion of
dematerialisation that arises from the object–sign distinction. Indeed, we can
give better accounts of these developments through the filter of stabilisation–
destabilisation: it is not that commercial objects have become more like signs,
but that things in general have become sites of intense social and economic
contestation such that they have become increasingly provisional and incip-
iently unstable as materialities.
Materiality, physicality and stability
The first task is to understand the various strategies used to ‘black box’ goods
as stable objects within economic and cultural theory, and to understand what
kind of game is being played through those strategies. In both economic and
cultural theory, the social object oscillates wildly between an absolute, pre-
given ‘thingness’ and an equally absolute indeterminacy, when it is treated as
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a sign. It is as if objects have to be ‘black boxed’ for fear that, once opened,
they will behave more like a Pandora’s box, issuing formless spectres.
Goods and markets in economic thought
It is in relation to markets that goods are most obviously conceptually
stabilised within economic thought. (For a full discussion of the argument
presented in this section, see Slater, 2002.) In everyday language, we define
markets as markets for particular goods: there are markets for consumer
electronics, or cars, or clothes. Similarly, marketing directors or financial
analysts are concerned with futures markets or housing markets. And this is
fundamental to both conventional economics and critical economic dis-
courses: markets are delineated by virtue of their containing goods that are
considered similar enough to be substitutable for each other and hence can
be understood as competing with each other. The very notion of a market
therefore depends on an anthropology of goods – the boundaries of markets
follow the categorisations of things. But it is a frozen anthropology. Within
economic analysis categorisation is not a process but a presumed background
that provides a stable framework within which market analyses can be
carried out. To some extent, this is a methodological manoeuvre that is sup-
ported by a variety of methodological devices which allow the analyst to take
‘things’ for granted. ‘Utility’, for example, abstracts from cultural processes
to a quantitative common denominator. Demand curves, frozen in time,
erase all changes in the properties of goods and in the nature of needs
and desires (Lancaster, 1971). The conceptual and disciplinary distinction
between formal and substantive rationality permits economics to detach
formal analysis from any knowledge of changing consumption cultures, and
allocates the latter to external disciplines such as sociology, psychology
and anthropology (Fine and Leopold, 1993; Slater, 1997).
At the same time, however, such manoeuvres are clearly tied to an underly-
ing ontology, even a cosmology: the conventional approach is to regard the
commercial object as an entity defined by a bundle of need-satisfying proper-
ties, glossed as ‘utilities’ or ‘use-value’. It is therefore part of an essentially rela-
tional formulation – a relationship of ‘use’ – and therefore something that only
makes sense as a subject–object relationship. Indeed, the framework of eco-
nomics is more akin to epistemology than ontology: it concerns the use of
informed reason to manage an object world. It is hardly surprising that an issue
which has fatally dogged Western philosophy – the separation and then
attempted reconciliation of subjects and objects – is not going to be resolved by
economists. They instead veer between two unsatisfactory alternatives both of
which bracket processes of materialisation. Firstly, naturalisation – needs and
goods are effectively treated as natural, rational, given or taken-for-granted;
assumed needs are associated with the assumed properties of things. Secondly,
subjectification – needs and objects are both matters of perception and opinion.
Social materiality is detached from social process, either by taking it as
given or by rendering it arbitrary. Each strategy achieves a stabilisation of
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goods as things that establishes the market as a stable methodological object
of knowledge and a presumed framework of normative social action. And yet
this assumption of stable homogenous goods runs counter both to common
sense and to actual economic practice. Firstly, we know not only that goods
change over time in a physical sense (innovation), but that perception of
goods changes, and along with this our sense of ‘what is the same as what’.
Hence markets are not stable structures if only because our anthropology of
things is not a stable structure but an evolving and conflictual cultural
dynamic. Moreover, economic actors – today functionally differentiated into
institutions such as advertising, brand consultancy, design – may place the
conjoint redefinition of goods and markets at the very centre of market prac-
tices: marketing, for example, is specifically dedicated to altering relations of
sameness and difference for competitive advantage. Far from competition
presuming the stability of things, destabilisation is central to conceptualising
and conducting competitive strategies.
Secondly, aggregation is a fiction: only if there was an exact fit between
every individual need and every good could we regard any collection of goods
to be the same for every consumer (Klein and Leiss, 1978). This is anthropo-
logical nonsense: people need to interpret goods (and usually do so collec-
tively, not individually) in order to assimilate them into their consumption. To
the extent that economic actors – producers or consumers – are indeed able to
aggregate things, it is precisely on the basis of the cultural reasoning through
which they establish (and dispute) provisionally stable categorisations.
This is not to say that goods and their categorisations are always unstable
and that therefore market structures, enduring competitive relations and
meaningful aggregation are impossible. There are everyday reifications that fit
economic analysis reasonably well (for example, a financial analyst looking at
the car market in global terms; or a consumer negotiating a category such as
chewing gum). We need to understand both stability and destabilisation, and
the conditions, processes and agencies that structure their relationship. The
point rather is that the instability of goods is always an inherent property of
their social being, and can be mobilised by economic actors as a resource in
their production, exchange and consumption. The problem is that the
assumption of stable goods and stable markets – inscribed in the very defini-
tion of a market – blind us to the dynamics of stabilisation and destabilisation.
Cultural theory
The stabilisation of things, therefore, needs to be understood as a conceptual
and practical strategy rather than in terms of stable physicality, or the loss
of stability through loss of physicality. Analysts and actors are engaged
in strategic games of constituting and deconstructing social materialities. The
objectifications that arise are always provisional and contestable; their dura-
bility resides in a broad range of social conditions and balances of social pow-
ers. It cannot be guaranteed by physicality; but neither does ‘culturalness’
necessarily entail destabilisation or the loss of social materiality.
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The relationship of physicality to object stability in cultural theory paral-
lels moves along the axis of the distinction between ‘objects’ and ‘signs’. Like
the distinction between naturalisation and subjectivisation strategies in eco-
nomic thought, ‘object’ and ‘sign’ denote two different ways of fleshing out,
or filling up, the empty space left by the qualitative indeterminacy of objects
and needs. However, the object–sign distinction also emerges out of a longer
and relatively autonomous history of thinking about social objects. It is gen-
erally bound up with moral and philosophical critiques rather than analyses
of social processes. On one side of the object–sign distinction there is the pre-
sumption that both things and needs can arise from a natural order, in which
they directly and transparently correlate with one another. This posits a Gold
Standard in object relations – usually located in a romanticised organic com-
munity of the past – in which objects could be construed as natural entities
(or humanly produced ones with natural properties) that functionally or
rationally answer to needs which are themselves regarded as natural. If these
needs are not defined as actually physical (food, shelter, clothing), they are
defined as if they were (for example, a natural need for love, security, spe-
cific social skills). This view begins with a long pre-modern moral–religious
tradition of asceticism and restraint (for example, critiques of ‘luxury’: see
Sekora, 1977; Berry, 1994). It is continued into a Romantic tradition that
posits a past or future harmony of objects and needs outside of the diremp-
tions of capitalist modernity (for example, Marx’s ‘natural metabolism’
between man and nature posits an ideal social formation based on use value).
We can similarly cite what Veblen (1898–99, 1990) termed the ‘instinct for
workmanship’ (a functional transformation of nature in relation to real
needs that constitutes his ultimate critical standpoint on the ‘invidious’ socio-
cultural system of industrial manufacture and consumption); Marcuse’s
1964 critique of false needs that arise from the commodity form; or Bour-
dieu’s 1984 appeal to a ‘taste for necessity’ that sentimentally stands the poor
in opposition to the symbolic violence of bourgeois culture. (Barthes 1986
uses the same argument in the postscript to Mythologies.)
It is against this backdrop that ‘signifying properties’ of goods (and that
motility of needs) might be regarded as both separable and relatively disrep-
utable: as signifying, needs and goods lose their anchorage in a moral–
existential objectivity, and become the playthings of commodity forms, status
competition, ideology, ethical relativism. The common denominator is invari-
ably a charge of arbitrariness. The stability of objects and needs is not studied
as a social outcome but is asserted as a normative standard; the presumed
dematerialisation of contemporary objects and needs, on the other hand, is
investigated as a pathology. Even in relatively neutral constructions of this
distinction (for example, Douglas and Isherwood, 1979) the informational
uses of goods can be analysed entirely separately from their functional order.
Of the many problems with the object–sign distinction, the one that most
concerns me here is that it presupposes the answer to the very question it is
meant to be asking: what counts as an ‘object’ or a ‘thing’ or a ‘function’
Markets, materiality and the ‘new economy’ 99
under specific social conditions? It is not simply that the very notion of a
‘function’ has to be meaningfully constructed (Sahlins 1976 still provides the
most comprehensive statement of that position); or that ‘cultural’ entities are
capable of both highly durable and objectified materiality. The basic problem
is that adopting the standard of brute physicality produces an oscillation
between crude things and hyper-sophisticated signs. Baudrillard is probably
the most extreme exemplar of that analytical structure: his rigorous critique
of the mythology of use-value results in the loss of all materiality from the
social world and the reduction of all sociality to the arbitrary play of signifi-
cation. The infamous result is a vortex of signs, or an ecstasy of communica-
tion, that precludes any object stability, any possibility of social materiality in
the sense employed here.
What is lost in-between objects and signs are the socio-cultural practices
by which things are constituted and recognised as things in the first place.
Much like the subject–object relations that characterise economic thinking,
the object–sign distinction is essentially epistemological. The questions that
concern it are not about the processes by which we make our world but those
by which we can guarantee correct knowledge of it: to what extent are object
relations governed by a correspondence between the real properties of phys-
ical things and the real needs of humans? To what extent are people capable
– in pre-modern times, or within consumer cultures, or ‘after the revolution’
– of functionally subordinating the things of the world to their human proj-
ects? (See Lash 1999 for a call to move from epistemology to an ontological
perspective concerned with how things are ‘grounded’ in lifeworlds.)
Black boxes: conceptual and practical stabilisation
As we have seen, there are diverse of motives for treating social objects as
‘black boxes’. This bounding of the object has a philosophical status (it marks
off subjects and objects, and identifies objects in terms of their ‘bundles of
properties’); it has an ethical status (it is a way of thinking about correct and
incorrect objects, needs and uses); and it has a clear economic function (it
marks off objects as discrete, singularised and therefore transactable entities
[Callon, 1998, 1999, 2002]).
We might contrast this situation with alternative frameworks such as the
perspective of material culture and objectification within anthropology and
consumption studies (for example, Miller, 1987; Strathern, 1990), and sci-
ence and technology studies derived from Latour and Callon. What science
and technology studies has been particularly good at demonstrating is the
complexity and heterogeneity of elements that hold together these black
boxes (and which spring out when we open them), and their clear irre-
ducibility to an object–sign distinction. ‘Black boxing’ means treating social
objects as finalised entities with fixed boundaries that cut them off cleanly
from other objects and social processes on their outside and that endow them
with a taken-for-granted ‘inside’ that is assumed to account for their shape
and stability. However, when we open the black box, or crack the shell that
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seemingly contains the object as a physical entity, we do not suddenly find
signs and meanings (they were always there) but rather the heterogenous
social networks that held the object in shape. For example, when we talk
unproblematically about everyday objects like cars or pens or utilities (water
or gas or electricity as reliable ‘objects’), we ‘black box’ a social entity in a
physical form. The example of utilities indicates how dubious this physicality
is: we know that in turning on the cooker, we are not simply consuming a
physical entity but rather we set in motion a socio-technical device (Callon,
2002) that stretches from, say, the North Sea through pipelines, regulatory
bodies, market structures, ownership structures, retail practices, advertising,
expert discourses, and much more. We also know that there is a liklihood that
complicated definitional issues will arise at the boundaries of these objects
and their uses. The idea of black boxing indicates that complex interwoven
social systems of provision (which mix the physical and the non-physical
indiscriminately) and potentially disputable categorisations of social things
can be crystallised in the form of stable objects and needs. A car is not a car
because of its physicality but because systems of provision and categories of
things are ‘materialised’ in a stable form. Conversely, these stable forms can
be destabilised in various ways, which does not mean they become somehow
less physical but that they might be put together differently.
A useful analogy might be made with the semiotic concept of découpage:
the idea of a stable object – like that of a stable signifier – involves making a
cut or incision in the world, cutting out a set of relations and oppositions that
are in reality continuous, and could be divided up quite differently. Destabil-
isation (for example, coming up with the idea that electricity companies can
sell gas) means returning to the continuity of systems and relationships and
trying out alternative découpages. The problem with black boxing – as the
analogy with découpages should suggest – is not that things and signs are never
stabilised. As already suggested, they very definitely are. The problem is
in hiding the process of production, and assuming that this stability arises
from the object itself rather than from the agencies that cut it out and bind
it together in particular forms. The further problem is that we have to
understand the way in which actors use the possibilities and conditions of
stabilising and destabilising things in structuring their actions, such as their
competitive behaviour.
As already noted, this does not mean that social objects are always unsta-
ble. We are constantly able to black box them in using or buying them on
often quite stable markets. The move of opening or closing black boxes is a
matter of the actor’s perspective, intentions and projects, not the nature of
objects. This is evident within corporate practice. An advertising or market-
ing executive may spend a great deal of time thinking through the definition
of an object and the structures that stabilise it precisely in order to destabilise
the good and re-stabilise it in an optimal position within competitive and
consumption relations. What should this mobile phone, for example, be
sold as? A gadget, a status symbol, a practical necessity, an integral part of
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mobile information systems comprising PDAs, Internet and integrated mes-
saging services? Sales staff may reconfigure the object in relation to each
prospective customer.
Yet looked at from the perceptive of the corporate boardroom, or of a
management consultancy, the mobile phone and its market may be consid-
ered relatively stable entities – indeed, as one part of an even broader context
of continuity, the consumer electronics market. That is to say, there are real
processes of abstraction as we move to higher levels of strategic planning at
which specific markets – and the products they contain – can be regarded as
stable and self-evident for all practical purposes. At that level, markets are
also held stable by broad structures which are resistant to the interventions
of single-market actors, and are therefore treated as given environments: for
example, distribution and retail infrastructures, or the market categories of
finance capital. We could in fact isolate a series of market levels – from cor-
porate planning through brand management (dealing with broad markets) to
product management (dealing with market segments), each of which treats
the lower levels as givens. And yet the black box may be opened at the most
global of levels, too. For example, we are currently witnessing the decon-
struction of the very idea of a telecommunications market at the most global
and macro of levels, a process through which even the most strategic players
must question both objects and market structures. The convergence of
mobile phones with PDAs (personal digital assistants) potentially creates new
objects that realign older ones; new wireless interconnections between
objects (for example, Bluetooth) potentially reconfigure systems in which
they are embedded; unforeseen technical potentialities reconfigure competi-
tion, pricing and market frameworks (for example, Internet telephony,
empowered by broadband, potentially merges all communications within a
single information flow). Finally, we need to recognise that the ‘black boxing’
of, say, the mobile phone market by a financial analyst is not a neutral con-
ceptual move: it has a determinate effect on the stabilisation of that market,
of the individual products it ‘contains’ (i.e. which define it), and on retail
structures and consumer practices.
Old and new economies: opening Pandora’s Box
The preceding argument has aimed to show how current commercial
ontologies bracket processes of materialisation. However, the issue of mate-
rialisation – or of stability–destabilisation – is not specific to any particular
period or society. It cannot ground a historical argument. Trobriand
islanders participating in a kula ring are as exercised by the materialisation
of objects as stable social entities as are dot.com capitalists. They both have
to deploy a total social repertoire of practices and institutions to ensure the
objectness of what they transact. Moreover, we cannot distinguish kula rings
from dot.coms on the basis of increasing role of signification or culture: the
materiality of all their objects involves the same heterogeneity of elements
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and regulatory structures, in which physicality and meaning are not usefully
separated out.
If we want to return to the issue of ‘new economies’, what we might look
for – instead of an altered social ontology – are new forces and principles of
stabilisation and destabilisation, and new ways in which issues of stabilisa-
tion–destabilisation are understood and reflexively incorporated into social
and economic action. What is ‘new’ today, I want to suggest, concerns the
extent to which the process of materialisation, and hence the dynamics of
stability–destabilisation of objects, has become reflexively institutionalised
and instrumentalised as a premiss of economic action and organisation. We
can re-describe vast areas of corporate and consumer behaviour in terms of
the opening and closing of black boxes in the interests of either competitive
gain or cultural reproduction. Put this way, we open up the historical ques-
tion of what new social conditions have opened up that historical path. I
want to put forward three developments – not exhaustive but illustrative –
that might answer this question. None of these is a new idea, to say the least:
they are the stock-in-trade of numerous theories of late modernity, post-
modernity or new economy. The point of this discussion, rather, is to show
that these developments build up a plausible picture of new conditions of
social materialisation but do so without reference to ‘dematerialisation’ or
the object–sign distinction.
Detraditionalisation and pluralisation of styles of life
We commonly characterise modernity in terms of the loosening of social
and cultural structures that – in pre-modern times – were fixed by juridical,
religious and traditional structures. For example, studies of emergent con-
sumer culture emphasise a destabilisation of both status and lifestyle: there
is a new fluidity to material culture, as well as a new pluralism that requires
‘choice’ and problematises the taken-for-grantedness of the objects,
lifestyles and relationships that fill everyday life (for example, Giddens,
1991). Critics of post-modern and late modernity perspectives (for exam-
ple, Warde, 1994, 1997; Gronow and Warde, 2001) have been correct in
pointing to enduring continuities and routinisations of consumption, com-
modities and status/class in everyday life, and even to a lack of anxiety or
even reflexivity in much mundane consumption. Nonetheless, even that
takes place against a backdrop of flux and destabilisation. The situation is
probably best described in terms of Simmel’s dynamics of objective and sub-
jective culture: modern subjects, confronting an explosive objective culture
under conditions of increasing atomisation and impersonality, oscillate
between enervation and indifference, or between reflection and habit, or
even modernity and tradition; nonetheless indifference, habit and tradition
all take on different meanings – and instability – under modern conditions.
At the same time, this unfixing and pluralising opens up commercial oppor-
tunities, which further ratchet up the new dynamism. For example, there is
a routinisation and spectacularisation of innovation – not just the shock of
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the new, but the routine expectation of the new – in commercial as much as
in cultural modernism.
The destabilisation of commodities that is part of these developments has
nothing to do with a change in the nature of goods. There could, of course, be
nothing more ‘signifying’ than a pre-modern sumptuary regulation such as the
sanctity of the king’s deer or the reservation of certain colours and cuts of
clothing to guild orders or aristocracies; but equally there could be nothing less
fixed – either in itself or in relation to status distinctions – than the material
range of foods or clothing today. We can use a simple historical example to
relate detraditionalisation to commercial ontology and market structures.
Political economists like Adam Smith, Ricardo and Marx regularly used corn
and cloth in their examples of market analysis, and in doing so they treated
these goods as self-evident, unproblematic and uniform: classic homogenous,
substitutable and therefore competing commodities. To some extent they did
this as neo-classicals would, bracketing the object in order to treat markets as
given structures within which they could analyse quantitative relationships. At
the same time, this is odd for a perspective which was otherwise so sensitive to
industrial histories of innovation. The additional factor is that corn and cloth
were, in early modernity, stabilised by considerably more than methodological
strategies. Even where there was already considerable innovation in these
goods, or the ways in which they were processed, sold and understood, they
were held in place by a range of regulatory structures. To be clear: they were
fixed by regulation, not by the cruder materiality or physicality of a temporally
earlier, less opulent or less ‘cultural’ epoch. The Edinburgh corn market down
the street from Smith was not filled with generic ‘corn’, but rather with corn
that was divided into varying grades of quality and price, differentiated into
market sectors; moreover, it was customary to divide the market into different
conventional periods – marked off by the sound of the market bell – during
each of which sale was restricted to particular classes of consumers. These clas-
sifications were matters of custom and right – that is to say, they evolved over
histories and were sanctified by time. Hence, for example, E. P. Thompson’s
1971 classic account of eighteenth-century battles over the moral economy of
grain markets is largely about the attempt to retain time-honoured anthro-
pologies of things that were deemed legitimate and ethical by virtue of their
historicity. Similarly, every known pre-modern market has a history of market
law, market policing, and market punishments, much of which concerned
questions of adulteration, weights and measures and other time-honoured
ways of fixing standards, hence of stabilising goods (for example, Braudel,
1982). Establishing the legitimate comparability of things such that recognis-
able and legitimate market relationships can obtain is never guaranteed by the
body of the object; rather, the body of object is produced by legitimate regula-
tion (for a contemporary Internet-based example of the stabilisation of trans-
actable things through social regulation, see Slater (2000 and in press)).
We need only look to the (super)market shelves down our own streets today
to see that, if we are no longer able to speak unproblematically about corn or
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cloth, it is not because of a crisis of materiality but rather a crisis of regulation.
More precisely, regulatory structures are themselves plural and problematical,
no longer stabilised by time or custom and therefore are themselves unstable,
provisional and contradictory. To take but one obvious set of examples: super-
market shelves may contain organic foods, genetically modified foods, low-
calorie and diet foods, frozen, dried or tinned foods, ‘normal’ foods from
sources that are either unknown or (politically, nutritionally or otherwise)
dubious. This fracturing of the object is obviously not just a matter of signs or
brands: these categorisations are established and stabilised, or destabilised,
disputed and redefined – as well as diversely understood – by a bewildering
range of voices and institutions: legal and governmental regulators; scientific
and expert voices with variable degrees of accredited legitimacy; consumerist
associations; businesses and trade associations, consumer constituencies.
What differentiates today’s supermarket from the corn market of Smith’s
day is a destabilisation that does not arise because goods are ‘less material’
but because the social materiality of the good has become a battleground
under conditions of detraditionalisation and pluralisation. There is a wider
range of alternative categorisations of goods; all categorisations appear
provisional; and producers, retailers and consumers are all aware of both
this diversity and its provisional character, and they see it as a legitimate
object of their own interventions through which they stabilise or dispute
categorisations of things.
Disembedded goods and system complexity
We could regard early modern corn and cloth as relatively embedded in a rel-
atively enduring material culture. Although in the early modern corn market,
corn could certainly be alienated as a commodity, its commodity status was
considered subordinate to its status within material culture, which is precisely
why, in Thompson’s account, issues of moral economy and market regulation
arose. By contrast, with the rise of modern market society, the spatial aggre-
gation of dispersed local markets into regional, national and global markets
means that objects have to be produced as disembedded and impersonal, non-
local. Yet this is a highly contradictory process, and it accounts for much of
the contemporary dynamic of object stability and instability. On the one
hand, we might take the example of the rise of branded packaged goods
(from the 1880s onwards, not the 1990s): here, we can see that the aggrega-
tion of national markets was often associated with the packaging and brand-
ing of traditional bulk commodities (for example, flour, or butter or bread).
This allowed manufacturers’ goods to be recognisable across localities but
largely on the basis of traditional categorisations of things. And, indeed, as
current debates about glocalisation indicate, it is a normal condition that
goods sold across localities must nonetheless make sense within each locality,
either because producers and retailers secure global understandings of their
goods, or because they tailor their goods to particular localities, or because
each locality is able to make its own sense of the goods.
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At the same time, however, the disembedding of goods through long-distance
trade means that fissures, conflicts and unevenness are opened up between
the different levels and contexts in which goods are defined and categorised.
Marketing discourses within producers and retailers must inevitably regard
goods not as stable categories but as negotiable entities across highly diverse
contexts. The material cultures from which these goods may originally have
been drawn, or into which they are to be sold, become objects of instrumen-
tal calculation rather than sources of legitimate cultural authority. The point,
again, is that this process cannot be understood in terms of a movement (or
even a distinction) between the physical and the symbolic. An embedded
good is held in place by both physical and symbolic structures, just as a dis-
embedded one is. The issue is rather that the mechanisms by which goods are
socially materialised – are given stable forms as objects and as categories – are
distributed between processes, actors and interests operating at different spa-
tial scales, and hence – yet again – the body of the commodity becomes both
the site of contest as well as its prize.
Management and marketing organisation
The kinds of developments I have been examining are treated by economic
and commercial actors both as problems and as opportunities, and, in devis-
ing strategies for managing them, those actors also intensify them. The
potential destabilisation of social objects is both an inescapable condition of
economic action and a way of reconceptualising business strategy. It has been
a central axiom of management discourse since the mid-twentieth century
(for example, the works of Peter Drucker) that businesses must not try to sell
to consumers what they make, but rather to make what the consumer wants.
We interpret this as reflecting a transition from a world of relatively stable
material cultures and market relations (in which, despite innovation, manu-
facturers could think in terms of relatively self-evident object categories) to
a world of increasingly unstable material cultures and market relations.
One symptomatic management and marketing term that responded to this
situation is the ‘product concept’ or ‘product definition’, along with cognate
terms such as differentiation, segmentation, positioning and market ‘gaps’
that related destabilised, problematic goods to equally unstable competitive
relationships. The idea of a ‘product concept’ renders abstract the very idea
of ‘a good’, making it a matter of definition and something that is produced
through the employment of cultural calculation, information and commu-
nicative skills at the very centre of corporate strategy. But it is absolutely not
contingent on the increasing abstraction, dematerialisation or cultural char-
acter of the goods themselves. Rather, ‘product concepts’ are modes of strate-
gising, organising and integrating everything which has a bearing on the social
materialisation of the object in any of its potential social forms. The product
concept includes the material and symbolic properties of the objects as it
emerges from design and production processes, from the understandings of
retailers, sales forces and diverse consumer constituencies and from the full
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range of cultural intermediaries. It includes the competitive position of the
good in respect of alternative goods and practices, and the financial, cultural
and social parameters of (close and remote) competitive structures. And it
includes the understandings of the good (as technology, sign, practice) within
diverse material cultures. Strategising in terms of product concepts can mean
trying out different definitions of the product to see which will be optimal in
terms of particular consumer and competitive relations; and it can mean try-
ing to assess which social and competitive relations are capable of being
altered (through a range of marketing and other technologies) in order to
optimally position a product that has been defined in a particular way. Finally,
the product concept is a command discourse: it is a way of conceptualising
and choosing the different things a given product could be; and it organises
and integrates the corporate practices through which a firm attempts to mate-
rialise a given product in a given way by intervening in all the social processes
through which things come to be given things. These corporate practices
involve heterogenous technologies and objects of intervention (for example,
design, packaging, perceptions, consumer practices, media environments,
retail spaces) which have generally become the domains of functionally dif-
ferentiated departments, firms and consultancies. These generally have to be
co-ordinated – precisely what product concepts, as management tools, are
meant to do.
This routine description of corporate practice – which can be fleshed out in
terms of developments within firms, business schools and management dis-
courses extending over at least a century – makes no reference to any shift in
products from physicality to sign, however conceptual or abstract the process
of defining these products may have become. Indeed, these developments
build on potentialities in the nature of commodities which were as available
in the eighteenth century as much as they are today (thus, Wedgewood’s mar-
keting operation, so often described as a proto-postmodern translation of
objects into signs (e.g. by Wernick, 1991), could more easily be described in
terms of product concepts as outlined here). The issue is rather that social
ontology – seen from the firm’s perspective of managing, in the interest of
competitive advantage, the processes by which things are materialised as
things – has become recognised as central to commercial practice, because it
can no longer be taken for granted and because it has become acknowledged
as the basis of more effective market behaviour. As a result, corporate inter-
vention in these processes has become more reflexive, more rationalised and
more institutionalised within corporate structures and divisions of labour.
The conclusion of this kind of analysis is quite simply that we do not live in
a ‘more cultural’ economy, or a society of the sign, or an enculturated econ-
omy but that we do live in a world that has opened up the black box of the
social object, institutionalising and rendering reflexive processes which were
always incipient. Hence, we live in a world of increasing instability at the level
of material culture, and one which is driven by strategies of stabilisation and
destabilisation, by contests over the materiality of the social world itself.
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An ‘economy of qualities’?
Let me end with one final approach to these issues which is fruitful because
it is both completely in tune with the analysis put forward here and yet
retains some of the elements that I have been trying to critique. In a recent
paper, Michel Callon (2002) offers the idea of an ‘economy of qualities’. On
the one hand, this refers to a process which is very like the process of social
materialisation. Where this chapter talks of ‘stability’ and ‘destabilisation’,
Callon talks of ‘qualification’ and ‘requalification’: Callon tracks the prod-
uct through a gauntlet of institutional processes – within firms, regulatory
bodies and consumer encounters with goods – over the course of which the
object is endowed with different ‘qualities’, ever refined and contested
between different parties. These qualities, moreover, are indiscriminate in
respect of the physical or the symbolic; rather the focus is on the different
technologies and metrics through which objects become determinate, and in
terms of which they might eventually be regarded as more or less stable,
though always provisionally (e.g., Callon distinguishes products – which
denotes things in their relationship to the process of qualification–requalifi-
cation – from ‘goods’, a term which connotes a sense of the object as more
or less stable). Moreover, Callon is explicit about the implications of these
processes for market structures: drawing on Chamberlin (1948), he argues
that categorisations of goods are fundamental to market structures.
However, he does not delineate the full extent to which this has become
operationalised as a competitive strategy within corporate practice; he is
more concerned with the status of expert knowledges in the qualification–
requalification process and hence with what he regards as the increasing
reflexivity of markets as more explicit knowledges become involved. Callon
(2002) regards reflexivity as the result (indeed the ‘inevitable’ result) of the
usual move from a material or manufacturing economy to an economy of
signs, or information, or services or – in this case – ‘qualities’:
The key argument in this article is the suggestion that, in the economy of qual-
ities, which can also be called the service economy, co-operation between schol-
ars and economic agents and the constitution of hybrid forums [reflexive spaces
of heterogenous debate over the structure of markets and goods] are inevitable,
for the questions they raise are largely identical.
The bulk of Callon’s analysis is concerned with the process of qualification
(which could be treated, as in this chapter, in terms of a range of social
conditions and practices), but Callon seems to wed this position to the
conventional assumption that it is a historical change in the kinds of goods
(services rather than manufactures) or in the composition of goods (more
sign, less body) that produces increasing reflexivity and destabilised things.
And yet this causal relationship is not substantiated. On what basis is it
assumed that the greater importance of reflexivity and ‘qualities’ is the result
of a move from manufacturing to services? Is it not just as plausible to argue
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in the other direction, that increasing reflexivity and qualification processes
are the cause of changes in the kinds of goods or services that are offered over
economic histories? Could it not be the case that increasing rationalisation of
the possibilities inherent in all transacted ‘things’ (i.e. their potential destabil-
isation) – which arises from a vast range of contingent factors – has resulted
in new processes of materialisation, or materialisation as a new and explicit
battleground of market actors? Perhaps there appear to be more ‘demateri-
alised’ goods in the economy because the dynamics of stabilisation and desta-
bilisation have become part of everyday social actions. And, finally, does not
this form of explanation – reflexivity based on a move from goods to services
– resurrect the distinction between objects and signs, or at least a division
between the materiality and immateriality of objects, that Callon would
everywhere else oppose? The problem is that Callon’s account of historical
change bypasses the central question (which the notion of an emerging
‘economy of qualities’ might otherwise partially answer): what are the diverse
conditions under which processes of materialisation are carried out at
different times?
The distinction between goods and services loomed very large in older
accounts of cultural and economic transitions out of industrial systems into
various formulations of a ‘new economy’. It is obviously different from the
object–sign distinction, but it equally obviously maps historical transitions on
to a shift from material to ‘immaterial’ commodities, from the production
and circulation of physical objects to the direct sale of commodified labour
and social relationships. To be clear: the goods–services distinction is impor-
tant and real in many respects. To use a standard textbook example, the dif-
ferent degrees of transportability of goods and services have a considerable
bearing on foreign trade (although even here the distinction is not straight-
forward: not all goods are transportable – for example, buildings – and not
all services are confined to a place – for example, insurance and financial
services, particularly in the age of the Internet). However, from the perspec-
tive of materialisation processes there seems little reason to distinguish them.
If, in the case of goods, we have to go beyond their physicality in order to
consider how they become socially material, so in the case of services we
have to go beyond their apparent intangibility to see how forms of labour
and interaction (serving a meal, fixing a car) can be socially formed into
discrete and transactable things.
Ironically, given that the movement from goods to services has grounded
so many narratives of historical transition, we find that it is precisely move-
ment in the reverse direction that was central to some of the earliest modern
forms of commercialisation and marketisation, in the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries – the materialisation of services in the form of transactable
goods. This is particularly clear in the commercialisation of leisure activities,
which was crucial to early consumer culture. It was in this period that a range
of sports (above all, horse-racing), entertainments (masquerades, pleasure
gardens and local assembly halls) and spectacles (such as circuses and
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theatres) were transformed from amorphous happenings into socially mate-
rial things: they were re-located to purpose-built, materially bounded spaces
(for example, racetracks or assembly halls rather than streets or houses); they
were given temporal boundaries (fixed starting and stopping times, with
internal rhythms and event sequences that structured them as objects); and
they were rendered transactable through the sale of tickets or subscriptions
(which already presumed their materialisation as discrete social things). It is
hardly a giant step to thinking about modern tourism in the same terms.
These developments within services correspond closely to the dynamics of
singularisation and separation that Callon maps out in Laws of the Market
(1998) and ‘The economy of qualities’ (2002).
The idea that an event can be rendered a transactable thing is a prerequi-
site to its commoditisation and to the possibility of stable markets in these
goods. However, there is another and complementary possibility, and this
emerges from other aspects of Callon’s analysis: that we need to think of
goods far more in the way we think of services, in terms of their service-like
properties. Callon, borrowing from Gadry, argues that in buying services we
are in effect leasing for a limited time the effective properties of a socio-tech-
nical network. In taking my car to be fixed at a garage, I am purchasing the
mobilisation of certain effects that I cannot or will not mobilise through my
own direct labour. From the perspective of materialisation, this relationship
depends on being able to ‘cut out’ (as in the semiotic découpage) or erect
boundaries around (and then to black box) a particular set of socio-technical
effects (‘servicing my car’), so that it becomes a discrete and transactable
event/object, access to which is regulated through an act of purchase. This is
formally equivalent to buying a ticket to a sports event whose transactability
and utility both depend on its ability to mobilise quite specific capacities, but
not others (a recognisable football match, but not a riot, and hopefully not
an American-football-style extravaganza). And we could (and should) apply
the same analysis to objects (physical goods) which are supposed to be always
already discrete and bounded. I do not buy a car in the first place because of
its being-in-itself but because of its capacity to mobilise, by connecting with,
a complex amalgam of socio-technical systems with emergent properties.
The potentials for stability and instability are in principal the same in the
case both of goods and of services or events: as transport and communica-
tions systems change, as urban structures and regulations change, so does the
car (for example, certain trips are rendered unnecessary by the Internet, or
mobile phones change the way we co-ordinate urban movement). Con-
versely, the materialisation of the car in particular physical and meaningful
forms may stabilise or destabilise surrounding socio-technical systems (car
manufacturers, promoting their investments, buy and dismantle tram and
trolley systems).
The difference between a good and a service, from the point of view of
materialisation processes, is a very banal one. It is not materiality versus
immateriality, or thing versus action or event, but simply (as Gadrey, 2000,
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argues) that purchasing a good normally means permanent transfer of own-
ership whereas buying a service is more like leasing or renting (I hire the
restaurant chef to make me a meal; I do not actually buy him/her or the
restaurant). They are different forms of alienating things, but the issue of
thingness remains the same. The stability of goods and of services in terms of
their perceived materiality does not arise from different properties of goods
and services, any more than  that of objects versus signs, but rather from pre-
cisely what concerns Callon (and this chapter): the contingent conditions
under which social materialisation takes place, and the reflexivity and ratio-
nalisation through which economic and cultural actors avail themselves of
the opportunities that arise from these conditions.
Finally, and perhaps ironically, it could be argued that far from it being the
case that the goods–services distinction has produced increasing market
reflexivity, the truth – to the contrary – is that reflexivity about stability and
destabilisation in markets has been eroding the goods–services distinction.
That distinction is possibly the first casualty, rather than the enduring cause,
of contemporary economic change. Economic actors have become virtuosos
in deconstructing and reconfiguring things, in giving any combination of
social factors a form that is stable enough to allow transaction, at least for a
limited period. This virtuosity is possible precisely because it does not dis-
criminate between object and sign, between physical and cultural things – it
is only concerned with materialising things as transactable entities.
As a final example, one might consider the most common exemplar of
‘new economy’ and dematerialisation: the brand. Without denying for a
moment that a brand involves the production of a commanding and binding
symbol, we also know that it is considerably more than that. The idea that
Nike, for example, is exemplary of the ‘new economy’ because its property
consists in cultural capital rather than ownership of factories is completely
disingenuous. On the one hand, like any business of the last one hundred
years or so, it is more than a brand: it is the organisation and co-ordination
of a productive apparatus capable of delivering volumes of discrete material
things (not just physical shoes but a stabilised social object: Nike trainers with
all the design, physical materials, cultural processes and imagery which that
involves). That is to say, Nike is a productive apparatus in precisely the same
sense that Callon or Gadrey would define a service as the mobilisation of a
socio-technical device (and which I would extend to all goods). And it is pre-
cisely the same deployment of product concepts as conceptual and practical
organisations of production that I attributed to the emergence of manage-
ment discourses over the twentieth century. Moreover, this form of organi-
sation is not very different from the organising and re-branding role of
retailers and mail-order firms either at the turn of the last century (which
gave a considerable impetus to the whole development of branding) or in the
1980s, when they acted as pioneers of flexible production.
On the other hand, what has certainly changed, as I have argued, is both the
increasing volatility of things – their shorter and more insecure social life –
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and the extent to which corporate practices respond to this by institutionalis-
ing, intensifying and reflecting on this as a normal condition of business life
and competition. Early brands – along with the very idea of packaging goods
– were part of a process of stabilising goods (packaging, bearing a logo, divid-
ing bulk commodities into discrete objects with uniform quantities and qual-
ities, underwritten by a nationally known and dependable manufacturer).
This is certainly still the case with brands like McDonalds and Coca-Cola
which promise a uniform experience anytime, anywhere. Yet that is hardly the
whole story, and certainly not for their managers: rather, the brand acts as a
container for the constant innovation necessary in today’s markets. Brands
like Nike and McDonalds hold their objects stable at a level of abstraction
above the almost daily renovations and adjustments of their product lines.
Hence, some of the more interesting contradictions in the contemporary
economy are between the stability, even the stodginess, of the overall marque
(for example, Ford as a company) and the constant reconfiguration of prod-
ucts (individual Ford cars). To reiterate: the issue here is not that commodi-
ties have become dematerialised (‘Nike is nothing but a logo’) but rather that
their materiality is understood and managed in relation to a backdrop of pro-
found instability that constitutes the very premiss of business practice.
Conclusions
The argument presented here is not intended to conclude that nothing has
changed, that ‘new economy’ (or service economy, information economy or
any of the other labels with which I started) is a myth. It is rather an attempt
to put our search for ‘what’s new’ on a firmer conceptual footing, one which
is not indebted to an untenable social and commercial ontology. This chap-
ter is therefore offered as a reinterpretation of long-running themes within
social and economic analysis. We need not deny the evidently increasing
centrality – in both practice and perception – of conceptual processes in the
conduct of contemporary economic processes: the centrality of information
and communications, social skills, cultural knowledges and cultural interme-
diation, and all the other developments that have been noted in the many dif-
ferent formulations of ‘new economy’ over the post-war period. But we need
to understand these factors not in terms of an untenable social ontology but
rather in terms of the changing conditions under which social objects are
brought into being in the first place.
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Introduction
Cultural and creative sectors have come to represent key areas of growth
within a number of regional and national economies, and figure prominently
within arguments regarding the increasingly ‘cultural’ character of economic
processes and the restructuring of market forms. An emergent cultural econ-
omy is also of critical interest for institutional analysis, and for a number of
reasons. Firstly, such an analysis addresses very clearly the need to take culture
seriously within the study of economic organisation – not simply in terms of
seeing culture as a kind of ‘padding’ for economic activity, but as a sector of
production, distribution and consumption involving distinctive organisational
forms, market relations and competitive logics. Secondly, within the cultural
field market actors, market segments and market commodities are constituted
in innovative and often unstable ways. Thirdly, contemporary cultural indus-
tries are subject to a highly variable mix of markets, firms and networks as
means of shaping economic processes and exchanges.
The discussion that follows traces key aspects of this governance mix for
the constitution of a cultural economy, as the contingent nature of cultural
products, cultural markets and cultural work puts into question certain
established frames for analysing economic organisation.
Cultural industries make slippery analytic objects:1 sectoral boundaries can
be hard to define; ‘firms’ can be only loosely integrated, hidden, short-lived or
very mobile (and often are all of these); product design, labour processes and
work practices can change very rapidly, running ahead of the unwieldy ana-
lytic categories that lumber in their wake (see McRobbie, 2001). It is difficult
to capture the range of products, the forms of knowledge and expertise, the
business types and economic actors that constitute the cultural economy in dif-
ferent places and across different sub-sectors.2 My concern here is to develop
a number of conceptual and critical points relating to the analysis of cultural
economies that may have extended relevance to the study of contemporary
market relations, competitive processes and economic organisation.
The discussion begins with the problematic notion of ‘cultural industries’.
Such a category mimics the convention of defining industries on the basis of
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distinct outputs – indicating here a set of industries producing broadly ‘cul-
tural’ products – in a context where more and more economic goods might be
said to involve cultural or aesthetic content. In thinking about what is dis-
tinctly ‘cultural’ about the cultural economy, then, the discussion turns to the
role of specialised knowledge in framing goods for cultural markets, and in
constituting market segments themselves. The skilled deployment of techni-
cal expertise in tandem with economic nous and cultural knowledge appears
as particularly crucial in a setting where demand for products and for labour
can shift very rapidly. This has critical implications for the nature and the role
of the firm. As the discussion goes on to suggest, the status of the firm as a site
of organisational culture and collective knowledge is precarious in sectors
where products, ideas and know-how quickly become dated, and as cultural
workers adopt (by choice or necessity) a more ‘detached’ relation to employ-
ers. Increasing reliance on cultural–economic networks for the exchange of
knowledge, for work, and for the promotion of shared work cultures can be
seen as a kind of hollowing-out of the firm as an economic organisation, as its
typical knowledge and cultural functions are taken up across an extended field
of market or network ‘non-organisations’.
Culture and economy – framing the cultural industries
The classification of distinct industrial sectors is an imperfect art, and the
case of the cultural industries appears more problematical than many. In a
context where the language of ‘culture’ has come to infect economic analy-
sis, the notion of relatively coherent cultural industries can be seen as much
as an effect of economic policy, academic discourses and market rhetoric as
it is a reflection of institutional realities. Precisely what is to be considered
‘cultural’ in relation to economic activity is rather open to question. Since the
1980s, economic development strategies in a number of national contexts
have placed increasing emphasis on the role of cultural goods and services in
labour market growth, urban and regional regeneration, and foreign trade.
Here, ‘culture’ is taken to refer to a specific domain of aesthetic and expres-
sive production that is susceptible to commodification in economic terms3
(see McAnany and Wilkinson, 1995; DCMS, 2001). Over the same period,
theoretical accounts within economic sociology have focused not only on
cultural production as an economic sector, but on the increasingly cultural
content of wider production processes, of economic goods and services, and
of economic life more generally (see Lash and Urry, 1994; du Gay, 1997; Ray
and Sayer, 1999). Such arguments look to the symbolic and aesthetic prac-
tices, images and goods that enter processes of production, distribution and
consumption in complex ways. In the most obvious sense, an enhanced role
for design within manufacturing, product differentiation and marketing
foregrounds the aesthetic content of goods that might not otherwise be seen
as expressly cultural products. Consumption choices, meanwhile, are played
out (within all the usual constraints of scarcity) via the informed calculation
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of cultural codes and symbolic associations. It follows that an enlarged field
of cultural production and consumption gathers in an array of items – from
foodstuffs or bedlinen to branded clothing and designer refrigerators –
whose symbolic character is at least as important for market differentiation
as are the functional claims that might be made for them.
On such an account, cultural industries are only a subset – if rather exem-
plary – of an extended range of economic processes that have an integrally
cultural character. This complicates what it might mean to think about a dis-
crete cultural economy, analytically separate both from a more general encul-
turation of economic life and from other sectors of economic activity. By
convention, industrial sectors are defined on the basis of what they produce,
or by the primary factors involved in production – such a convention renders
different sectors quantifiable, comparable and, by extension, governable.
Under that definition cultural industries are those engaged in the production
or distribution of goods and services broadly deemed ‘cultural’, ‘aesthetic’ or
‘expressive’, further divisible into a number of sub-sectors based on different
types of cultural output (see Pratt, 1997).4 Of course such distinctions –
within cultural industries as elsewhere – are artificial: there tends to be a sig-
nificant degree of crossover between sub-sectors, and a high degree of diver-
sity within them. A music venue, for instance, looks more like a theatre – in
terms not only of its product, but also its organisational structure, labour
process, skills’ profile, market orientation and internal culture – than it does
a musical instrument manufacturer’s premises, even though both would be
classed as members of a ‘music’ sub-sector. It depends on how you slice it.
While the various outputs of art galleries, film production companies, graph-
ics firms or costume designers may all be cultural products, the range of
goods and services brought under the heading of ‘the cultural industries’ –
from paintings to club nights to web-pages – and the kinds of labour
processes involved – from craft production to performance to software pro-
gramming – are extremely diverse.
The notion of coherent cultural industries in that sense sets a frame around
an set of unstable processes, products and actors. As the art critic Adam Gop-
nik (1993, p. 166) has written:
Only someone who has never actually seen an industry can imagine that the art
world – with its small-scale, speculative, boom-and-bust economy, its discover-
ies and outrages – is one. An industry produces a standardised product for a
more or less reliable mass market of consumers. The art world is not an indus-
try. It isn’t even a business. It is a carnival with a casino attached.
Gopnik was writing specifically (and ironically) against the notion of an ‘art
industry’, but the remark resonates across the cultural industries more gener-
ally. If a ‘carnival’ air animates a great deal of political rhetoric and market
boosterism about the creative economy, the latter’s casino-like aspects have
been only too evident in the variable fortunes of the first publicly floated Inter-
net companies and the rapid burn-rates of others. But there is a further and
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more serious point to be taken here. Gopnik’s conceit works by contrasting
the volatile art market with real industries, defined in terms of standard out-
puts and the ‘more or less reliable’ markets for them. In these terms it is
questionable, indeed, how far a set of distinct industries can be said to produce
‘culture’ in the same way that others produce automobiles or tobacco.
Markets and cultural knowledge
What are broadly grouped together within ‘the cultural industries’, then, con-
sists of a range of institutions with a common orientation to a creative field of
products and practices. However, different firms are involved in producing
material and non-material outputs, operate in different markets, and take in a
range of skills, services and corporate structures. One suggestive alternative to
an output-based definition is to consider the knowledge capacities and organ-
isational routines enfolded in different types of economic activity. ‘Firms are
in an industry’, as Metcalfe (1998, p. 19) contends, ‘by virtue of certain things
that they know in common.’ Such an approach places greater emphasis on
labour processes and organisational cultures in constituting industrial sectors
– and particularly on the forms of knowledge and skill that are reproduced
therein – than it does on the nature of common outputs.
A process-based definition, foregrounding the role of economic actors and
the knowledge exchanges between them, seems especially appropriate to the
analysis of cultural industries. This has to do not only with questions of tech-
nical or creative expertise, but with a wider investment in forms of cultural
knowledge. What brings multimedia companies, fashion wholesalers, record
labels and set designers together under the umbrella of ‘the cultural industries’
is in part an orientation to cultural modes of knowledge, practice and dis-
tinction that shape the organisations themselves, that steer design and pro-
duction, and that are closely linked to issues of marketing and consumption.
While it may sound clumsy to say that certain industries ‘produce’ culture as
others produce cars, the metaphor can be reworked to indicate how specific
agents (individuals and firms) create or mediate cultural products and services
for nascent markets. To think about culture as an economic product, here, is
to consider how cultural goods, images and concepts are translated into mar-
ketable commodities by economic agents. The effect of such a ‘production of
culture’, what is more, is not simply to re-frame certain ideas, expressive
forms and aesthetic goods in commodity terms, but also to frame potential
markets for them (cf. Callon, 1998). In the context of new media, Pratt (2000,
p. 427) suggests that business start-ups are concerned not simply to find a
niche in some broadly identifiable market, but simultaneously to ‘imagine a
market, a niche, and a product’. Supply and demand are ‘co-constructed’
(Callon, 2002) through the qualification and ‘singularisation’ of goods, and
the positioning of potential consumers for them. Markets, market segments,
and marketable products are mutually emergent within speculative processes
of market making.
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Knowledge has a critical role to play in these market processes. While the
cultural economy is not unusual in placing a premium on knowledge, it is dis-
tinctive in drawing together forms of economic and cultural expertise in such
an integrated manner. The competence of cultural workers as ‘knowledge
workers’ bears not only on the conception and design of products and serv-
ices, but also on the way these agents must work to anticipate trends,
appraise tastes and inculcate preferences. Marketing and distributive func-
tions therefore are not easily set apart, especially at the start-up stage, from
technical or creative functions. These competences can be hard to distinguish
not only because an emergent cultural economy includes numerous smaller
businesses unable to support a pronounced division of labour, but because
such a division of labour is meaningless in relation to the ways in which many
goods and services are conceived, produced and marketed. A significant
degree of crossover between technical, creative and marketing functions in
new cultural sectors is given partly by the size of firms, but also by the unsta-
ble, short-lived or volatile nature of both the products and the markets for
them. The tasks of designing cultural products and directing them to specific
market niches form a process combining creative talent, technical skill, eco-
nomic calculation and cultural knowledge. Knowledge and competences are
deployed across processes of production and distribution, and are exchanged
between actors and technical capital in a form of what Callon (2002) calls
‘distributed cognition’.
Part of this knowledge work, furthermore, is done by consumers – as Met-
calfe (1998, p. 29) points out, ‘intelligent consumers are as much a part of the
innovation process as intelligent suppliers’. Hodgson’s call (1999b, p. 251)
within institutional economics for a more serious engagement with culture
focuses on the ways cultural factors shape economic preferences, as well as
aiming to bring the culture of organisations into the purview of institutional
analysis. In emergent cultural markets, these two dimensions are closely
linked. The culture of the firm, as well as the content of its product, can help
shape the preferences of its consumers. Organisational cultures – forms of
representation and self-presentation, and values, language and symbolic codes
– are not simply ‘embedded’ in the routines of organisations (especially of
those which have not been around long enough to have developed any
durable routines), but also are qualities to be strategically cultivated, marketed
and de-coded by consumers.5 In that respect new cultural sectors are exem-
plary of what has been termed an ‘economy of qualities’ – oriented towards
the positioning and qualification of mutable products in highly protean con-
sumer markets, and in which competition is driven by the hyper-differentia-
tion of producers and of consumers, as well as of products (Callon, 2002; see
also Metcalfe, 1998, p. 11; Scott, 1999, p. 808).
Firms and ‘disentangled’ labour
The labile character of cultural products and markets is reflected in the
way that cultural enterprises do not necessarily or immediately constitute
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themselves as firms in a coherent or stable sense. It follows that a conventional
business model is not always appropriate to the ways economic actors organ-
ise their activities in these sectors. It can be difficult, for example, to analyse
business size in terms of employee numbers, or to capture the distinct func-
tions of different workers, given the elastic employment practices of cultural
enterprises, including the high degree of multi-tasking and doubling-up
within smaller and newer businesses. Highly variable recruitment practices
are dictated by specific labour processes as well as by the nature of products
and markets, as businesses take on staff for given projects and events – for one
night in certain music venues, for instance, to three- or six-month contracts in
film and video production (Skills Observatory, 2000, pp. 5, 10). This is not
exactly the same as freelance employment or ‘consultancy’ – at times it is
closer to the seasonal work model typical of tourist or agricultural industries.
In other contexts, workers are far more able to set their own employment
terms, with contract and freelance work acting as a marker of labour market
power rather than one of insecurity. That is most likely to be the case in fields
such as multimedia and software programming where companies have diffi-
culty in recruiting specialist staff, and confront high rates of turnover and
dynamic, often international, labour markets (Skills Observatory, 2000, p. 5).
The labour market effects of this kind of skills’ shortage are compounded
by a strong freelance ethos in growth sectors where working outside a com-
pany’s structure is seen as preferable – in both a financial and a cultural sense
– to working inside one (see Pratt, 2000, p. 421). In certain fields of cultural
production, at least, the language of flexibility does not appear simply to put
a spin on processes of casualisation and insecurity. Rather, the market posi-
tion of skilled workers in new media and related sectors is enhanced by the
temporary nature of contracts and consultancies, in a field where products,
ideas, technical solutions and forms of expertise can date very rapidly.6 One
should be wary, of course, of confusing adaptation with progress, of taking
accommodation for innovation. As Richard Sennett (1998, p. 25) notes,
when corporate wisdom cautions against becoming ‘entangled’ in long-term
employment contracts, ‘detachment and superficial co-operativeness are bet-
ter armor for dealing with current realities than behavior based on values of
loyalty and service’.
Such ‘disentangled’ labour sits at the top end of a labour market marked
by varieties of casualisation. As such, it raises in high relief certain critical
questions about the nature and role of the firm in emerging economic sec-
tors. Ronald Coase’s 1937 classic account turned on a contrast between the
organised structure of the firm and a market of self-employed producers,
each contracting freely with others under competitive conditions. One
advantage of the firm over an ideal-type market lay in its ability to minimise
the costs of transacting with any number of free agents, replacing the latter
with employees whose productive activity was directed inside the firm itself.
It is open to question how far cultural labour markets can be seen as markets
of self-employed producers – as a real-world example, that is, of Coase’s
ideal-type. However, it is certainly the case that for a significant minority of
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skilled workers the contract for services has come to replace the employment
contract per se (see Hodgson, 1999a). Such individuals contract with firms
to provide given services, or enter into (more or less stable) relational con-
tracts with other individuals via networks. Either way, the formal architec-
ture of the firm is eroded or bypassed.
The cost to business of this kind of transacting is evident in the price some
freelance workers are able to command for their services in cultural labour
markets, and in the problems of uncertainty faced by firms lacking the in-
house expertise to deliver on specific projects. What is less clear is how far
working outside a firm structure allows ‘disentangled’ workers to retain
control over the labour process. Both factors of course are relevant to the co-
ordinating role of the firm: the ability to economise on transaction costs, and
the ability to direct labour processes in line with its own ends. The contract
for services in this way becomes a key instrument for regulating cultural work,
but the degree of specification is problematical – as is the nature of ownership
– when the ‘products’ involved are innovative, speculative or highly creative
(see Lury, 1993). This adds something to Callon’s notion of ‘distributed cog-
nition’ across design, production and marketing functions, as concepts and
goods are subject to forms of qualification and re-qualification that alter the
terms under which contracts for services are entered. Here, an ethos of cre-
ativity can be a means of managing flexible labour processes, the open-ended
nature of creative work and the unstable nature of creative products lending
themselves to the ‘reflexive’ re-specification of original briefs. Long or erratic
working hours, nail-biting deadlines, confused, poorly conceived and con-
stantly changing briefs, all can be explained away as aspects of the mercurial
nature of ‘creativity’ (see McRobbie, 2001). A creative ethos, in that sense,
represents a cultural strategy for handling the social costs of transacting with
workers who are expected to be flexible, if not exactly free, agents.
Other institutional economists (including Coase in his later work)
expanded the social costs’ account of the firm by emphasising the latter’s role
in capturing information and promoting knowledge. In its weakest version,
such an argument points to firms’ attempts to lock-in knowledge and infor-
mation in the form of individual workers’ expertise. A stronger version holds
that the firm itself – as an institution – is the key locus of knowledge. It is
firms, rather than the individuals within them, that really are knowledgeable
– after all, ‘it is firms, not the people who work for firms, that know how to
make gasoline, automobiles and computers’ (Sidney G. Winter, quoted in
Hodgson, 1999a, at p. 199). This extended account sees the firm as more
than a technical solution to transaction costs and problems of imperfect
information. As a durable institution the firm is not merely constituted via
contract, but reproduced via an organisational culture involving forms of
knowledge and modes of learning. As Hodgson would have it: ‘The advan-
tage of the modern capitalist firm over market- or exchange-based alterna-
tives may lie in its capacity to develop an integrated corporate culture to
facilitate learning and the acquisition of specialist skills’ (1999b, p. 246).
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It follows that the shift to contracting in the cultural economy raises seri-
ous questions about the ability of firms to capture and promote knowledge.
In a context where the increased complexity of production (especially in
software and new media) places a premium on specialised skills, firms are at
a disadvantage when forced to buy-in knowledge and expertise on a one-off
or time-limited basis. The ‘market problem’, here, remains primarily ‘an
information problem’ (Metcalfe, 1998, p. 12). Of course, this cuts in two
ways: firms also can rapidly update knowledge by ‘updating’ knowledge
workers in flexible labour markets. Either way, this kind of transacting for
knowledge in markets has interesting implications for the nature of the firm.
Long before the vogue for human capital in socioeconomic analysis, Veblen
(1990) highlighted the value of institutions as sites of knowledge even over
their value as sites of capital (see also the discussion in Hodgson 1999a,
pp. 193–7). Technical, tacit and processual knowledge is reproduced within
institutions as part of an organisational culture of rules, routines and norms.
Institutions such as firms, moreover, are sites of collective knowledge as
much as they serve to foster individual knowledge: the things that a firm
knows are emergent from the individuals working within it over time, but
ultimately are not reducible to them as individuals. It is this collective nature
of institutional knowledge that a great deal of human capital theory down-
plays, emphasising the education and training of individuals over the role of
corporate cultures. At the same time, the collective nature of institutional
knowledge – the fact that it is firms rather than individuals that know how
to make cars, or (to use Adam Smith’s classic example) know how to make
pins – comes under question in sectors where it is individuals rather than
firms who know how to make new software applications.
Recent theories of the ‘weightless economy’ place heavy emphasis on
intangible assets – knowledge, information, expertise and ideas that can be
capitalised in various ways (see Quah, 1996; Cameron, 1998; Coyle, 1999;
Leadbeater and Oakley, 1999; cf. Pratt, 2000). The value of such cognitive
assets is especially salient for those ‘weightless’ firms that do not hold
much in the way of the tangible – the spectre here is the failed dot.com,
whose intangible assets turn out to be neither fungible nor exclusive (or, of
course, are simply over-valued), and whose passing leaves nothing but a
roomful of computers, a few potplants, and dizzying losses. Economic
knowledge, however – if frequently more portable than some other eco-
nomic assets – is rarely exactly ‘weightless’. An institutional perspective,
for one thing, points to the way that knowledge is embedded in organisa-
tions, often in highly material ways. Institutional knowledge is embodied
in labour processes and practices, is reproduced through the organisation
of spaces and facilities, and is distributed across technical components.
Neither does the disentangling of workers from the institutional setting
represent a decisive move towards weightlessness. The status of certain cul-
tural workers as self-employed producers is given not only by their posses-
sion of intangible assets in the form of knowledge or skill, but often by
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ownership of their means of production (software, specialised equipment,
etc.) – where in contracting for certain services, that is, firms are hiring-in
both labour and capital. Labour processes in cultural growth sectors typi-
cally combine intensive human input with specialised technologies (Scott,
2000, p. 11). Indeed, it can be difficult in new media sectors to make a
distinction between capital and labour, between technology and expertise,
between tangible and intangible assets. In that context cultural workers
might be thought of in terms of what Jean Gadrey (2000) calls ‘socio-
technical capacity’ – a combination, as it were, of human with technical
capital (see also Callon, 2002).
Network cultures
The contract for services, especially where this involves the purchase of
‘socio-technical capacity’, sits within a wider framework of network transac-
tions that are characteristic of the cultural economy. Cultural economies
tend to be organised around dense networks of small–medium enterprises,
producing high degrees of interdependence, with larger firms networked
in at certain points (see Lash and Urry, 1994, pp. 114–20; Scott, 2000,
pp. 11–13). Contracts for services remain, it should be stressed, a form of
market exchange, but one based on network relations that are both more
and less formal than transacting in markets: more formal, in that relational
contracts develop institutional and durable features that spill over the bound-
aries of the firm; less formal, in that social ties are an explicit and even nec-
essary component of these arrangements. There is a pronounced overlap
between labour markets and social networks within cultural economies;
also between supplier markets and social ties (Pratt, 2000; Scott, 2000; Skills
Observatory, 2000; McRobbie, 2001).7 Of course, there are questions to be
asked about the strength of these particular weak ties. The rather different
and sometimes conflicting desires for ‘disentanglement’ on the part of
cultural workers and employers means that social ties can be distinctly
attenuated, provisional or instrumental in character.
How then to square these competing logics of economic culture? The
disentangled knowledge worker cultivating ‘detachment and superficial co-
operativeness’ in insecure labour markets (Sennett, 1998, p. 25), against the
capacity of the firm to ‘facilitate learning and the acquisition of specialist skills’
through an organisational culture (Hodgson, 1999b, p. 246). There clearly is
a case to be made that economic networks reproduce some of the innovative
and informational virtues of markets. Given the rate of change in those cul-
tural sectors most dependent on new communications technologies (film and
new media, music and interactive software), networks can be more effective in
the exchange and upgrade of information than firms, more subject to lock-in
by contract, sunken capital investment and routine. In enhancing information
and promoting innovation, relational ties between firms and individuals can
be a critical part of the competitive process – ‘collaboration’, as Metcalfe
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(1998, p. 14) has it, is a familiar ‘corollary of competitive activity’, but its
effects are not simply or always anti-competitive.
It also can be argued that networks replicate the somewhat different infor-
mational and knowledge capacities typically attributed to the firm (see espe-
cially Scott, 1999, 2000). This argument works on the assumption that
networks are capable of reproducing the kind of integrated knowledge cul-
ture that has been one of the firm’s strong suits – even if neither networks
nor firms are currently much given to promoting ‘values of loyalty and serv-
ice’ as an economic good (Sennett, 1998, p. 25). For Scott, such an effect
depends on particular kinds of economic agglomeration, based on the con-
centration of cultural industries in key sites. This is a version of the network
as cluster, where cultural linkage is a function of spatial proximity (see also
Pratt, 2000). Scott invokes Alfred Marshall’s notion of an ‘industrial atmos-
phere’ to describe the shared forms of knowledge, skill and work practice
generated and reproduced within cultural–economic districts. It is a per-
spective that has affinities with Veblen’s even more expansive claims (1914)
for the cultural nature of work, distinctive not only of different ‘industrial
arts’ but of the industrial character of nations: ‘a set of relevant habits,
acquired over a long time, widely dispersed through the employable work-
force, reflective of its culture and deeply embedded in its practices’ (cited in
Hodgson, 1993, at p. 133). Industrial atmosphere, it should be noted, is not
simply a question of ambience, but finds its material expression in routines,
in practices and in norms of social exchange. Highly spatialised network
relations in this sense mirror the role of the firm as milieu, providing a
context for the development of collective as well as individual knowledge,
competences, routines and norms. This indicates how networks can evince
certain organisational qualities while remaining relatively ‘informal’, but
also gestures to the point at which economic networks ‘harden’ into more
durable institutional forms. It is at this point that networks become objects
of economic governance.
Questions of governance
In Scott’s account, success in the cultural economy – given the role of net-
working, the degree of interdependence between firms, and the tendency
towards agglomeration – is a collective rather than simply an individual mat-
ter. He therefore sees a key part for certain ‘agents of collective order’ (Scott,
2000, p. 27) in promoting economic efficiency and growth. The state, in
other words – and in its various extended guises – encourages both competi-
tion and agglomeration on a number of levels. At the most basic, policy meas-
ures determine the competitive environment within which firms and
individuals operate, most obviously in instituting a legal framework for com-
petition. Moreover, governance agencies steer competitive processes in stew-
arding innovation in research and technology. Business support and start-up
initiatives, meanwhile, foster the entry of new market competitors. In respect
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of agglomeration, on the other hand, the development of dedicated infra-
structure, locational planning, training and labour market strategies, and the
institutional support of industry networks all promote the clustering of cul-
tural industries. If network relations between individuals and firms are par-
ticularly salient for the organisation of cultural–economic activity, governance
agents play a strategic role in brokering sector networks, and in providing
institutional leverage such that informational, technical and financial
resources can be mobilised via these networks. Public and quasi-public actors,
it follows, possess various means for hardening and embedding cultural–
economic networks into a fairly stable institutional landscape.
This array of measures offers something of a wish-list for the effective gov-
ernance of cultural sectors as an economy of networks. As it stands, cultural
industries – however enthusiastic the governmental designs upon them – are
broken up by different logics of accumulation, co-ordination and regulation.
Forms of cultural production cut across state, market and non-profit sectors
in often complicated ways. Given the extent to which recent thinking about
the creative economy has been bound up with images of entrepreneurial or
risk-taking behaviour (see Leadbeater and Oakley, 1999) – from the mix of
self-promotion and private sponsorship that produced the Young British
Artists in the 1990s, to the virtual economic bubbles of an expanding Internet
economy – it is worth noting how much cultural activity remains located in
the public and non-profit sectors (see Boorsma et al., 1998; Salamon et al.,
1998). This only compounds the difficulty of mapping the cultural economy
– and of quantifying, for the purposes of national accounting, its overall con-
tribution to national wealth. It is not always clear which (part of what) organ-
isation should be counted, or the extent to which overlapping public subsidies
and private contracts distort the measure of economic outputs (although see
DCMS 2001 for an attempt to stabilise such a measure). The cultural econ-
omy in this way represents a laboratory of mixed economic governance, with
a dense cross-cutting of public subsidy, market activity, private contract, grant
funding and volunteer labour – all of them liable to shrinkage and shift.8
Conclusion: beyond the firm?
It is not especially novel to suggest that the distinctions between markets,
firms and networks, viewed as different technologies of economic co-ordi-
nation, are breaking down (see, most notably, Williamson, 1985; Hodgson,
1999b). This is partly a reflection of the ‘growing networks and increasing
intermediate relations between firms’ that extend across different economic
sectors (Hodgson, 1999b, p. 242), and which characterise the cultural econ-
omy in particular. On another level this blurring reflects the growth of net-
work theory within socioeconomic analysis, such that firms and markets can
come to look to the analytic eye simply like different versions of a network.
There is a danger here of collapsing the categories of ‘market’ and ‘firm’ into
a general theory of networks (see Thompson et al., 1991, pp. 14, 18; Callon,
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1998) – blunting the analytic edge of each term, that of ‘networks’ especially.
However, in the context of the cultural economy it seems questionable, given
the spread of relational contracts and the disentanglement of labour, how far
a definition of the firm that understands this as ‘an organised enclave, apart
from the market’ can be sustained (Hodgson, 1999b, p. 237).
In examining how cultural–economic activity is organised in broad terms,
or in tracing more closely the path of a cultural product from conception
to consumption (see Callon, 2002), one is continually led out of the firm via
different networks and, at certain moments, into markets of various kinds.
For Scott (1999, p. 808),
modern cultural–economic systems almost always take the form of complex
networks of workers within firms, linked together by tightly wrought networks
of transactions between firms, in which many different hands are brought to
bear on products as they go through the process of conception, fabrication and
final embellishment.
There are particular implications here for how we might think about the
nature and the role of the firm. Accounts of economic organisation within
institutional analysis, suggests Hodgson (1999b, pp. 232–3), typically have
centred on the classical form of the capitalist firm, based on private property
and the wage relation. This model is put into question as the contract for
services comes to replace the wage relation for a significant minority of
workers, especially those who combine creative expertise with technical cap-
ital (whether we want to describe them as ‘self-employed producers’ or as a
sort of ‘socio-technical capacity’). Such a shift has highly variable implica-
tions for different cultural workers in respect of income, working conditions
and employment security; these changes also have marked effects on the cul-
ture of organisations, particularly in respect of their ability to capture, hold
and reproduce knowledge.9
As a laboratory of mixed economic governance, the cultural economy does
not lend itself always or easily to the ordering categories of market, firm and
network. Hodgson attempts to open out the conventional analysis of these
three categories as distinct (and exhaustive) terms, by locating them within a
more general model of ‘organisations and “non-organisations”’. In this
account economic activity is co-ordinated via more or less organised means,
and the capitalist firm is just one – if rather dominant – mode of organisation
among others (including the mutual or public enterprise, for example).
Network relations, crucially, can be seen to cut across the boundaries of
organisations and non-organisations, at certain times evincing the innovative
capacities of markets, at others taking on more stable, durable and institu-
tional features that replicate the capacities of the firm. Within the cultural
economy this produces a kind of hollowing-out of the firm, as collective
knowledge, conventions of work practice and cultural norms come to be
mediated by relational ties. This is not to say that networks can or do simply
displace firms as modes of economic co-ordination – the path of even the
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most freestyle cultural producer, as McRobbie (2001) puts it, tends to remain
one from ‘clubs to companies’. At the same time, where demand for labour as
for products is insecure, networks can promote disentanglement as much as
they secure economic embeddedness. Being both inside and outside a firm
represents something of an each-way bet. The point is that there are
exchanges at the margins between organisations and ‘non-organisations’, as
actors and products move in and out of the market ‘frame’, as networks
harden at certain points, and as the boundaries of firms become more porous,
their internal organisation less orderly, what they ‘know’ more provisional,
their lives shorter.
Notes
1 The arguments developed in this chapter have emerged from research into
cultural industries in London – carried out as part of a larger project in partner-
ship with colleagues at the University of East London and Greenwich University
(see Skills Observatory, 2000). The project strand which informs the current dis-
cussion was based on interviews with seventy-five organisations, fifteen each in
the cultural industries sub-sectors of audio-visual, design and publishing, music,
performing arts and visual arts.
2 These analytic problems are in part the effect of an emergent cultural economy
itself, and in part they reproduce the more general problems of researching the
small and medium-sized enterprises that are typical of much of that sector. The
focus of the London research was on the small–medium enterprises that charac-
terise the cultural economy in east and south-east London. Firms interviewed
ranged in size from micro-businesses with fewer than ten permanent employees
to medium-sized firms employing up to 400 people. However, casual, contract
and freelance employment meant that the ‘size’ of businesses varied widely on a
project or an event basis – for example, one music venue had a handful of per-
manent employees, but could employ several hundred for particular events. The
seventy-five firms were selected so as to ensure: a geographical spread across the
study area; a spread of business type; and a spread of business size within the
small–medium range. The single exception in the sample was a large newspaper
publisher employing 6,100 people.
3 In Britain in 2001, the creative industries were calculated to account for 5 per
cent of GDP (at £112.5 billion, including £10.3 billion in export earnings), and
to provide over 1 million jobs. See DCMS (2001).
4 The definition of ‘cultural industries’ used in the London Skills Observatory study
was conventional in focusing on outputs, based on five sub-sectors: audio-visual,
design and publishing, music, performing arts and visual arts. Britain’s Depart-
ment of Culture, Media and Sport defines the creative industries in terms of the
following sectors: advertising, architecture, art and antiques, crafts, design,
designer fashion, film and video, interactive leisure software, music, performing
arts, publishing, software and computer services, television and radio – although
these categories at times are extended to take in the broader domains of sport and
leisure, tourism, and facilities such as parks and libraries. Such categories are
hardly exhaustive, and are given to extension and expansion as the cultural econ-
omy undergoes rapid change. McRobbie (2001) contrasts the usual suspects from
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the policy field with a range of self-styled job titles among new cultural entrepre-
neurs, ranging from ‘cultural strategist’ to ‘incubator’ and ‘music portal’.
5 The strategic or acquired nature of organisational ‘culture’ is evident in the com-
parison between different informants in the London study: people working in a
printer’s, using design software to produce fine art postcards and selling over the
Internet, appeared less clearly identified with the ‘cultural economy’ – in spite of
their creative and technical skills, in spite of the nature of the product, in spite of
their use of new media – than did those doing clerical work in a medium-sized
advertising agency. Believe, in other words, the hype.
6 In other fields displays of loyalty and commitment appear more evident as labour
market strategies. The Skills Observatory 2000 study found that visual and per-
forming arts organisations, in particular, tended to a greater use of volunteer and
placement staff, especially but not exclusively in the public and non-profit sectors.
Voluntary work or work for low pay in those contexts was a way of demonstrat-
ing commitment to an organisation and to a creative field, as well as a means of
gaining relevant skills and knowledge. A comparison between firms within the
design and publishing sector sheds further insight on the variable nature of cul-
tural labour markets. One advertising agency reported being swamped by unso-
licited applications from graduates, while a number of printers reported difficulty
in recruiting graduate and female workers – in spite of salaries competitive for the
sub-sector, the skilled nature of the work and the opportunities these firms pro-
vided for in-work training. One informant reflected that printing simply wasn’t
‘trendy’ – it remained stubbornly ‘old economy’ in spite of its nominal categori-
sation within the cultural industries.
7 Indeed the London study suggested, somewhat contrary to conventional analysis
of cultural industries, that social ties were of more immediate relevance to sup-
plier markets than to labour markets (Skills Observatory, 2000). This may, how-
ever, be skewed by the interview study being based on employers rather than on
employees. More generally, where a firm buys-in human and technical capital in
the form of ‘socio-technical capacity’ – a freelance designer using her own equip-
ment, say – the distinction between labour and supplier markets is a difficult one
to sustain.
8 Moreover, different kinds of ‘governance mix’ characterise different cultural sub-
sectors. The London study found that businesses in visual and performing arts
tended to be more closely tied to forms of public and civic support than those in
the audio-visual, software, design and publishing fields (see Skills Observatory,
2000).
9 See McRobbie (2001) for an account that considers the effects of such economic
arrangements both for individual workers and for wider organisational and pro-
fessional cultures, especially in terms of de-politicisation.
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Introduction
The peculiar economics of professional sports leagues has long been recog-
nised (see Neale, 1964). Traditionally, the essence of the problem was seen
to lie in the fact that sports leagues and the individual clubs that make up the
league provide a joint product that depends on effective co-operation
between competing clubs. Clubs agree to join, and be regulated by, a league
because co-operation in the supply of a joint product increases the economic
value of the product supplied by each individual club. The output of the
league and its constituent members is maximised when there is some degree
of competitive balance in the league so that the outcomes of matches are
uncertain. If leagues become unbalanced, lack of uncertainty over the out-
comes of matches reduces demand by spectators/viewers. In the absence of
regulation, leagues have a tendency to become unbalanced. Leading clubs
attract more spectators and viewers, sell more merchandise and can com-
mand higher prices for tickets and for the rights to broadcast matches. Those
revenues can be reinvested in players, which serves to maintain and enhance
the dominance of the leading clubs. In the absence of measures to check
those forces, leagues tend to become unbalanced, attract sub-optimal levels
of spectators/viewers and face the dual threat of the bankruptcy that plagues
lagging clubs and the possibility that breakaway groups of leading clubs will
seek the competitive balance afforded by a rival league. For that reason most
leagues play a regulatory role by redistributing income from stronger to
weaker teams (Findlay, Holahan and Oughton, 1999).
More recently, two further peculiarities of professional football leagues
have become apparent. The first concerns the nature and role of match-going
supporters in the production of live football matches and issues in corporate
governance, while the second concerns the vertical production relationship
between football clubs and, on the one hand, the league and, on the other,
television broadcasters.
In the UK, football, the largest professional league sport, has traditionally
been regulated by the Football Association, the Football League and more
recently the Premier League. In recent years the economic problems facing
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sports leagues have increased as the growth of pay-TV has opened up a new
market for viewing sport that has significantly increased the revenue streams
flowing into the game. As the commercialisation of professional sports
leagues has increased, government has intervened with the Football Task
Force, and there have been regulatory interventions from the Restrictive
Practices Court and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. At the same
time, many football clubs have become plcs and in doing so have bypassed
the key FA regulation against the commercial exploitation of clubs by gain-
ing FA agreement that the newly created plc holding companies would be
exempt from rule 34 which had, up until that time, prevented the owners of
clubs from extracting profits. This change in the corporate governance of
football clubs has heightened conflict between the various stakeholders –
match-going supporters, TV viewers, shareholders and managers.2
The institutional arrangements around the creation and development of
the market for professional football in Britain – and subsequently increasingly
of the market for the broadcasting rights for professional football, including
for pay-TV in the form of both subscription channels and pay-per-view on an
individual match basis – have thus been purposively constructed. Over time,
it has also been deliberately changed, significantly, under the influence of
internal and external pressures on the game. This has taken the form of the
richer clubs breaking away from the existing league structure to create their
own ‘Premier’ league. It has seen media companies buying into football clubs,
most dramatically with the attempted merger between Manchester United
and BSkyB. And as discussed below, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) tried
and failed to break up the collective selling arrangements by the leagues to
media companies.
This chapter analyses the economic and policy implications of three inter-
related aspects of the corporate governance and regulation of professional
league football that underlie these changing institutional arrangements: first,
changes in ownership structures and corporate governance; second, vertical
integration between broadcasting companies and football clubs; and third, the
collectivity of football leagues and the sale of broadcasting rights. The next
section deals with issues of corporate governance and argues that fan equity
should be recognised as ‘goodwill’ in clubs’ accounts and that supporter-
shareholder trusts should be formed to solve the problem of misaligned incen-
tives and the associated principal–agent problems between supporter
shareholders and commercial investors. The third section deals with issues of
vertical integration between football clubs and broadcasters, while the fourth
looks at the welfare implications of league collectivity and the exclusivity of
broadcasting rights. The final section draws some conclusions and argues that
the three factors comprising the ‘peculiar economics of football’ require a
dual system of regulation: regulation from below to resolve problems of
corporate governance and misaligned incentives and regulation from above
to prevent distortions of the competition in broadcasting and preserve the
collectivity of the leagues.
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Corporate governance
There is now a growing recognition that match-going fans are intrinsically
involved in the joint production of football matches. Crowd involvement and
support can add greatly to the entertainment value of matches, and a match
played before a packed stadium is more enjoyable and provides more quality-
adjusted units of output than one played in front of empty seats. This is
particularly the case for matches that are screened live, where the crowd adds
greatly to the audio-visual content of the programme. For that reason,
together with the considerations that football supporters, unlike almost any
other industry’s customers, are unlikely to switch allegiances or brands no
matter how sub-standard the product. Football supporters are clearly stake-
holders in their clubs. This particular form of stakeholding has been termed
‘fan equity’, (see Hamil 1999 for a discussion of this notion). Of course, it is
difficult to estimate the economic value of ‘fan equity’, but the problem of
valuation here is no different from the standard problem facing companies
which regularly put a value on ‘goodwill’ in their annual accounts. Moreover,
there have been numerous cases where the extent of fan equity has had clear
monetary dimensions. For example, many clubs faced with bankruptcy have
turned to their fans for financial support to keep the clubs up and running.
Plainly, there are few industries where the customers would organise a whip-
round to prevent a company from closing. Recognising fans as stakeholders
in this way means that issues of corporate governance take on particular
dimensions (as discussed below) and regulatory implications.
The change in corporate governance structures that has occurred as clubs
have been transformed into plcs raises particular issues in the case of profes-
sional league sports. In particular, it is evident that institutional investors in
football clubs may have very different objectives from those of supporter
shareholders. Unlike the latter, institutional investors do not contribute
directly to the joint production of the product. At the same time institutional
shareholders are not subject to the kind of brand loyalty that makes them
peculiarly vulnerable to exploitation of local monopoly power. This implies
that there is an incentive for financial and institutional shareholders to
exploit brand loyalty and local monopoly at the expense of supporter share-
holders. Finally, the stockmarket flotation of football clubs has allowed sup-
porters and media companies to acquire significant ownership stakes in
leading clubs. However, the interests of these two groups of shareholders are
often diametrically opposed. For example, media companies may have an
interest in the formation of a European ‘Super League’ as a means of max-
imising pay-TV (satellite and cable) subscribers in the European marketplace,
while supporters have an interest in maintaining national leagues as the main
competitive arenas.
The Government set up the Football Task Force to investigate these corpo-
rate governance issues, and its unanimously approved third report (Football
Task Force, 1999) supported the formation of supporter-shareholder trusts.
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The resulting formation of Supporters Direct aims not only to assist the for-
mation of such trusts, but also has the declared aim of encouraging the election
of representatives of such trusts to the boards of directors of football clubs.3
Vertical integration
The arguments in this section are illustrated by reference to the issues raised
by BSkyB’s attempted take-over of Manchester United. In September 1998
British Sky Broadcasting Group made a formal offer to acquire Manchester
United. The bid, which amounted to an attempt by Britain’s dominant pay-
TV sports broadcaster to control Britain’s leading football club, rang warn-
ing bells among BSkyB’s competitors and Manchester United’s shareholders
and fans. The former feared that the take-over would consolidate BSkyB’s
already dominant position in the market for live football broadcasting and
make it even more difficult for others to make inroads into the industry. The
latter felt that Manchester United’s interests would become subservient to
BSkyB’s broadcasting interests, as the club would become a bargaining and
marketing tool for a broadcasting company intent on enhancing its dominant
position in the pay-TV market. The director general of Fair Trading agreed
that both the fans and BSkyB’s competitors were right to be worried, and on
29 October 1998 he referred BSkyB’s proposed acquisition of Manchester
United to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) for investiga-
tion under the Fair Trading Act 1973.
The MMC was charged with the task of investigating the proposed acquisi-
tion and determining whether it might be expected to operate against the pub-
lic interest. It is normal for the MMC to consider public interest concerns but
unusual for the OFT to require this in the referral. This unusual step no doubt
reflected the unprecedented number of submissions, received by the OFT,
overwhelmingly opposed to the take-over. The MMC set up a panel of five
experts drawn from the members of the Commission, chaired by Dr Derek
Morris, the overall chairman of the MMC. During the next four-and-a-half
months, the panel investigated the proposed acquisition, taking evidence from
over 350 parties.
On 12 March 1999, the MMC delivered its findings in a report to the
secretary of state for Trade and Industry (Monopolies and Mergers Com-
mission, 1999). Four weeks later, on 9 April 1999, Stephen Byers, secretary
of state for Trade and Industry announced his decision to block BSkyB’s
proposed acquisition of Manchester United based on the basis of a full
acceptance of the findings of the MMC. In his announcement to the Stock
Exchange Mr Byers said:
Having considered the [MMC’s] report, advice from the Director General of
Fair Trading and also taking into account further representations which have
been received, I have decided to accept in full the unanimous recommendations
of the MMC. The MMC’s findings are based mainly on competition grounds,
where they concluded that the merger would adversely affect competition
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between broadcasters. But they also examined wider public interest issues, con-
cluding that the merger would damage the quality of British football. I accept
these findings. (Department of Trade and Industry, 1999)
In this section we outline and assess the issues raised by the BSkyB–
Manchester United case and discuss their implications for the future of
British football. We start by considering the nature of the footballing indus-
try. An appreciation of this, and of the peculiar ‘brand loyalty’ of the con-
sumers (fans), is important to a proper understanding of the effect that the
acquisition of football clubs by broadcasting companies would have on the
public interest. We then analyse the anti-competitive effects that the
attempted acquisition would have had on the broadcasting and media mar-
kets, before going on to consider broader public interest concerns relating to
the quality of British football.4
The nature of the football industry
The nature of the British footballing industry, with its local and community
involvement, and its fan loyalty, creates public interest concerns and also
makes the industry peculiarly vulnerable to anti-competitive behaviour.
Before detailing the grounds on which the attempted acquisition of Man-
chester United by BSkyB would have acted against the public interest it is
important to appreciate, firstly, the unique nature of the industry; secondly,
the rather different notion of the ‘firm’ that is appropriate to an analysis of
this industry than is the case when analysing most other industries; and,
thirdly, the peculiarities of this industry’s customers – the football fans.
Firstly, regarding the nature of the football industry, while it has become
fashionable to refer to the range of stakeholders that a firm or industry has
beyond its shareholders, in the case of football the importance of those other
stakeholders – and in particular of the local communities – is absolutely
vital.5 While anti-competitive practices should be opposed whatever the
industry, the precise way in which such practices operate varies from indus-
try to industry, and so an appreciation of the impact of these practices in the
case of the acquisition of a football club by a media company is assisted when
the nature of the footballing industry is understood.
Secondly, regarding the ‘firms’ involved in the industry, the importance of
the football club to the local community – and conversely the importance of
the local community as a key stakeholder in the football club – has been
reflected in the fact that the firms which own and control football clubs have
generally been dedicated to this task. There are of course football-related
activities in addition to the operation of the actual football club, but this does
not detract from the fact that the main line of business of the firm is not with
the media or other interests but, rather, the football club. Also, while wealthy
individuals have often bought football clubs, those individuals have tended
to be supporters of that club, and have not used the club to promote their
own business operations to the disadvantage of other firms competing in
whatever markets their own business operates.
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Thirdly, as Hamil (1999) argues, the relation of the customer – in this case,
football fans – to the product and hence to the company, is rather different
from that which obtains in other industries. In most industries, if a firm’s prod-
uct is not sufficiently competitive in terms of price and other factors, con-
sumers will be lost to rival firms. In the case of football, the customers tend not
to switch allegiances so easily (either between clubs or sports). This creates a
situation analogous to one of local monopoly, discussed below. It is true that
fans can continue to support the club and may be able to consume the prod-
uct through pay-TV (currently, in the UK, by subscribing to BSkyB which holds
the exclusive rights for broadcasting Premiership matches live), rather than
paying through the turnstile at the ground. But that is a rather limited form of
competition, since it does not involve the consumer switching from one team
to another, and even this limited degree of competition between outlets would
have been eliminated entirely in the case of Manchester United if the
attempted acquisition had been allowed to proceed. The special nature of the
footballing industry thus both creates particular public interest concerns and
influences the way in which specific restrictions on competition operate in that
market. The particular and peculiar nature of the footballing industry, and the
concomitant necessity for regulatory intervention, have long been recognised.
It led, for example, to the Football Association’s rule 34 which aimed to
prevent the commercial exploitation of clubs,6 and more recently to the
establishment by the Government of the Football Task Force.
The peculiar nature of the footballing industry can be illustrated, finally,
by reference to one of the consequences which the attempted acquisition
would have had – which has not, as far as we are aware, been commented on
to date in public discussion – namely that several thousand shareholders who
have a keen and passionate interest in the future success of the company in
which they have a stake (as owners as well as supporters) would be forced by
law, against their will, to part with their shares. This is a rather dramatic
reversal of the whole impetus of governmental policy over several years now,
across both Conservative and Labour Governments, to encourage wider
share ownership. Indeed, one of the main arguments used in favour of float-
ing Manchester United Football Club as a plc was precisely to encourage
wider share ownership. BSkyB made clear that their aim was to acquire the
90 per cent of shares which would have allowed them, by force of law, to
require all remaining shareholders – which in the case of Manchester United
plc consists of several thousand fans – to then part with their shares in their
club. As one shareholder put it at the November 1998 Manchester United plc
AGM, his share certificate is displayed proudly on his wall at home; had the
acquisition proceeded, he would not have replaced it with a share certificate
in BSkyB.
Anti-competitive threats and restrictions on competition
BSkyB’s bid raised three separate areas of concern regarding anti-competitive
threats and restrictions on competition:
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The market for watching Manchester United There is a large market for watching
Manchester United. This market is part of the wider market for watching
football, which in turn is part of the general market for watching sport, itself
a part of the broader market for entertainment. While there are therefore
related and segmented markets, there is no doubt that there is a distinct mar-
ket for watching Manchester United, for which a match between, say, Coven-
try and Wimbledon (two other Premiership clubs) is not a close substitute.
There are two outlets for this market for watching Manchester United – either
attending the ground or else watching games live on television. The sales via
these two outlets are organised and priced by separate companies, namely
Manchester United and BSkyB respectively. Had the attempted acquisition
been successful it would have created a monopoly provider for the two
outlets. This would have resulted in at least two anti-competitive threats.
Firstly, the monopoly provider would be able to decide on price rises for
the two outlets simultaneously. And although as with any monopolist there
would be a point beyond which price rises became unprofitable, the monop-
oly provider would no longer be as concerned as would a non-monopoly
provider, at the prospect of a price rise shifting some customers to the other
outlet, of watching on television. The welfare effects of vertical integration
and vertical mergers are normally judged on a case-by-case basis. In contrast
to horizontal mergers the impact of vertical mergers on economic welfare
depends on the nature of the vertical relationship between the two compa-
nies. Vertical merger between two companies that are producing comple-
mentary goods is unlikely to be welfare decreasing, in the sense that raising
the price in one part of the company will be offset by a fall in demand not
only in that industry but also in the complementary industry. In substitute
industries vertical mergers can have more serious adverse effects because an
increase in price in one segment of the market will lead to an increase in
demand in the firm’s other market segments. In effect, the vertically inte-
grated company is able to use price increases in one market as a means of
raising demand in its related substitute market.
Secondly, there would have been a wider danger of this restriction on com-
petition leading to an abuse of the resulting market power, with behaviour
detrimental to the interests of attending fans, such as altering the day of the
week and the time of day when matches are staged.7 This is already done to
some extent, in the interests of maximising viewing figures, but at least there
is a strong countervailing force with the interests of the attending fans being
represented by a company (Manchester United) separate from the broad-
caster.
Anti-competitive practices and restrictions on competition BSkyB has a huge finan-
cial interest in its televising of live Premiership football. The attempted acqui-
sition would have weakened the competitive position of BSkyB’s broadcasting
rivals and would have strengthened BSkyB’s already dominant position in
pay-TV. The football club in question would have been owned by one of the
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broadcasting companies and would therefore inevitably have been used to dis-
tort the bargaining process, creating restrictions on competition.
If the attempted acquisition had proceeded, then, in any subsequent nego-
tiations over the rights to televise football, there would have been a change
in the balance between the TV company and the football clubs: BSkyB and
its rival broadcasters would be on one side of the bargaining table, and on the
other side would be the clubs, with BSkyB owning and representing the
biggest and most powerful of those clubs.
It is the interest of all league football clubs to reach agreement with
whichever broadcasting company offers the best deal. With the attempted
acquisition, other broadcasting companies would have been put at a
competitive disadvantage vis à vis BSkyB. Manchester United could have
been used to push for an acceptance of the BSkyB offer. The club might
have done this even if the deal had not been in the interests of the foot-
balling industry taken as a whole, provided it was in the interests of its
parent company, BSkyB.
Manchester United’s vote – and more importantly, its power and influence
– would have been used to favour a deal with BSkyB rather than with
BSkyB’s competitors. In addition to representing a distortion of the compet-
itive process to the detriment of other broadcasting companies, such a situa-
tion could also have posed an anti-competitive threat to other football clubs
in the Premiership (and might in addition have had a deleterious effect on
clubs outside the Premiership). If the merger had gone ahead and the Restric-
tive Practices Court had ended the current bargaining arrangements, then
other broadcasters would have been at a competitive disadvantage vis à vis
BSkyB in attempting to secure television rights, since the biggest and most
popular club would already be owned by one of the other broadcasting com-
panies. This would no doubt have provoked those other broadcasters to buy
up top football clubs themselves. Whether the BBC would have been per-
mitted to defend itself in this way is, however, rather to be doubted. Nor
would such a defense of the BBC’s interests be something to be welcomed;
on the contrary, it would replicate many of the anti-competitive dangers
described in this section, and would further divide the Premiership between
the few top clubs, on the one hand, and the rest of the league, on the other.
In addition, the position of other football clubs vis à vis BSkyB would have
been affected by BSkyB’s ownership of one of the clubs. Had the attempted
acquisition been reported as Manchester United acquiring BSkyB, objections
would no doubt have been raised by the other clubs that the main broad-
caster was to be owned by a Premiership club. BSkyB (‘owned’ under this sce-
nario by Manchester United) would even have the right to move the dates
and times of crucial games to be played by Manchester United’s rivals in the
title race. This is just one of the more minor ways in which vertical integra-
tion between a broadcaster and a football club could be abused, to the more
general implications of which we now turn.
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Abuse of vertical integration The attempted acquisition would have decreased
competition through the vertical integration of the supplier (Manchester
United) and broadcaster (BSkyB) of Manchester United football matches. In
the event of Premier League clubs individually negotiating television rights,
Manchester United would then find itself ‘negotiating’ with its owners –
a most extreme case of exclusive trading. There is reason to be concerned
that such vertical integration may even have operated against the interests
of Manchester United itself. If BSkyB were to require the participation of
Manchester United to launch a European Super League, or any other such
venture, there would be a risk that the club would be forced by its parent
company to break away from the Premiership, if that was what was required
to accomplish the parent company’s media goals.8
The vertical integration of BSkyB and Manchester United would have
created three additional anti-competitive threats.
Firstly, in 2001 when the other broadcasters had to compete with BSkyB
over the rights to televise live Premiership matches, BSkyB would have been
in a position to offer more than its rivals, since a proportion of BSkyB’s offer
would have returned directly to the vertically integrated company. The pro-
portion of the money that would have returned to BSkyB, via its ownership
of Manchester United, would have been far greater than 5 per cent,9 as
matches involving Manchester United are shown more frequently and attract
more viewers than matches involving many other Premiership clubs.
Secondly, such vertical integration would risk the natural competitive
processes in both industries – broadcasting and football – being distorted
through cross-subsidies. The likely direction would be for the broadcaster
to cross-subsidise the football club, since the competitive advantage this
would give the football club against the competitor clubs would be
expected to produce a subsequent pay-off to the broadcaster, as success on
the field led to increased viewing figures, including through pay-TV.10 Such
cross-subsidising would lead to a growing inequality and competitive
imbalance; these effects would have been intensified had the BSkyB bid
proceeded, and would subsequently have triggered other bids by broad-
casters for Premier League clubs. There is also the possibility that the cross-
subsidising danger would work the other way, with the broadcaster using
profits from the football club to allow BSkyB to undercut its rival TV com-
panies for a time.
Thirdly, the attempted acquisition would have represented a form of ver-
tical foreclosure, thus impeding competition. The market for football broad-
casting and packaging is increasingly a market for ideas in which diversity
and creativity matter. Such a market is best served by being fragmented,
allowing new entrants to innovate and compete. Vertical integration restricts
such processes. Indeed, the attempted acquisition would have been a move
against the trend, deliberately promoted by Government, to encourage out-
sourcing from broadcasters to other content providers.
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Public interest concerns and the quality of football
The bid by BSkyB to acquire Manchester United represented a serious threat
to the interests of British football both as a leisure activity and as a business
sector. It is important to maintain – and indeed strengthen – the current links
between the various sectors of the footballing industry. The majority of Pre-
miership players start their careers in the lower divisions, including non-
league clubs. The majority also finish their footballing careers outside of the
Premiership, either as players, managers, or in some other football-related
occupation. There are therefore strong bonds within the game. These links are
vital to the continued health of the sector, and in the long term even to the
success of individual Premiership clubs despite the fact that over the short and
medium term their profitability could be boosted by neglecting such links.
It is important to stress two points here. Firstly, rich individuals have in the
past bought clubs, and clubs have also been floated as plcs. The attempted
acquisition of Manchester United was quite different from all previous take-
overs or flotations, in that it would have left the football club as only a small
part of the parent company’s operations; in addition, the main interest of that
parent company (BSkyB) – namely broadcasting – would be other than foot-
ball, and yet at the same time there would have been a strong incentive to use
the footballing part of the business in the interests of the parent company. The
link between this football club and other clubs in England would have become,
at best, less important in the eyes of the relevant–BSkyB–shareholders.
Secondly, the attempted acquisition should not be considered in isolation.
Had this acquisition been allowed to proceed, it is likely that similar
takeovers of other major Premiership clubs would have followed. Such a
process would have been inimical to the long-term development of the game
as a whole. It could even have led to a formal breakaway of such ‘super clubs’
from the rest.
There is also the local monopoly aspect of football clubs that needs to be
taken into account. Football fans almost invariably support only one team,
and this support is translated commercially through attendance at matches
and watching or listening to them through TV and radio, and through pur-
chasing associated goods and services. Such consumers (fans) do not readily
switch their consumption to another football club. Support and loyalty cre-
ates a lock-in to one club. Thus, the owners of football clubs are, in effect,
local monopoly suppliers of a unique product, and that raises major regula-
tory concerns. There have been various factors preventing the abuse of this
monopoly power in the past, including the FA’s rule 34, referred to below. The
success of the attempted acquisition would have constituted a serious risk that
this monopoly power would be exploited against the public interest.
A couple of additional comments are called for in relation to the claim that
each club is to a large extent a local monopoly. As mentioned above, this is
due to the nature of football support, with clubs relying on local support and
this in turn resulting in fan loyalty to the local club. This monopoly power
derives both from geographical locality and from the nature of fan loyalty.11
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In other sectors of the economy (such as the water industry) such local
monopoly would be seen as sufficient reason for direct regulation. In the case
of the footballing industry this has not, to date, proved necessary as there has
been a general recognition both of the above facts and also, therefore, of the
importance of not over-exploiting this monopoly power. There is serious
reason to doubt whether BSkyB would have exhibited the same degree of
self-restraint.12 There was thus good reason to suspect that an abuse of
monopoly power would have resulted. As indicated above, the attempted
acquisition would have diminished what restraining influences there are at
present, such as the choice between attendance at the ground, on the one
hand, and paying for a BSkyB subscription to watch Premiership games live
on television, on the other.
The MMC’s findings
The MMC broadly accepted the points made above, and recommended against
the merger, a recommendation that the Government accepted. In announcing
his decision, the secretary of state for Trade and Industry stated that
the proposed merger may be expected to reduce competition for the broadcast-
ing rights to Premier League matches. This would lead to less choice for the Pre-
mier League and less scope for innovation in the broadcasting of Premier League
football. The MMC also concluded that enhancing BSkyB’s ability to secure
rights to Premier League matches in the future would reduce competition in the
market for sports premium television channels. This would in turn feed through
into reduced competition in the wider pay TV market.13
On the question of wider public interest concerns, the Commission con-
cluded that the merger would adversely affect football:
We have concluded that the merger would reinforce the existing trend towards
greater inequality of wealth between clubs, weakening the smaller ones. We have
also concluded that the merger would give BSkyB additional influence over Pre-
mier League decisions relating to the organisation of football. On both counts
the merger may be expected to have the adverse effect that the quality of Eng-
lish football would be damaged. This adverse effect would be more pronounced
if the merger precipitated other mergers between broadcasters and Premier
League clubs. (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1999)
Summary
BSkyB’s attempted take-over of Manchester United plc would have strength-
ened BSkyB’s dominant position in broadcasting. (Matches involving Man-
chester United account for 25 per cent of all BSkyB’s viewers of Premier
League matches.) Vertical integration between broadcasters and football
clubs raises a number of issues surrounding competition and vertical
restraints. In particular, vertical integration may
● distort the bargaining process for the sale of TV rights;
● facilitate market foreclosure in broadcasting;
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● lead to greater exploitation of the local monopoly that clubs enjoy; and
● widen the inequality between the leading clubs and the rest.
The secretary of state’s decision to block the merger may have deterred other
broadcasters from attempting to take over football clubs but it has not
stopped a number of media companies (including BSkyB) from acquiring
vertical shareholdings in leading Premier League clubs. This goes against the
arguments set out in the MMC’s report14 and raises the question of whether
such vertical linkages should be prohibited in the case of football clubs and
broadcasting companies, as they have been in a number of other industries,
such as rail, gas and electricity.
League collectivity and broadcasting rights
The emergence of football as the main programming ‘software’ used to attract
viewers in the pay-TV market has led to regulatory concerns over vertical inte-
gration between football clubs and broadcasters, as well as over the role of
leagues as collective suppliers of live broadcasting rights. These two concerns
have been the subject of a case brought before the Restrictive Practices Court
(RPC) by the OFT against the Premier League over the latter’s collective sale
of television rights, and of a Monopolies and Mergers Commission inquiry,
which recommended the blocking of the proposed vertical merger between
BSkyB and Manchester United plc. The central issues underlying these cases
are closely linked. The OFT’s case against the Premier League’s collective sale
of television rights rested on the argument that the League was behaving like
a cartel, raising prices and restricting output. This failed to appreciate the
importance of the collectivity of the League and the fact that it serves at least
two functions. First, unlike a standard price-fixing cartel, which contributes
nothing to the product sold, it is actively involved in the joint production of
the output. Second, the League plays a functional role by regulating the inher-
ent tendency for imbalance by the redistribution of television revenues from
the more successful clubs downwards. This may be compared with a situation
of individual selling by clubs where the leading clubs would be able to charge
considerably more than the lagging clubs for the TV rights to their matches
because they attract more viewers per match. It was largely on those grounds
that the RPC judgement went against the OFT.15
Conclusions
This chapter has identified three peculiarities of the economics of professional
football. This triad of peculiarities suggests the need for multiple forms of reg-
ulation. Incentive conflicts between clubs, and between clubs and their league
(where leading clubs can credibly threaten to leave to form a rival league)
undermine the capacity of leagues, particularly the Premier League, to be self-
regulating and suggest the need for an independent regulator. Incentives for
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vertical integration between clubs and broadcasters serve to distort competi-
tion in broadcasting, threaten the collectivity of the league and may adversely
affect the quality and organisation of football. There is a clear need to prevent
such vertical integration, as is the case in industries, such as rail, electricity and
gas. Finally, stakeholder conflicts brought about by the stock market flotation
of clubs may be resolved, or at least alleviated, by the formation of share-
holder/supporter trust holdings. What is required is a dual system of regula-
tion with top-down regulation to preserve league collectivity and distortions
of competition in broadcasting and bottom–up regulation to resolve corpo-
rate governance issues.
Notes
1 We are grateful to Jeanette Findlay, Sean Hamil and Bill Holahan for valuable
comments and discussion. The usual disclaimer applies.
2 For a report on the state of corporate governance at football clubs, see Hamil,
Michie, Oughton and Shailer (2001).
3 For a description of the origins and operation of Supporters Direct, see the vari-
ous contributors to Hamil, Michie, Oughton and Warby (2001).
4 This section draws on our submission to the MMC made jointly with Keith Cowl-
ing, Simon Deakin, Laurence Harris, Michael Kitson, J. Stan Metcalfe, Malcolm
Sawyer, Ajit Singh and Roger Sugden, to whom we are grateful. We are grateful
to Gordon Borrie, Sean Hamil, Alan Hughes and Geoffrey Whittington for advis-
ing on the drafting of the submission.
5 In the 1992 Fulham FC v. Cabra Estates plc case the Court of Appeal expressed
the view that the company (Fulham FC) was more than the sum of its ‘members’
(i.e. shareholders), and on that basis blocked the sale of the football club’s
ground.
6 Rule 34 is discussed below.
7 This would be particularly detrimental to travelling fans who might have already
made travel arrangements, including the purchase of flight or rail tickets which
may be wholly or in part non-refundable.
8 In 1998 the Premiership did threaten, Manchester United and the other clubs
involved with expulsion from the Premiership over their discussions regarding a
European Super League (discussions which Manchester United had denied they
were involved in, although this denial turned out to be false).
9 Five per cent, since Manchester United is one of twenty clubs in the Premiership.
10 Such cross-subsidisation would have implications quite different from the case
where money is put into a football club by, for example, a benefactor; in the case
of the attempted acquisition of Manchester United by BSkyB a cross-subsidising
of Manchester United might have been pursued not just to favour Manchester
United against other football teams, but because this would have then given
BSkyB an advantage over the other broadcasting companies.
11 Gerry Boon of accountants Deloitte and Touche has refered to the demand inelas-
ticity from this brand loyalty: ‘That means you can put the prices up but the
demand doesn’t change. They still buy the product.’ (cited in Conn, 1997, p. 155).
Manchester United could probably continue to sell all tickets – even on an
advanced season ticket basis – for all home games even if they increased prices
142 Jonathan Michie and Christine Oughton
substantially. Indeed, average admission price increases of over 30 per cent were
introduced for the 1991–92 season (Manchester United plc Prospectus, 1991).
12 Price wars involving The Times and The Sun, and between Sky and BSB, were
pursued aggressively.
13 Department of Trade and Industry (1999), p. 2.
14 As argued by Nicholas Finney, OBE, MMC panel member for the BSkyB–
Manchester United inquiry; see Finney (2000).
15 The peculiarity of the economics of sports leagues is perhaps illustrated by the
fact that this was the first time the Office of Fair Trading has ever lost a case in
the Restrictive Practices Court.
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Introduction
This chapter studies the evolution of the software industry in the UK. Previous
work on the evolution of the software industry in the UK by Grindley (1996)
emphasised the constraints imposed on the newly emerging software sector
due to the steady erosion of a domestic hardware capability. While hardware
manufacturers were an important source of demand and often supplied the
entrepreneurship required for software firms in the early stages, we show that
independent vendors of software gradually dominated the supply of output in
this sector. They also replaced in-house development of software in a process
of vertical disintegration.
The global emergence of the software market took two forms: outsourcing
by large firms to independent software consultancies; and the emergence of
a package software sector comprising genuinely independent producers
of ‘commodity’ software. In the UK, the demand side of the newly emerging
software market was always scale constrained, though less so than for other
European countries whose markets for software were linguistically frag-
mented. This slow growth of software demand delayed a full-fledged arm’s-
length market in package software from emerging in the UK despite
considerable national strengths in computing and related sciences.
When a market started to emerge for traded software in the 1980s, niche
market strategies, driven by heterogeneous demand, had an important
impact both on the evolution of firm competences and on the nature of com-
petition and competitive advantage in the UK software sector. While out-
sourcing of software has been an important stimulus to the emergence and
growth of the UK software industry, this trajectory of growth has had its lim-
its. Firms are constrained both by the growth of demand and by the lack of
marketing skills that might re-invent market boundaries so necessary for the
development of software products. The absence of a large commodity soft-
ware market has meant a less radical impact of the software industry upon
industrial growth in the UK economy.
Thus, in this chapter, we describe the evolution of an industry driven
by the need for outsourcing and limited by the competences developed by
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outsourcing. The UK software sector is not alone in this trend – indeed the
situation is far worse for the European software sector. The body of this
chapter is organised in the following way: the next section describes the role
of demand factors in the process of vertical disintegration and distinguishes
between the product and service segments of the software market. Section
three reviews the changing need for software in the growth of the global soft-
ware industry. Section four highlights the role of a narrow demand base in
the emergence of a market for traded software in the UK. The fifth section
examines the supply side of the software market and details the nature of the
firms that are entrants to the industry in the UK. Section six examines
the impact of these demand- and supply-side factors on the nature of com-
petition, competitive advantage and barriers to growth for firms in the UK
software sector.
Vertical disintegration and the growth of the software market
Vertical disintegration and the emergence of intermediate markets
Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations linked the growth of the inter-firm
division of labour and the emergence of specialised industries to the growth
in the demand for final goods. The idea of inter-firm division of labour had
received less attention from the economists of the nineteenth century than
did the notion of intra-firm division of labour. In 1928, Allyn Young drew
attention to the important notion of inter-firm division of labour and the
consequent ‘production round-aboutness’ in the economy. To him this was
an important source of increasing returns in the economy. Among later econ-
omists, Stigler (1951) developed the importance of the division of labour for
the vertical disintegration of production and Rosenberg (1963) drew atten-
tion to the emergence of intermediate technology markets due to the growth
in demand and to the economies of specialisation that an economy as a whole
derives due to the existence of specialised technology sectors.
Rosenberg’s work on the machine tool industry drew attention to another
important phenomenon that he associated with the rise of specialised tech-
nology sectors. This was the phenomenon of technological convergence
whereby several industrial sectors begin to share a set of common tech-
niques. Thus, he pointed out that industries as diverse as bicycles and
sewing machines and firearms shared the same mechanical principles and in
fact the manufacturers of sewing machines made the first bicycles. The
cross-sectoral demand made possible by technological convergence created
a large enough scale of demand for the specialised machine tool sector to
emerge. Firms no longer needed to manufacture their own machines but
could buy them from the independent firms in the machine tool sector. In
turn, the capital goods sector that emerged was a technology market capa-
ble of serving diverse upstream sectors which benefited from the efficiency
improvements in design and innovation simply by virtue of production
round-aboutness.
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The emergence of the software industry has many characteristics reminis-
cent of the growth of the capital goods sector. Firstly, the growth of the pack-
age ‘product’ software industry has been fuelled by the widespread
computerisation of administrative and production activity. Thus, it is an
intermediate demand based on the growth of computerisation in the econ-
omy. Secondly, the market for package software is often across sectors of use.
Lastly, the package (or commodity) software industry today serves many
upstream sectors, and embedded new software is rated an important source
of innovation in several services sectors.
The ‘product’ and ‘service’ segments of the software market
In the software industry the distinction between professional services (includ-
ing customised software) and the software packages and products segments of
the market has always been recognised by industry analysts. The professional
services component of the software demand depends upon the outsourcing
of IT needs by other firms, while the software packages and products segment
of the market resembles an arm’s-length market. The key difference between
the two types of market revolves around the degree of client/customer
concentration for a typical firm operating in these markets.
Service markets are generally outsourced markets with a large element of
customisation, and they tend to have small numbers of buyers. The average
value of transaction for each buyer, however, can be high, making the scale
of demand viable for market-based production even though customer num-
bers are often small – ranging from five to eight customers a year. In contrast,
firms create software product markets by anticipating and bundling the soft-
ware needs of users, whether in the area of operating systems or software
applications. There are large fixed costs in the development of products:
R&D expenditures, testing of prototypes, and marketing expenditures.
Products are successful when there are many users willing to buy them. This
spreads the fixed costs over many units and brings down the value of each
transaction. A large number of customers also implies the relative anonymity
of any individual customer. Client concentration is low, and in that sense
product markets are like arm’s-length markets.
The larger part of the aggregate revenues from software in every country
comes from the professional services segment. Nevertheless the size of the
package segment is indicative of the extent to which arm’s-length markets
have developed in software. The package software market is also the more
rapid growth segment of the market. As Malerba and Torrisi (1996) show,
Europe lags behind America in the relative size of this sector. The UK has a
smaller package software market when compared to the USA, but is ahead of
other countries of Europe.1
Hoch et al. (1999) observe that the product and services segments of the
market operate to very different competitive logics. Product provision in soft-
ware is akin to the commodification of software, and requires investment in
anticipation of demand. Software product providers, however, have mostly
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fixed costs. The only variable cost they incur is the cost of additional units,
which for software is the cost of reproduction. When there is the large dom-
inance of fixed costs, standard economies of scale accrue to the producer.
Total profits increase as market share grows.
Service providers in software, in contrast, have very few fixed costs. Typi-
cally their costs are incurred as they produce, and often with the client incur-
ring those costs. Most of their costs are the costs of labour and they maximise
their profits by utilising their labour resources fully. Their objective is to
develop their human resources and to utilise the human capital created as
fully as possible. Achieving large scales of output is not necessarily a goal.
In microeconomics’ terminology, the balance of fixed and variable costs
differs according to whether a firm is a product provider or a service provider.
This affects both the way in which firms think and compete and also has con-
sequences for the market structure that emerges. Throughout the remainder
of this chapter the emphasis will be on the first rather than the second.
A final difference between the service and product segments of software
concerns the way that marketing is actually done in the two segments. Service
software is customised and its selling is closely tied to how well the software
producer understands the business domain of the firm that she is selling
to. Close and repeated interaction with the user are useful in expanding the
credibility of the service producer, and a successful project with one user will
create a market by establishing a reputation for the service producer.
Product segments rely on different modes of marketing, depending on
the nature of the product they are selling. Information about the uses of the
product is created initially through advertising, usually in trade magazines.2
Trial promotions of software products have usually taken place through
retailers of hardware who distribute some software free with the comput-
ers sold by them. More specialised software (for example, computational
programs, specialised database products) are usually advertised through
the educational press in a manner similar to the promotion of textbooks.
Similarly, the marketing of games borrows the instituted selling arrange-
ments that are often used for the selling of films for the screen. Thus,
depending upon the nature of the product, the method of actually market-
ing the product borrows from the institutions that exist to market other
similar products.
Demand factors and the changing need for software in the global economy
Computer software is the machine-readable stored code that instructs a
microchip to carry out specific tasks. Over the thirty years of its evolution the
software market has encompassed this basic functionality, across a range of
differentiated uses. Based on the function of the software and the sorts of
tasks it instructs the microchip to carry out, there are three broad categories
of software: operating systems, tools and applications. Conceiving of the soft-
ware sector in this way, in terms of the need for code, defines the importance
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of particular computer science skills that are required to write those kinds of
software. A second classification is in terms of how software and its associ-
ated services are provided by producers. Thus there are ‘product providers’
or ‘customised software/service providers’. Each of these two kinds of pro-
ducers may provide operating systems, tools or applications. Such a classifi-
cation is useful because it emphasises the associated differences in the nature
of the markets and the competition between the two segments (Mowery,
1996; Hoch et al., 1999). It is therefore that distinction which is emphasised
in this chapter.
Hoch et al. (1999) argue that the software business unfolded in five stages.
The first stage (1949–59) comprised the development of professional service
firms in the USA, which developed tailor-made solutions for several big
software projects underwritten by the US government and, later, by large
corporations. The SAGE and the SABRE systems were products developed in
this period. Nevertheless, in the 1960s the demand for software came from
a few large firms, and the conventional wisdom was that software could not,
by itself, make money.
The decade 1959–69 saw the emergence of the first two software product
companies. Mark IV written by Informatics was one of the most successful
software products. The other software product came about due to a failed
contract. ADR produced the product Autoflow for another firm (RCA)
which decided that the product was not what it wanted after all. ADR tried
to recover its costs by selling the same product to other buyers. Eventually
ADR rewrote the product slightly for the IBM 1401 and later for the IBM
360 series.
The 1970s started with the unbundling decision of IBM. The immediate
consequence was that a number of software product companies emerged,
providing database applications across a range of business operations, for
finance and insurance companies. These companies, also called independent
enterprise solution providers, included firms like SAP, BAAN and Oracle – all
established during this period.
The 1980s saw the rapid spread of the personal computer and the associ-
ated need for a different kind of software – mass-packaged software that
could be installed on small systems. The software market splintered into
areas of application. Prior to the 1980s there were two competing platforms
for operating systems on personal computers, viz. the DOS system and the
Mackintosh. In the 1980s, Windows emerged as the standard operating sys-
tem. Applications software for the personal computer were written based on
the operating system on which it was to run, and this grew as a distinct area
of software.
The spread of the PC created the possibility of replacing mainframe sys-
tems with networked PCs. From this there emerged a new kind of software
market where PCs, whether running different operating systems or the same
operating system, could ‘talk’ to each other. The Internet is an extension of
that basic idea. The possibility of writing software that enables different
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microchips to communicate with each other also opens up whole new areas
of application – in telecommunications, in media and in ‘intelligent’ con-
sumer durables. These are also the important growth areas for the future of
the software industry.
Demand for software in the UK economy
Demand for software was slow to develop in the UK despite the involve-
ment of the universities of Cambridge and Manchester in the first attempt
to build a modern computer at the University of Pennsylvania, and despite
the uses for the computer envisaged by Maurice Wilkes at Cambridge, who
foresaw that software would dominate the use of the computer. More than
anything else this reveals that a capacity to develop computer science in the
universities was necessary to but not sufficient for the development of a
software market.
The emergence of independent vendors and the growth of the software
market in the UK really took place only with the spread of microcomput-
ers in the 1980s. Many companies were using in-house developed software
and computerised systems in administration or for embedding in elec-
tronic capital goods such as telecommunications and defence systems.
Such software was, however, produced internally for use within a large
firm. Only a small proportion of software written by firms was ‘traded’
between firms. Thus, Grindley (1996, p. 208) shows that in 1984 only
about a quarter of all software production was traded software: the total
‘market’ for software was only $1.4 billion, though the UK produced
software worth $5.9 billion.
Though the emergence of a software market was delayed in the UK as
compared to the USA, when it did emerge it mimicked the stages of evolu-
tion of the software industry described earlier (pp. 147–9). Figure 8.1, based
on the SDQ9 Business Monitor series for computer services, shows the grad-
ual process of vertical disintegration in the growth of the UK software
sector. It charts the growth of billings for computer services (including soft-
ware) between 1971–87. The share of billings from parents and associate
firms declined over time, while that of private vendors increased. The gov-
ernment’s demand for services was never very high and that of foreign
billings shows a marginal increase overtime.
In the US, the initial demand for software came from government labora-
tories, followed by hobbyists and large firms. In the UK there was a notable
absence of any large-scale governmental demand, and large firms were slow
to adopt computerisation. It is very difficult to get a sense of which sectors
of the UK economy drove the demand for software. Table 8.1, derived from
data based on the CBR survey (see Appendix), indicates that those sectors
were manufacturing, finance and financial services, followed by trade and
other service sectors.
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Table 8.1 Sector-wise distribution of computer software and services sales
Sector % of all firms reporting any sales to the sector
Manufacturing 46.5
Financial and business services 44.2
Retail and wholesale trade 37.2
Other services 37.2
Health and education 21.9
Central and local government 32.6
Personal consumers 4.7
The newly emerging computer software firms were dependent on the spread
of computerisation and the replacement demand for computers (across sec-
tors of industry) to expand the demand side of the market. The big shift from
mainframe to distributed computing produced this opportunity: small and
medium-sized firms also could benefit from computerisation. This expanded
the overall market for software rapidly, as is clear from Figure 8.1.
The generally slow spread of computerisation took place alongside devel-
opment of a heterogeneity of hardware platforms for which software had to
be written. This, in turn, was because of a lack of standardisation among the
operating systems both across companies and across different vintages of
computers from the same manufacturer. Furthermore, industrial sectors dif-
fered in the kinds of software they needed for computerising their adminis-
trative tasks: for example, payroll systems and inventory systems differed
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Share of billings to public service clients Share of private (other UK) billings
Figure 8.1 Breakdown of billings to clients in the UK software sector (1971–87)
across industrial sectors. All these factors meant that UK software producers
(of operating systems, tools and applications) faced fairly heterogeneous
demands for software. This heterogeneity created a further segmentation of
the newly emerging software market, especially in application areas. Conse-
quently, the emerging software market developed mostly due to the external-
isation of software production by large firms, rather than because of a radical
redefinition of market boundaries around the attributes of software, as had
happened in the USA when the first product software packages emerged.
Some support for these arguments comes from the CBR survey of UK
computer firms. The survey found very few software firms that did not earn
revenue from services as well: 63 per cent of the software and services firms
interviewed over 1995–96 felt that they were doing work which clients once
did themselves. As table 8.2 shows that roughly two in three UK software
firms sold half or more of their total output to large private firms.
Table 8.2 Rankings of sales (%) to large private sector firms
% of total sales Number of firms % of all firms
Less than 10 11 28
10–50 3 8
Over 50 25 64
Missing 4
43 100
Though independent vendors of software gradually replaced in-house
departments of large firms as suppliers of software, there were parts of the
software market that they did not manage to redefine in the way that the first
producers of products had done in the USA. This is in part because in many
of these areas UK firms still face the stiffest competition from US firms. A
consequence of this inability to redefine software market boundaries, how-
ever, was that though a market for software supplied by independent vendors
did emerge in the UK in the mid-1980s it was a market that was still tied to
a narrow base of demand that emanated from a few large firms, with a large
service component attached to it. In what follows I argue that this had impor-
tant consequences for competition and competitive strategies.
Nature of firms and the supply side of the UK software market
As I have indicated the supply side of the UK software market showed the
expected changes overtime. Initial entry into the newly emerging software
market was by firms in adjacent sectors: hardware firms and education and
training establishments. Grindley (1996) details the nature of firms that pro-
vided software in the period 1983–89, and this is reproduced in the second
column of table 8.3. The table shows that independent providers of software
were becoming important in the professional services category, dominating
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hardware manufacturers. The faster growing software packages market, for
which no detailed figures are reported here, was still dominated by hardware
manufacturers.
More recent data drawn from the CBR computer survey (see Appendix) for
the period 1996–97, and reported in the fourth column of table 8.3 present a
different picture. The randomly drawn sample of the survey revealed that
only 2 per cent of software and services firms faced serious competitors who
were hardware manufacturers. The serious competition for UK software and
services firms in the mid-1990s came more from independent software houses
and system houses/integrators.
Table 8.3 Sectors of origin of the main competitors
Share of market by 1989 Share of firms reporting one or 1995–96
provider (%) more competitor, by type (%)
Hardware 5 Hardware manufacturers 12
Independent software 
vendors 24 Independent software vendors 55
Subtotal of all professional 
services 29 Suppliers of EDP 24




Subtotal package software 38
Sources: Column 2 is from Grindley (1996): Table 8.2, p. 207; column 4 is derived from the
CBR survey, which is described in the Appendix.
The late start of the software market has meant that UK software produc-
ers have always faced severe foreign competition. Over 40 per cent of firms
face no overseas competition, but for others the consequence of the late UK
start in the software has also meant that the stiffest competition they face is
from US competitors. This is clear from table 8.4.
Table 8.4 Nationality of the main overseas competitors
No. of serious competitors US firms European firms Other firms
1–2 12 7 3
3–5 6 2 1
Over 5 1 – 1
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Competition, competitive strategies and barriers to growth 
of firms in the UK software sector
The discussion thus far has shown that, as a whole, the UK software indus-
try has been constrained by an insufficiently large demand for homogenous
software products, and thus professional services accounts for the greater
part of software revenues. At the same time, on the supply side the nature of
entrants has changed, with hardware manufacturers accounting for a dimin-
ishing portion of the competition and giving way to independent vendors. In
this section I explore how the aggregate changes on the demand side have
influenced the nature of competition and of competitive advantage in the
software market. The barriers to growth reported by software firms are con-
sidered and are related to the nature of demand and competition facing firms
in the UK software market.
Firms in the UK software market operate principally in small outsourced
niche markets where they are insulated from competition and where they can
develop specialised products for a few large firms. The CBR computer survey
gives many indications of this tendency, as already reported. Table 8.5 reports
the evidence on the nature of competition faced by firms. Less than a third of
firms faced more than five competitors and most firms faced between three
and five competitors. This is what one would expect in niche markets.
Table 8.5 Serious competitors faced by UK software and computer services firms
No. of serious competitors No. of firms % of firms
0–2 10 23.8
3–5 20 47.6
Over 5 12 28.6
Firms were asked to score the most important factors that contributed to
their competitive advantage on a scale of 1 (not important) to 5 (crucial to
the firm). The frequency of the extreme scores of 4 and 5 is reported in table
8.6 below. The factors that received the largest proportion of extreme scores
across firms were niche market specialised expertise and an ability to deal
effectively with particular clients. Generalised skills, like R&D expertise and
marketing and sales expertise, in contrast ranked very low. The importance
of established reputation to firms in securing competitive advantages is also
clearly indicated.
The relatively low importance of domestic and foreign demand growth in
imparting any advantages to the firm is also significant, and is indicative of
the demand constraints faced by UK firms in this sector. However, from table
8.7 it is clear that demand is not the most important barrier to growth
reported by UK software firms. The highest barriers reported by firms are
those concerning the availability of finance and of marketing, management
and technical skills.
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Table 8.6 Factors contributing to the competitive advantage of firms
Extreme scores
Factors in competitive advantage N %
Specialised expertise 41 95
Long-term relations with clients 37 86
Responsiveness to client needs 36 84
Product quality or design 34 79
Established reputation 31 72
Technological leadership and innovation 24 56
Growth of market demand in the UK 22 51
R&D expertise 20 47
Marketing and sales expertise 16 37
Competitive prices 14 33
Diversification 12 28
Growth of market demand globally 11 26
Growth of market demand in Europe 10 23
Low production costs 10 23
Total firms 43
Table 8.7 Barriers to the growth of UK software firms
Type of barrier Extreme scores
Frequency % of firms
Availability of finance 21 49
Marketing and sales skills 19 44
Availability of highly qualified staff 15 35
Management skills 14 33
Cost of finance 13 30
Growth of demand in principal product markets 10 23
Increasing competition globally 9 21
Increasing competition locally/nationally 9 21
Total firms 43
Both the availability of finance and marketing ability are crucial factors if a
firm is to successfully make the transition from service provider to product
provider. The different costs in the product and service segments of the soft-
ware market were discussed earlier (pp. 145–7). This different balance of
fixed and variable costs is accompanied by a different balance of skills and
competence among firms in the two segments, making the transition from
one segment to another very difficult. Indeed, there is not a single example
of a firm that has successfully made the transition from service firm to soft-
ware product firm in the global economy.
In an earlier study of the West European software industry, Malerba
and Torrisi (1996) found that reputation and knowledge of user needs,
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usually acquired through long-term relationships with the customer, were the
important barriers to entry to the customised market. The package software
market demonstrated barriers to entry on account of marketing and distribu-
tion networks as well. The balance of skills needed and their requisite variety
is clearly evident in table 8.8.
Table 8.8 Entry barriers for different types of European software producer (average scores)
Knowledge of 
Financial Marketing and user’s Technological skill Image and Corporate 
Firm type resources sales network environment and capabilities reputation culture
Software and services 2.83 3.25 3.64 3.20 3.86 2.69
System software and 
utilities 1.50 2.00 3.50 5.00 4.00 4.00
Packaged software 3.50 3.36 3.73 3.00 3.45 3.50
Services (EDP, 
Consulting/training) 2.23 3.36 3.73 3.14 4.36 2.50
Technical services 
(software development 
tool expert systems) 3.50 3.25 3.25 3.00 2.25 1.00
Note: Scores from 1 (‘not relevant’) to 5 (‘very relevant’).
Source: Malerba and Torrissi (1996), table 7.9, p. 178.
It is remarkable that the barriers to growth reported by UK firms are those
which also constitute barriers to entry in the product segments of the soft-
ware market. But perhaps this is not surprising. Niche markets along a nar-
row demand base could have predisposed firms to acquire specialised
client-specific management skills over generic management skills of various
types. The further growth of such firms, however, requires value addition to
the product or a broadening of the demand base. A useful analogy here is that
of tailors and readymade garment manufacturers in the clothing industry.
The history of clothing tells us that the best tailors did not set up readymade
garment shops. Yet many tailors went out of business because of the emer-
gence of those shops. A similar outcome is likely in the product and services
segments of the software industry.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the emergence of the UK software and computer
services sector using the available empirical evidence on the industry. The analy-
sis shows that independent software vendors came to replace in-house devel-
opment of software as the market for software services grew. The growth of the
traded software market was, however, slow to take off, despite a strong science
base, and even as late as 1984 only 25 per cent of the total software produced
was traded. Entry to the newly emerging software sector was effected by firms
from many other sectors, and in the 1980s the existence of different platforms
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meant that hardware producers were also the dominant software producers.
This situation changed in the 1990s, when independent software houses
became the primary source of competition for other software firms.
Externalisation of their software demand by large firms remains the dom-
inant process underlying the growth of this sector. For UK software firms
this has meant a narrow base of demand and the pursuit of niche market
strategies in segmented markets that are relatively insulated from competi-
tion. But such a strategy has its limits. Niche markets do not develop
the skills required for larger-scale product development and marketing.
Breaking into the more lucrative and higher growth software product mar-
ket is hampered by the lack of marketing and management skills and the
availability of finance for investment.
I have suggested that a story of cumulative causation underlies the pattern
of growth of the UK software market. The emergence of demand and the for-
mation of markets in the UK software sector have predisposed firms to the
acquisition of skills that are suitable for niche markets. Crossing over to a
commodity or product market is difficult, because to do so requires a more
balanced distribution of technical, financial, management and marketing
abilities. However, the lack of an arm’s-length ‘product’ market also reduces
the scope for externalities of the sort described earlier (pp. 145–7). Thus, the
way that software markets have formed in the UK has probably lessened the
potential impact of software on the economy.
Notes
1 Grindley (1996), table 8.1, shows that in 1994 package software (including appli-
cations solutions and applications tools) accounted for 37 per cent of all software
revenues in the UK, compared to 32 per cent for all of Europe.
2 In the UK these are magazines such as PC World.
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Appendix note on the data sources
Tables 1–7: The main source of data for tables 1–7 is the CBR computer survey of 83
firms in the UK computer sector (hardware and software/services), conducted by the
author and directed by Dr David Keeble, in 1995–96. The averages reported here are
based on data on the randomly selected software and computer services firms, which
were forty-three in number. Very few of those firms provided products only, and
about one-third of revenues for most firms came from the customisation services
offered around the software products they provided, hence the term ‘software and
services’ For more details on the survey, see Athreye (2001, pp. 21–2).
The survey of firms was conducted in two stages. The first stage was the sending
out of a pre-interview questionnaire which asked the firms to report on factual details
such as year of establishment, years of experience in the computer industry, sales,
employment details, exports and R&D expenditures. In the second stage these ques-
tionnaires were followed up by detailed interviews with firms. The interview was
based on a semi-structured questionnaire and addressed questions relating to innova-
tion, competition and competitive strategies. The sampling frame used was a random
sampling frame drawn from Dun and Bradstreet data on computer sector firms.
Figure 8.1 is based on figures obtained from SDQ9 Business Monitor series for
computer services; various volumes, 1974–92.
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Introduction
The Boston area has the highest concentration of colleges and universities,
research institutes and hospitals of any place in the world. The plethora
of graduate research programmes suggested that the industrial future of
Massachusetts was secure in the emerging knowledge economy of the late
twentieth century.
However, the research intensity of the region has not insulated the state
from the vicissitudes of the business cycle. For example, after enjoying a
ninety-month expansion labelled the ‘Massachusetts’ Miracle’, the Com-
monwealth lost one-third of its manufacturing jobs between 1985 and 1992.
The country’s first high-tech region had seemingly lost industrial leadership
much more quickly in the new industries of the late twentieth century than
in industries first established in Massachusetts in the nineteenth century.
The simultaneous collapse of the minicomputer and defence industry, with
the end of the Cold War, touched off a downturn which, added to the long-
term contraction of traditional industries, suggested that industry in Massa-
chusetts was in terminal decline. Combined with the setbacks in these major
markets was the emerging prominence of Silicon Valley, which was fostering
and commercialising innovations much faster than was Route 128, and often
in the same technologies. Clearly, few were willing to bet on the resurgence
of Route 128.
Nevertheless, the predictions of industrial gloom turned out to be wrong,
or at least premature. A return to growth beginning in 1992 long surpassed
the ‘Massachusetts’ Miracle’.2 Why the rise, the crash, and the rise again?
Certainly the decline of the mini-computer industry and cutbacks in defence
expenditures are part of the story, but not, in themselves, an explanation.
In this chapter I seek to explain the resurgence of Route 128. It was not
widely predicted and the explanation is not obvious. In fact many were so
convinced of the terminal decline of New England as a site of industrial pro-
duction that articles continue to be written on the decline of the region years
after its resurgence. Something about the region has given it the resilience to
bounce back from ‘structural’ decline.
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Open systems and regional innovation: the
resurgence of Route 128 in Massachusetts1
Michael H. Best
If the resurgence and the basis of the region’s competitive advantage
had to be accounted for in a two-word summary, my candidate would be
‘technology management’. Industries have come and gone but, fortuitously,
Massachusetts has sustained a regional technology management capability.
But my candidate is not an obvious one. The notion of technology manage-
ment is rarely invoked in discussions of competitive advantage and industrial
growth. It seems to be lost within the white spaces of business organisation
charts, and in the hallways of higher education it is to be located somewhere
between the departments of engineering, management and economics.3
This chapter seeks to bring ‘technology management’ into the discussion of
the reasons for regional growth and decline. My treatment of the notion
bridges three institutional domains: business model, production system and
skill formation. I use the idea of a ‘productivity triad’, shown in figure 9.1, to
focus attention on the interrelationships among the three domains and the
mediating link of technology management capability between the inputs
and outputs of an enterprise or a region’s production system. My hope is that
the productivity triad will also sharpen our understanding of innovation
dynamics in regional growth.
I argue that the severe decline of 1985–92 in Massachusetts can be
explained in terms of the emergence in Silicon Valley of a new model of tech-
nology management that undermined Route 128’s competitive advantage in
a range of industries. But, fortunately, the economic contraction did not
destroy the region’s production or skill formation capabilities. It put them
under pressure, but the severity of the decline involved the ‘creative destruc-
tion’ of a business model that was no longer capable of driving regional
growth. In its place a new business model emerged more suited to exploit the
region’s technological heritage and unique production capabilities. The
decline played a critical role in the resurgence.
The business model was the weak link in Route 128’s ‘productivity triad’.
The hierarchical, vertically integrated, organisational structure inherited from
past successes had turned into a disadvantage. Its weakness was only exposed






Figure 9.1 The productivity triad
with the emergence of a new model in Silicon Valley. In head-to-head com-
petition with the new, the old business model disarmed the region’s inherited
technological and production capabilities and choked the region’s growth
potential. I argue that the return to regional competitiveness can be explained
in terms of the emergence of a new ‘focus and network’ business model that
fostered a range of ‘cluster dynamics’ and thereby established the institutional
foundations for a regional ‘open systems’ model of innovation. Fortunately,
the new business model revitalised the region’s unique heritage of technolog-
ical and production capabilities and skill base, and thereby replaced the forces
of decline with new regional growth dynamics.
That something new has happened is beyond dispute. But without a deeper
understanding of the processes involved it gives policy makers little guidance
with regard to sustaining regional growth. The idea of the productivity triad
suggests that advancing or sustaining regional growth depends upon the
ability to keep all three elements of the productivity triad ‘in sync’ in a world
of interregional competitiveness. These are the enabling conditions that
support a region’s technology management capability.
Furthermore, the productivity triad offers a framework for exploring the
sources of a region’s competitive advantage and of regional growth and
decline. While the productivity triad points to relationships among the con-
stituent elements, each can be examined in terms of links to the others. I start
with the business model.
The open systems business model
The entrepreneurial firm4 was the driver of growth during both the Massa-
chusetts’ miracle and the resurgence periods. As a business model, the entre-
preneurial firm is driven by a technology–market dynamic, a mutual
adjustment process that advances a firm’s technology capability as it refines
its product concept in the market. Firms pursue emerging market opportu-
nities by developing unique production capabilities, often of a technological
form, but the process of developing such capabilities creates new product
concept possibilities and thereby the opportunity to redefine the ‘market’. A
redesigned product that better meets customer needs sets the technology–
market dynamic in motion again.
In the course of the Massachusetts’ miracle a series of firms led by techno-
entrepreneurs (often benefiting from government orders and research
sponsorship) invested heavily in emerging computer-related technologies
and established new markets. They joined others that were specialising in
defence industry products and systems. The rapidly growing new firms
organised according to the business model of vertical integration. This had a
series of consequences.
Both the business model and the technology architecture of the leading
enterprises were of the closed-system type.5 DEC’s components, for exam-
ple, were hardwired to one another. The microprocessor, the motherboard,
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the memory chips, the disk drive, the operating system, the display screen,
the software programmes, the printer, the printer microprocessor, the
printer engine software, all of the computer peripherals were designed
according to a proprietary (and closed) architecture.6 Sub-contractors made
peripheral parts but were not encouraged to develop independent design
capabilities. This is not surprising: it was the business model that had served
the nation well for roughly a century (Chandler, 1977).
What was inconceivable was that these highly successful high-tech compa-
nies, leaders in the rapidly growing markets, could stumble on the techno-
logical side. They were first movers in rapidly growing markets and they
were integrated with the innovative milieu centered on Boston’s universities
and research institutes. But they did stumble, collectively. Ironically, their
weakness was technology management, individually and collectively.
The miracle years in Massachusetts (late 1970s to 1985) were also a time
during which new business models, with superior new product development
and innovation performance standards, were being developed in other
regions. The Japanese extended the Toyota production system to the Canon
model that set new standards for rapid new product development and incre-
mental innovation (see table 9.1).7 This model established a technology
management capability that integrated applied research and production in
the service of product-led competition. The Canon model established new
performance standards in time to market for new product development. A
new technology-pull model of industrial innovation accompanied the new
business model (Best, 2001). The Canon production system, however, did
not pose the biggest threat to Route 128.
Route 128 companies rarely competed head-to-head with the Canon
model. Industrial enterprises in Massachusetts had never developed high-
volume manufacturing capabilities. Consequently, they were not vulnerable
in industries like consumer electronics, automobiles, and electrical products
in which the Japan enterprises were rapidly gaining market share. The vul-
nerability of Route 128 was to a third business model, one that emerged first
in Silicon Valley. This ‘open-systems’ model established new performance
standards for disruptive, as distinct from incremental, innovation. It was this
vertically disintegrated but systems-integrated business model that exposed
the weaknesses of Route 128’s business enterprises and undermined the
engines of growth in New England.
The ‘open-systems’ or focus and network business model is one in which
firms specialise in unique capabilities, usually involving a technological dimen-
sion, and join networks to partner for complementary capabilities. Success
at capability specialisation in high-tech usually involves the development of
technology teams that span a range of scientific and technological disciplines.
The open-systems business model can be described in terms of the principle
of systems integration, much as vertical integration historically fits the princi-
ple of flow.8 The new business model unleashed the internal technology–
market dynamic from containment within vertically integrated enterprises to
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drive a whole range of specialty component suppliers (not only those along the
‘value chain’ but across ‘value networks’). Sun workstations, for example,
were designed with common interface rules and operating system source code
to plug in microprocessors from Intel, IBM, AMD, or Motorola; display
screens from Sony or NEC; disk drives from Seagate or Quantum; memory
chips from Hitachi or Samsung; printers from HP or Epson. In leading com-
panies like Intel, HP and Sun it combined a leadership–ideas dynamic with the
technology–market dynamic.9
These internal dynamics, in turn, set in motion the processes identified in
‘cluster dynamic’ or regional growth dynamics model shown in figure 9.2.10
The new business model, enjoying increasingly far-flung applications, has
proven highly competitive against both the Canon (closed system) and the Big
Business (vertical integration) models. It is the organisational cornerstone of
a new competitive advantage based on a regional model of innovation.11
Three innovation dynamics can be distinguished.
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Table 9.1 Production systems model
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Production Exemplar Performance Production Application Production Technology Industrial
systems breakthrough principle capability management organisation
advance vehicle
PS1 Armoury Standard- Interchange- Product Product Specialist Open
isation ability parts engineering machine
PS2 Ford Cost Flow Single Throughput Exogenous Vertical
(economies product efficiency (R&D lab) integration
of time) (synchron- pipeline)
isation)
PS3 Toyota Flexibility Flow Multiple Incremental Process Closed
and quality products innovation innovation
(inventory (cellular (shopfloor
turnover manufacture) incremental 
AR)
PS4 Canon New product Flow New products New product Applied R&D Closed
cycle-time technology development (design and 
manufacture) 
DR+AR
PS5 Intel New Systems Technology New Technology Open
technology integration innovation technology integration
cycle-time (multiple development teams
technologies) (R&D and 
manufacture) 
BR+DR
Notes: AR = applied research; DR = developmental research; BR = basic research.
Techno-diversification
The cluster dynamics of figure 9.2 is constituted by a virtuous circle of entre-
preneurial firms driven by an internal technology–market dynamic generating
both growth and new technological opportunities which, in turn, foster firm
creation in emerging sub-sectors followed by new patterns of inter-firm
networking. In the process regional innovations dynamics are fostered as the
techno-diversity of the region increases and with it the probability of new
technological combinations and the emergence of new entrepreneurial firms.
Examples of the repetition of the virtuous circle of regional dynamics
leading to enterprises specialising in new technological ‘species’ in different
technological domains are commonplace in the Massachusetts of the 1990s.
One example is that of data storage systems, the ‘filing cabinets of the
electronics age’.
EMC is an entrepreneurial firm that simultaneously has developed a
unique capability and spawned a new industrial sub-sector. The company
began as a supplier of add-on memory boards for the minicomputer market
in 1979, moved into mainframe storage a decade later, and ‘added software
to help manage its boxes as it made the switch to open systems in the middle
of this decade’ (Degman, 1998, p. 1). EMC has achieved the leading edge in
storage technology with an engineering staff which, in 1998, totalled 1,200
and an annual research budget of $0.333 billion. In the same year the com-
pany opened a 682,000 square foot facility in central Massachusetts to test,
qualify and assemble computer storage systems.
EMC has ‘spawned a new generation of software and service companies
providing ways for corporations to monitor and manage data, back up and
protect it, find and fix disk-storage bottlenecks, and warn desktop computer
users to clean out their hard drives before they run out of space’ (Rosenberg,
1999). For example, a co-founder of EMC and a ten-year employee have
formed StorageNetworks, a company that offers businesses data-storage













Figure 9.2 Cluster growth dynamics
services on the networking model of telephone switches or electrical power
generators. Other nearby companies that are driving and redefining the data-
storage business, each with a unique specialty are Astrum Software (monitors
disk-storage usage at each PC and server within a department), HighGround
Systems (storage research management), Connected Corp. and Network
Integrity, Inc. (backup systems) (Rosenberg, 1999).
The eleven firms that have spun out of Cascade Communications in the
internet switching equipment sector are another example. All are located north
of the Massachusetts Turnpike on I-495, a Boston ring-road outside but paral-
leling Route 128.12 The emerging firms specialise in a range of products and
services unified by the integration of hardware and software required to move
data, voice and video over networks. While the region has historically been a
centre for communication switching equipment (ex-AT&T’s Lucent Technol-
ogy’s 2 million-square foot manufacturing site is in nearby North Andover),
many of the new firms can be traced to the technological capability and skill
base created at Cascade Communications. Cascade specialises in frame relay
technology for ‘efficiently directing the congested streams of data flowing
across phone lines’. Sycamore, likewise, combines networking and optical
technologies. Each of the companies, however, specialises in a distinctive
technological capability and uses open-system architecture. Principals in nine
of eleven of the startups had been employed at Cascade (Zizza, Pelczar and
Eisenmann, 1999). Several principals had worked at the Advanced Network
Group of MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory, at Motorola/Codex, and at DEC.
The examples of data-storage equipment and telecommunications switch-
ing equipment are leading cases. But they represent a large class of business
enterprise genealogies in which the emergence of regionally networked
groups of firms can be traced to the technology and market dynamic of an
entrepreneurial firm. Other examples in the Route 128 region include semi-
conductor equipment manufacturers (Eaton Semiconductor, Varion Ion
Implant, Teradyne, Micrion); electronic test equipment suppliers; digital sig-
nal processing semiconductors (Analog Devices, Mercury Computer Systems,
Alpha, BKC Semiconductor, C. P. Clare); electro-medical products (over
twenty companies led by HP, now Agilent); biotechnology; genome industry
(nearly 200 Massachusetts’s companies in 1998); enviro-technology; pump
laser equipment (MIT Lincoln Labs, Lasertron); infrared imaging systems
(‘Lab 16’ Raytheon, Honeywell Radiation Center, Lockheed Martin Infrared
Imaging Systems, Telic Precision Optics, Inframetrics, Inc.); and industrial
automation (Foxboro Instruments, Groupe Schneider’s Amicon Division).
CorpTech, a data-processing company, categorises America’s small and
medium-sized (under 1,000 employees) ‘technology manufacturers’ (most of
which are privately held) in seventeen industries as shown in table 9.2. The
dispersion is indicative of the diversity of industries associated with Route 128.
The mix of high-technology manufacturing in Massachusetts, with approxi-
mately 2 per cent of the nation’s population, is remarkably similar to that of
the nation as a whole. CorpTech estimates that over 8 per cent of America’s
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small and medium-sized high-tech companies are based in Massachusetts, with
a total of over 200,000 employees.13
These data support the theme that a process of techno-diversification has
driven the resurgence of the Massachusetts’ economy. Technology manage-
ment in the Massachusetts’ miracle growth industries of minicomputers and
defence was locked up in vertically integrated enterprises. The downturn was
critical to the upturn, as the demise of these enterprises facilitated the transi-
tion to an open-system multi-enterprise model of industrial organisation. The
accompanying decentralisation and diffusion of design combined with a her-
itage of technological skills and capabilities to fuel the internal growth dynamic
of entrepreneurial firms, which, in turn, fostered techno-diversification and
regional innovation dynamics.
Open-systems networking
The box at the left of figure 9.2 represents inter-firm networking. Three types
of inter-firm relation can be distinguished: market, closed-system, or keiretsu,
and open-systems networking. Inter-firm relations are structurally linked to
intra-firm organisation: Big Business and arm’s-length market-driven supplier
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Table 9.2 Techno-diversification of Massachusetts’ (MA) manufacturers (January 1999)
Companies MA % US %
Factory automation 337 10.5 12.1
Biotechnology 151 4.7 3.5
Chemicals 95 3.0 4.1
Computer hardware 35 13.6 13.8
Defence 56 1.7 2.1
Energy 105 3.3 4.5
Environmental equipment 203 6.3 7.1
High-tech manufacturing equipment 421 13.1 12.6
Advanced materials 159 5.0 6.6
Medical 248 7.7 6.3
Pharmaceuticals 95 3.0 2.5
Photonics 240 7.5 5.0
Computer software 993 30.9 24.8
Sub assemblies/comp 530 16.5 17.2
Test and measurement 378 11.8 11.2
Telecom and Internet 415 12.9 15.5
Transportation 92 2.9 3.6
US holding companies 245 7.6 8.4
Source: CorpTech Directory of High Tech Manufacturers. CorpTech tracks America’s 45,000
plus technology manufacturers with under 1,000 employees (90 per cent are ‘hidden’ private
companies and the operating units of larger corporations). Of 42,342 US entities, 3,242 or 7.7
per cent are located in Massachusetts. These are independent companies, subsidiaries of major
US corporations, and American operating units of foreign companies. Data extracted with
permission from CorpTech website: www.corptech.com
relations, the kaisha business model and keiretsu long-term supplier relations,
and entrepreneurial firm and open-systems networking. The kaisha business
model fostered the principle of multi-product flow and achieved performance
standards (cheaper, better, faster) which established the ‘new competition’ of
the 1970s and 1980s.
The third type is open-system networking, commonly referred to as ‘hor-
izontal integration’, multi-enterprise integration, co-operation, networking
or affiliated groups of specialist enterprises. Open-systems networking is the
inter-firm counterpart to the increasing specialisation of the entrepreneurial
firm. It has proven effective at both rapid new product development and
innovation and, consequently, became the new competition of the 1990s.
The open-systems model depends upon inter-firm networking capabilities.
Inter-firm networking has evolved with the shift from price-led to product-
led competition. This entails integration of manufacturing and new product
development processes. But rapid new product development is not simply
adding a product (multi-divisional diversification): increasingly it involves a
whole group of specialist companies operating at different links along the
product chain or at different nodes in the value networks.
Open-system networks convert the inescapable dilemma of the individual
entrepreneurial firm into a growth opportunity for a region’s collective
enterprises.14 Abandoned possibilities are simultaneously opportunities
for new divisions within subsidiaries or spin-offs or for new firm creation.
The pursuit of new capabilities also opens new inter-firm partnering possi-
bilities for complementary capabilities. Ease of entry, as well, enhances the
regional capability for firms, existing and new, to respond to new market and
technological opportunities.15
Open-systems networking is a model of industrial organisation that fosters
specialisation and innovation. Historically, open systems prevailed in the
design-led industrial districts of the Third Italy. More recently, the emer-
gence of systems integration capabilities in technology has both fostered
open-system networks and developed because of them. In both cases the
business model of specialisation and inter-firm networking form an inter-
nal–external dynamic that fosters innovation and growth.
The starting point remains the technology capability/market opportunity
dynamic that drives the entrepreneurial firm, the source not only of the
growth of the firm but of a derivative set of regional growth dynamics. But
the internal dynamic of entrepreneurial firms simultaneously enhances
regional growth potential. Whether or not the potential is realised depends,
in part, upon strategic choices made within the entrepreneurial firm and the
extent of inter-firm networking capabilities.
The firm’s dilemma is either a cluster’s constraint or opportunity. The
firm’s dilemma is a cluster constraint in a region populated by enterprises
that are vertically integrated.16 But the firm’s technology choice dilemma is a
cluster opportunity in a region with ‘open-system’ networks.
The goal of the entrepreneurial firm is to develop the organisational capa-
bilities to differentiate the firm’s product in the market place and establish a
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market niche and an ongoing relationship with customers. Success requires
product redesign and development capability. To the extent that firms are
successful, the mode of competition shifts from price-led to product-led. The
rebounding pressures of product-led competition in the market on the inter-
nal organisation of the firm reinforce the drive to develop unique products
and production capabilities. A new dynamic between internal organisation
and inter-firm competition is established. Regions that make the transition
to product-led competition can enjoy a competitive advantage over regions
in which the dominant mode of competition is price. Product-led competi-
tion engenders the entrepreneurial firm. The entrepreneurial firm, in turn
drives the new internal/external dynamic. Success in the marketplace increas-
ingly depends upon product development, technology management and
innovation capabilities.
Inter-firm networking offers greater flexibility for new product develop-
ment and innovation than does vertical integration.17 Ironically, networking
can foster the social relations necessary for effective co-location of specialist
but complementary activities more easily than can vertical integration. While
a vertically integrated company operates under a single hierarchy which can
direct departments to co-locate, it does so within a bureaucracy and a set of
technologies that were originally designed for different purposes. They
become embedded in social systems and individual career paths within the
firm that can offer resistance to organisational change. Open-systems-
networking offers a range of co-design possibilities without locking an enter-
prise into any single design.
The Internet is a great facilitator of open systems networking. In fact, the
Internet is an archetypal open-systems technology. It establishes interface
rules that enable design modularisation. The Internet makes it possible to
manage supplier relations by seamlessly integrating information across dif-
ferent computer systems, parts lists and even design programmes. All-but
seamless integration across businesses enhances the simultaneous increase in
specialisation and integration that Adam Smith identified as the principle of
increasing specialisation.
As an easy plug-in system for specialist companies, the Internet lubricates
the internal–external dynamics that spawn entrepreneurial firms. But it can
also be seen as a metaphor for networking in general, and is thereby a target
for policy makers seeking to increase entrepreneurial firms. In this, the Inter-
net is the new invisible hand, but one that assists the creation of entrepre-
neurial firms and regional innovation.
The new firm creation process is itself an aspect of mutual adjustment. Just
as the dynamics associated with new product development involve a continu-
ous redefinition of product concept, carrying out the process can foster a pro-
liferation of firm concepts. Diversity and the principle of variation, or
increased speciation, mean the creation of new firm concepts. This process is
enhanced in open-system networks in which specialist new firms can readily
plug in to existing product chains. This process suggests that the strategies
of firms are themselves shaped in the ongoing practice of refining a firm’s
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concept or specific characteristic by which it distinguishes itself from other
firms and thereby derives its market power.
The entrepreneurial firm startup system is particularly strong in the Silicon
Valley and Route 128/495 high-tech regions in the USA and in the design-led
and the fashion industries of the ‘Third Italy’. Taiwan, Ireland and Israel have
all established variants, if on a smaller scale. The greatest attention has been
focused on financial markets as the enablers of entrepreneurial firm emer-
gence and development. Venture capital and ‘initial public offering’ capabili-
ties are certainly contributors to the high rates of new firm creation in both
Silicon Valley and Route 128/495. As important as financial commitment
is, the driving force must be the technological and market opportunities
for establishing a firm with the profitability to make an attractive return to
suppliers of finance.
The resulting open-systems business model is a business system that
expands opportunities for yet more entrepreneurial firms. Collectively the
open-systems business model sets higher performance standards in rapid new
product development and disruptive innovation (as distinct from continuous
improvement or incremental innovation). It is a driver of growth. Wealth
creation involving technological advance and techno-diversification is a
process analogous to Adam Smith’s principle of increasing specialisation as
applied to technological capability.
Techno-diversification and networking enhance both new product devel-
opment and industrial speciation, or the creation of new industrial sub-
sectors. The protean character of technological capability, particularly evident
in high-tech sectors, is a feature of industrial change even in the oldest sectors.
The electronics industry morphs into, for example, an information and
communications sector. Furniture becomes interior design and furnishing.
The process of industrial speciation cannot be done within a single firm. In
fact, the very success of a firm’s pursuit of one technology’s trajectory can
create obstacles to technological transition; hence the role of networks by
which new entrants can focus on a technological capability and partner for the
complementary capabilities. Regions with open-system networks have low
barriers to entry for new specialist firms. This process drives down the time
for technological change and the process of new sub-sector formation.
Regional specialisation and innovation processes
The upper box in figure 9.2 signifies the extent of capability specialisation
and technological diversity within a regional population of industrial enter-
prises. Specialisation has regional and inter-regional dimensions. Greater
specialisation internally is a measure of the technological diversity within a
region. Greater specialisation externally is a measure of uniqueness of the
regional capability and thereby of regional competitive advantage.
Greater diversity is particularly relevant to innovation. An industrial district,
unlike any single firm, offers the potential for new and unplanned technology
combinations that tap a variety and range of research- and production-related
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activities. Open systems offer wider opportunities to foster creativity, fill gaps,
replenish the knowledge pool and match needs to research.18
Regional innovation capabilities lie behind the competitive advantage of
‘low-tech’ high-income industrial districts common to the ‘third Italy’. Such
districts have developed a competitive advantage in design capabilities that have
fostered industrial leadership in a range of design-led or ‘fashion industries’.
Recently, high-tech regions have developed similar capabilities for rapid
design change and industrial innovation. In fact, regions such as Silicon
Valley and Route 128 have developed regional innovation capabilities embed-
ded in virtual laboratories in the form of broad and deep networks of opera-
tional, technological and scientific researchers which cut across companies
and universities. Silicon Valley project teams are continual combining and
re-combining across a population of 6,000 high-tech firms, making it an
unparalleled information and communication technology industrial district.19
The core of the innovation process in this model is the fillip given to new
product development (NPD) by the differentiation and integration process
(see figure 9.1). Firms under strong competitive pressure and in demanding
markets are seeking to push ahead with product improvements and new
products as fast as possible. In doing so they encounter technical problems
that they do not know how to solve, and they search for solutions, dipping
into the specialist technological and scientific bodies of knowledge that are
available in other firms, in universities and elsewhere. The companies best at
effective and fast NPD have developed the capability to integrate technolo-
gies, starting with software and hardware. They know where particular kinds
of knowledge and expertise can be located and how to dip into the pool of
technological and scientific knowledge and expertise to solve particular
problems. It is likely that this knowledge will be in identifiable ‘chunks’
related to the needs of the particular firms and industries and to the charac-
teristics of the science and technology.
Models of innovation are associated with different business models. The
kaisha variant of the entrepreneurial firm decentralises design and continual
change into the operating units. The rapid gain in Japanese market share in
many industries in the 1970s and 1980s was achieved, in part, by designing
a complementary incremental innovation capability into production. It fos-
tered a technology-pull model of innovation.
The regional model of innovation derives from the open-system regional
growth dynamics (the diffusion and development of a range of growth
dynamics issuing from the entrepreneurial firm). An American variant is the
leadership and design dynamic which combines top–down and bottom–up
actions captured by Andrew Grove’s leadership–design dynamic. Techno-
diversification, technology integration, new technology combinations and
industry speciation are all elements in processes that advance the technology
capabilities of a region.
The regional growth dynamics model fosters combined development and
diffusion of innovation. Regional innovation refers to processes that not only
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trigger the regional growth dynamics but which reshape it via the process of
industrial speciation. Thus the regional growth dynamics from an infrastruc-
ture for new industry incubation and formation.
The idea of regional innovation dynamics suggests a collective entrepre-
neurial capability as a basis for regional competitive advantage which, like its
enterprise-level counterpart, can be conceptualised as a technology market
dynamic, but at the regional level.20 Industrial districts compete against one
another. Given different paces of technological development or a shift by one
region to a higher model of technology management or a new technology
platform, the losing region risks losing a whole swathe of enterprises.
As the networking capabilities of a region become more robust, the more
that region takes on the semblance of a virtual collective entrepreneur. The
virtual collective entrepreneurial firm is a self-organising change agent com-
posed of networked groups of mutually adjusting enterprises.21 The collec-
tive entrepreneurial firm is a composite of networking firms that collectively
administers the regional growth dynamic processes of figure 9.2.
High-tech industrial districts such as the one found in Massachusetts:22
● Drive the new firm creation process. Intel’s R&D strategy is based on ‘the
acknowledged role of the spin-off or startup’, not in creating but in
exploiting new ideas.
● Create a collective experimental laboratory. Networked groups of firms
are, in effect, engaged in continual experimentation as the networks form,
disband and reform. Both the ease of entry of new firms and the infra-
structure for networking facilitate the formation of technology integration
teams in real time.
● Expand the number of simultaneous experiments that are conducted. A
vertically integrated company may carry out several experiments at each
stage in the production chain, but a district can well exploit dozens simul-
taneously.
● Foster design modularisation and, with it, the decentralisation and diffu-
sion of design capabilities. In computers, IBM got the process underway
with the modularisation of the 360 computer which created an open sys-
tem. This was greatly enhanced when the design modules for the operating
system and the microprocessor were developed by Microsoft and Intel.23
The resulting standards have created enormous market opportunities for
specific applications software.
● Counter the inherent uncertainty of technological change with the poten-
tial for new technological combinations. This feature of the regional
networking model of innovation is captured by a recent review of retro-
spective surveys of the conditions critical to successful innovation.
A survey by Ronald Kostoff (1994) finds that the first and most important
factor is a broad pool of advanced knowledge. Kostoff ’s review indicates that
‘an advanced pool of knowledge must be developed in many fields before
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synthesis leading to innovation can occur’. This advanced pool of knowl-
edge, not the entrepreneur is the critical factor. In the words of Kostoff
(1994, p. 61):
The entrepreneur can be viewed as an individual or group with the ability to
assimilate this diverse information and exploit it for further development. How-
ever, once this pool of knowledge exists, there are many persons or groups with
capability to exploit the information, and thus the real critical path to innova-
tion is more likely to be the knowledge pool than any particular entrepreneur.
The knowledge pool is developed through non-mission-oriented research
in a range of fields ‘by many different organisations’. Successful innovations
tend to be preceded by ‘unplanned confluences of technology from different
fields’ (Kostoff; 1994, p. 61). In fact, the unplanned is combined with the
planned: ‘mission-oriented research or development stimulates non-mission
research to fill gaps preceding the innovation’.
The second critical condition is recognition of technical opportunity and
need. ‘In many cases, knowledge of the systems applications inspires the
sciences and technology that lead to advanced systems.’ The second factor
suggests that there is feedback on problems between of application engineers
and scientific investigators. Radar, for example, was ‘invented’ in response to
a clear need.
The third, fourth and fifth critical factors are a technical entrepreneur who
champions the innovation; financial input; and management support. The
sixth and final factor is continuing innovation and development across many
fields. In the words of Kostoff: ‘additional supporting inventions are required
during the development phase preceding the innovation’.
Three of the six critical factors for success point to networking capabilities.
From that perspective, an industrial district, unlike any single firm, offers
the potential of a technological full-house with a variety and range of research-
and production-related activities which can foster creativity, fill gaps, replenish
the knowledge pool, link needs to research and incite unplanned confluences
of technologies.
Complex system products
To contribute to economic growth, technologies must be embedded in pro-
duction systems. The process by which technological capabilities are embedded
in a company and a region’s production system is an extension of the ongoing
operations of entrepreneurial firms. The technology capability and market
opportunity dynamic that drives the entrepreneurial firm is, simultaneously,
a single step in a cumulative sequence by which a region’s technological
capability is extended.
The notion of the collective entrepreneurial firm extends to the region the
technology capability and market opportunity dynamic that drives the
growth of the firm. Regions can be thought of as developing specialised and
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distinctive technology capabilities which give them unique global market
opportunities. The successful pursuit of these market opportunities, in turn,
reinforces and advances their unique regional technological capabilities.
Regional specialisation results from cumulative technological capability
development and the unique combinations and patterns of intra- and inter-
firm dynamics that underlie enterprise and regional specialisation.
Thus, a region’s technological capabilities are an outcome of a cumulative
history of technological advances embedded in entrepreneurial firms. But the
historical process is also collective. Just as individual entrepreneurial firms
develop unique technological capabilities, a virtual collective entrepreneur-
ial firm advances a region’s unique technological capabilities. The regional
process of technology capability advance will likely involve a succession of
firms, with new firms building on advances made by previous innovators.
A region’s technological capabilities are like a seabed, or an industrial
ecology, in which entrepreneurial firms are spawned, grow, flourish and die.
At the same time, however, entrepreneurial firms, driven by a technology
capability and market opportunity dynamic, are forever advancing their own
capabilities. In the process, the region’s technological capability seabed is
revitalised by the ongoing self-organising activities of its inhabitants. It is a
virtuous circle. Regional technological capabilities spawn entrepreneurial
firms, which upgrade regional technological capabilities, which spawn more
entrepreneurial firms.
Specialised and cumulative regional technological capabilities lie behind the
competitive advantage of ‘low-tech’ high-income industrial districts common
to the ‘third Italy’. Such districts have developed a competitive advantage
in design capabilities that have fostered industrial leadership in a range of
design-led or ‘fashion industries’. But beneath such design capabilities is a
unique mastery of a range of technologies derived from a craft heritage com-
bined with specialist engineering skills.
Massachusetts is remarkable for its extraordinary depth and continuity of
technological innovation capabilities. It is part of a region that has been on the
cutting edge of new technology development since industry began in America.
The processes of technological capability development and diffusion, however,
are obscured by the conventional linear conception of technology diffusion
from university research to company R&D to NPD. This is doubly so in Mass-
achusetts because of the region’s renowned research universities. The region’s
university research laboratories have an unrivalled record as a generator of
techno-entrepreneurs and business spin-offs. But the headlines generated by
individual success stories obscure the region’s unique technological capabilities
cumulatively and collectively embedded in its production system. The success
of New England in jet engine production, for example, has a technological
genealogy that goes back to water turbine innovations in the 1850s to power
the region’s textile mills.24 The continuity of technological capability is deeply
intertwined with the region’s extraordinary innovation record and is crucial to
an understanding of the region’s economic growth and productivity level.
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If the production system that defines the regional competitive advantage
of the American mid-west is mass production, the production system that
defines the competitive advantage of New England could be called complex
system products. I look next at its technological heritage in the region.
Technological Heritage
New England’s competitive advantage does not lie in mass production of con-
sumer goods. New England has a regional competitive advantage in the man-
ufacture of industrial machines, equipment and instruments.25 Industrial and
commercial machinery (including computers), and electronic and electrical
equipment (including telecommunication exchanges and switches, electricity
transformers, chip-making machines, air traffic control systems, electro-
medical devices) account for close on half of the region’s exports. That share
goes up to 75 per cent by adding in instruments, engineering chemicals and
transportation equipment (primarily aircraft engines and parts) (Little, 1993,
p. 9). Some refer to these as the high-tech industries. They are equally repre-
sentative of the precision equipment industry, which utilises the region’s pro-
duction capabilities in precision machining and technology integration. The
manufacture of precision equipment, including instruments, machines, and
tools, is a critical input to complex system products.
Complex system products tend to stay in New England. New England’s
competitive advantage in complex products springs from several factors. First,
Massachusetts has long enjoyed a world-class precision equipment-making
capability made up by hundreds if not thousands of firms collectively making
a range of products from turbines to jet engines to printing machines to
telecommunication switching equipment to semiconductor-making equip-
ment. The heritage of specialist machine shops, tooling companies, instrument
makers, equipment manufacturers and injection moulders collectively consti-
tute a flexible open-system supplier base.26 After a slow start, this supplier base
has embraced information technology in the form of computer-aided design to
compress the time to market for NPD (Forrant, 1998). The Internet has been
a similar tool hastening the transition to process integration of the supply chain
(the kanban system).
Second, the region has a long heritage in core industrial technologies. For
example, innovation in turbine technology dates back to the early days of the
Lowell textile mills, in the mid-1800s.27 As in the cases of many complex
products, aircraft engine making represents a product concept that had been
initiated elsewhere but was turned into a production capability in New
England.28 Pratt & Whitney and GE often capture an 80 per cent market
share of new orders for large commercial jet engines world-wide (Almeida,
1999, p. 3).29
A leading post-war example is microwave technology, associated with the
early development of radar in England. A team of scientists brought a single
small magnetron (the microwave generating tube at the core of the machine)
to the USA in 1940. Within five years a new industry had sprung up around
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Route 128, creating the region’s largest defence contractor, Raytheon, whose
employment increased from 1,400 to 16,000 (Rosegrant and Lampe, 1992,
p. 85). Raytheon developed lock step with MIT’s Radiation Laboratory, set
up in 1940 to co-ordinate microwave research. The Rad Lab, according to
Rosegrant and Lampe (p. 84), developed over 150 systems ‘that applied the
versatile microwave technology to a dizzying array of applications’. The
Greater Boston area may have been the only place where the capabilities and
skills existed to ramp up a new industry so rapidly.30
Third, the region has a heritage of links between instrument making, scien-
tific research and new industry creation. The region’s extraordinary instru-
ment-making capability has been an important contributor to the region’s
strength in scientific research, and Rosenberg (1999) cites numerous exam-
ples of technological innovations precipitating such research. Sometimes, this
feeds back to foster new industries.
The world’s biggest scientific instrument is the Hale Telescope installed on
Mount Palomar. Russell Porter, the principal designer, worked at the Jones
and Lamson machine shop in Springfield, Vermont, in the 1920s, together
with a journeyman machinist in optics and instrument design (Wicks, 1999).
The owner, James Hartness, drew on Porter’s knowledge of optics to devise
more precise measures of screw threads, but saw the opportunities in lens
grinding for instrument making. Sixteen machinists in the shop were mem-
bers of the Springfield Telescope Makers in 1921. Most built their own tele-
scopes, which required accuracy to one-millionth of an inch. These
capabilities and skills contributed to the emergence of an optical cluster in
Sturbridge, Massachusetts, led by companies such as American Optical Com-
pany. They also contributed to advances in the science of astronomy and,
eventually, the marriage of optics and electronics and the development of
electron microscopes.
Fourth, the region has an industrial heritage not only in precision machin-
ing technologies but in combining and recombining technologies to improve
old or develop new products. The technology map of the jet engine, for
example, is based on patent statistics involving twenty-four technical fields.
These include aeronautics, ramjets and rockets, airfoils, optic systems, elec-
tro-chemical machinery, metallurgical apparatus and processes, measuring
and testing technologies, fluid-handling systems, control systems, fuel sys-
tems, exhaust nozzles, coating and chemical processes and apparatus, and
materials and materials manufacturing (Prencipe, 1998, table 1, p. 8).31
But even with all of these advantages, the severe downturn of the 1980s
need not have been reversed. Critical to the resurgence in growth was the re-
invention of many industrial sub-sectors and the creation of new sub-sectors
in terms of systems integration.
Systems Integration
The application of design modularisation methodologies complemented the
region’s technological heritage. The combination of systems integration and
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the region’s unique production capability heritage in precision equipment may
not have been planned, but it has been fortuitous. Systems integration is the
great facilitator of the integration and re-integration of diverse technologies
for the purposes of rapid NPD and innovation. The development of a regional
capability to integrate information technology into the design, production and
constitution of the product has been a source of competitive advantage. It has
given leverage to the region’s precision equipment and machine-shop heritage,
forging a regional capability to combine and re-combine technologies in
pursuit of new product applications.
The origin of systems integration in Massachusetts is the defence connec-
tion. Since the early 1950s, the Electronics Systems Centre of Hanscom Air
Force Base in Massachusetts has co-ordinated a plethora of projects involv-
ing the integration of radar, communication, and computer and software
technologies. Those projects were the foundation for America’s air defence
systems and air traffic control systems. Its digital computer sponsored proj-
ect, known as Whirlwind, became the basis for the modern minicomputer, or
business computer, which spawned Route 128’s minicomputer giants such as
DEC and Data General. The MIT Lincoln Laboratory, co-located with
Hanscom, continues to specialise in radar, communications, digital process-
ing, optics research and advanced electronics. In 1958 the non-profit MITRE
Corporation was founded to focus on the ‘systems engineering’ requirements
of air defense systems. The software challenges of systems integration are
considerable, and Route 128 became a leader in developing computer-aided
software engineering tools, user-interface design tools, advanced software
design methodologies, and software testing tools (NCTP 1991, p. 55). This
huge pool of software engineering talent fed back into the manufacturing
base of the region to establish a unique capability for integrating hardware
and software.
Integration of design and manufacturing
The defence connection and Massachusetts’ industrial heritage, however,
were not enough; systems integration as a driver of growth depends on the
transition of a critical mass of industrial firms from sub-contractors to prob-
lem-solving enterprises with independent design and development capabili-
ties. Rapid NPD depends upon a work organisation in which design and
manufacturing are integrated. The hierarchical, functionally departmen-
talised, vertically integrated business model of New England that dominated
during the Massachusetts’ miracle years did not involve the decentralisation
of design. The spread of the open-system business model was simultaneously
about the development of high-performance work systems (HPWSs).
According to a recent report, the proportion of employees in firms that
‘made some use of self-managed teams increased from 28 per cent in 1987
to 68 per cent in 1995’. ‘A plant that has adopted a cluster of practices that
provides workers with the incentives, the skills, and, above all, the opportu-
nity to participate in decisions and improve the plant’s performance has an
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HPWS’ (Appelbaum et al., 2000, p. 9). The authors continue: ‘Workers in an
HPWS experience greater autonomy over their job tasks and methods of
work and have higher levels of communication about work matters with
other workers, managers, experts (for example, engineers, accountants,
maintenance and repair personnel), and, in some instances, with vendors or
customers’ (2000, p. 7). New England was a leader in this transition.32
It was a critical change in the organisation of New England business that
facilitated the development of the new regional model of innovation. I turn
next to skill formation, the third element in the productivity triad.
Technology skill formation
The open-system model of industrial innovation as pioneered in Silicon Val-
ley and Route 128 in the USA involves tapping into basic research conducted
at the region’s universities. In fact, the co-existence of MIT and Route 128,
and of the University of California at Stanford and Silicon Valley, has led
many to identify research activities conducted in prestigious universities as
the driver of knowledge-intensive industries. There is good reason. But it is
not the whole story.
MIT set the standard. No other institution has played a more central role
in producing techno-entrepreneurs and shaping new industries over a span
of more than a century.33 According to a BankBoston study,34 MIT graduates
have started 4,000 companies nationwide and 1,065 in Massachusetts; the
latter account for 25 per cent of sales of all manufacturing firms and 33 per
cent of all software sales in the state.35
The close links between MIT’s and Stanford’s research capabilities and
the high-tech enterprises around them are widely recognised. They have
become models for policy makers the world over. Too often, however, the
links between R&D conducted at research universities and industrial inno-
vation and growth are defined in terms of a linear sequence model that
obscures the underlying relationships. Dozens of prestigious universities
located elsewhere are not associated with regional growth dynamics, just as
most high-growth success stories do not involve a technology transfer role
for prestigious universities.
The productivity triad and the capabilities and innovation perspective
suggest a more complex set of relationships between basic research conducted
at universities and industrial growth than the flow of technology and techno-
entrepreneurs, important as they can be. Put differently, successful technology
transfer, in terms of the growth process, is a consequence of three underlying
and enabling relationships that are obscured by the linear sequence view:
● university research activities to assist the technology–market dynamic that
drives regional growth dynamics;
● manpower planning processes to address the scale requirements of the
growth process; and
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● characterising and diffusing engineering methodologies to target technol-
ogy transitions.
Enterprise capability–university research dynamic
Regional growth dynamic processes depend upon business models driven by
the technology capability and market opportunity dynamic. The links between
industrial innovation and productivity growth go beyond the transfer of new
technologies from university labs, as important as that can be in special cases.
Even in cases of successful technology transfer, the transfer is often a conse-
quence of a mutual adjustment process driven by entrepreneurial firms with
networking capabilities.
The rapid growth of entrepreneurial firms is simultaneously an advance in
technological capabilities. The research capabilities and knowledge speciali-
sation of universities may or may not be shaped by the unfolding process of
unique technology capabilities of entrepreneurial firms, but the regional
growth impact can be substantial (Best, 2001).
Such a mutual adjustment process between growing firms and university
research capability development is critical to an understanding of both Sili-
con Valley and Route 128. Silicon Valley and Stanford, in the words of Leslie
and Kargon (1996, p. 470):
had grown up together, gradually adjusting to each other and to their common
competitive environment. Each helped the other discover and exploit new
niches in science and technology . . . In the proliferation of new technical fields
and new companies that characterised the early evolutionary stages of these
industries, the right kind of university could make a real difference in fostering
horizontal integration and collective learning throughout the region.
A failure to understand that dynamic is responsible for the nearly universal
lack of success in transplanting the Silicon Valley model, even by Frederick
Terman himself. Terman emphasised the crucial role of prestigious universi-
ties and their capacity to attract leading scholars, not the mutual adjustment
processes identified here. Entrepreneurial firms in Silicon Valley, such as
Intel, have benefited considerably from research activities at Stanford Uni-
versity, but these have been the outcome of the nurturing of networking
capabilities over a period of time.
Thus, the impact of university research on growth will depend in important
ways on whether regional innovation processes are underway. University
research, alone, will not drive a region’s business model or shape the level of
technology management capabilities. As shown in figure 9.2, an open-system
regional growth dynamic is also an enterprise startup system that multiplies
the number of entrepreneurial firms and drives a set of innovation dynamics.
A responsive tertiary education system is critical to fuelling those growth
processes with the requisite skills.
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Manpower development planning
Entrepreneurial firms are successful because they advance technology capa-
bilities to develop emerging market opportunities in an ongoing interactive
process. But sustained regional productivity growth depends upon more than
technology transfer and absorption.
In fact, even the combination of right business model and specific tech-
nology capability development will not sustain growth. The growth of firms
will not translate into regional economic growth without the expansion of
the requisite engineering–technological skill base. The regional growth
dynamics depend as well upon a labour pool of engineers and technologists
to convert the innovative ideas into production capabilities. As shown in fig-
ure 9.3 the role of tertiary education is critical for producing a pool of engi-
neers and technologists to convert innovative ideas sparked by the internal
growth dynamic of entrepreneurial firms into viable products on the scale
and in the form required for regional growth.
An inelastic skill base will translate into skill shortages and wage pressures
thereby choking growth and eroding regional competitiveness. Industrial
development depends upon this process of labour supply development.
Without a complementary growth in a labour force with the requisite skills,
the innovation capabilities even of MIT would not have been translated into
sustained regional growth dynamics.36
Figure 9.4 reveals an extraordinary supply response to the technology capa-
bilities being developed during the Massachusetts’ miracle. The number of
batchelor’s degrees in electrical engineering conferred by Massachusetts’
universities and colleges increased from 718 in 1982 to 1,648 in 1988. The
costs of this transition were heavily borne by the public education system. An
expansion in graduates by 1,000 requires an increased intake of 4,000 students
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Figure 9.3 Regional growth and skill formation dynamics
in electrical engineering degree programmes which, in turn, requires an expan-
sion in faculty positions of nearly 300 (given a 15:1 student to faculty ratio) in
electrical engineering, plus a corresponding investment in facilities.
The sharp drop-off that accompanied the crash of 1986–92 has not turned
around. The resurgence relied heavily on skill formation investments by the
educational system and human resource programmes of companies enacted
during and preceding the miracle years. It has also relied on immigration.
This is not always available.
The Massachusetts labour force benefits from roughly 15,000 immigrants
per year. The proportion of the recent foreign immigrant population to
Massachusetts in ‘highly skilled management, professional, and technical
occupations’ is estimated to be 33 per cent. (According to the 1990 census,
28 per cent of the immigrant workforce in the state had a bachelor’s degree
or higher (MTC, 1998).) In-migration has taken up much of the slack from
the shortfall of engineering graduates of colleges and universities in the state.
The number of foreign-born and, in most cases, foreign-educated technical
workforce has accumulated to a sizeable fraction of the total pool.
Furthermore, the figure suggests another source of increased technical
labour supply in Massachusetts: graduates who remain in Massachusetts. Of
the 6,000 graduates produced per year, a higher percentage stays in the state.
The trend in net migration over the ‘resurgence’ has shifted from minus 60,000
to plus a few thousand. If this trend line continues and the international
in-migration stays constant at roughly 5,000 per year, Massachusetts goes
some distance to responding to the needs.37 Here, again, the Massachusetts
education system is supplying benefits that impact on growth.
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Figure 9.4 Electrical engineering graduates in Massachusetts
Engineering methodologies and curriculum development
Integral to the notion of the productivity triad is the process of mutual
adjustment between technology advancing, rapidly growing firms which, in
fact, are driving a new technological trajectory, and engineering methodolo-
gies which make it possible to ramp-up an engineer–technologist skill base.
These form a mutually interactive process in which technology capabilities in
companies and engineering methodologies in the education system march
forward together. This is particularly so with the application of the principle
of systems integration and the development of the open-system business
model that has opened up the terrain of knowledge-intensive industries.
This regional dynamic did not begin with MIT. Engineering disciplines
are not static. As we have seen, precision engineering has been re-invented
in each major technological era beginning with the mechanical age and
extending into photonics and genome technologies. Each technological age
has been accompanied by the development of a new engineering discipline
that, in turn, became a vehicle for the diffusion of the new technology across
the industrial spectrum. In the early days the agents of diffusion were
machinists trained in interchangeability or, ‘armory practices’ – a term
denoting the organisational capabilities that accompany and institutionalise
the technical aspects of interchangeability (Best, 2001, pp. 25–8). Today they
are likely to be engineering and science graduates who have specialised in
disciplines such as information technology, opto-electronics (photonics) or
life sciences. Here, too, New England has a rich heritage that fits both the
continuity and change dimensions of technology.
MIT has been closely involved with industry-leading entrepreneurial
firms.38 But those linkages play a role in the development of an engineering
curriculum that makes it possible to ramp-up skill bases to supply the needs
of regional concentrations of industry and rapid growth. Examples include
chemical engineering, and the chemical and then petro-chemical industries;
electrical engineering followed by the electrical power and electric engineer-
ing firms such as GE; microwave technologies and the development of
Raytheon. In all of these cases, the development of the technology and the
industry-shaping and market-creating and expanding firms was not univer-
sity technology spin-offs but partnerships in the co-shaping of emerging and
unfolding technologies and engineering methodologies.
Systems engineering does not fit neatly into the educational curriculum, but
is nevertheless critical to Route 128’s competitive advantage. The region’s
heritage in complex system products is important here. Systems integration
activities demand an ability to communicate across technological domains.39
Complex system products are training grounds for systems integrators, indi-
viduals who can speak in several technological languages.40 New England has
a high share of cross-technology communicators. With each historic develop-
ment of new engineering methodology the earlier ones were redefined to
make them interoperable. Mechanical became electro-mechanical followed by
integration with electronics and, later, information technology. Information
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technology plays a double role as independent technology domain and enabler
of technology integration. Each revolution fostered a regional ability to
communicate across technological domains. Most techno-entrepreneurs are
cross-walkers – problem-oriented people who learn to read and converse in
diverse technological languages. These are the vaunted communication skills
that are often considered missing in engineering education.
The formal education system was of vital importances, but so too was the
codified and tacit knowledge that was created in the process of pursuing
the technology capability–market opportunity dynamic that defines the entre-
preneurial (learning) firm. While the vertical integration business model
became a drag on the region’s innovation potential, it contributed to the devel-
opment of a deep and broad skill base in systems integration. Together the
enterprise and educational system dynamic bequeathed to the region a skill
base in systems integration activity highly appropriate to the requirements of
the new industries following upon the information technology revolution. If
those skills had not been bequeathed from an earlier period, the region would
have had to create them anew.
Conclusion
The development of competitive advantage in high technology in Massachu-
setts is as much about technological continuity as it is about change. The
region’s traditional technological capabilities in precision machining, com-
plex system products, and science–engineering education positioned it well
for the minicomputer and defence industries that grew rapidly during the
period of the Massachusetts’ miracle. Furthermore, there was a logic to
the vertical integration business model that drove growth during these years.
In both product areas, the business model reinforced integral or closed-
system architecture. Design modularisation was not the challenge. It was
only with the development of design modularisation elsewhere that the com-
bination of a vertically integrated business model and an integral product
architecture common to Massachusetts’ was no longer viable.
The application elsewhere of the open-system business model of focus and
network-fostered regional innovation and regional growth dynamics opened
up a new regional competitive advantage. In the new model, business and
industrial organisation were redefined to capture more fully the innovation
and growth potential of systems integration and the associated decentralisa-
tion and diffusion of design.
But New England enjoyed two of the three elements of the productivity
triad for systems integration.41 From that perspective, the secret to the suc-
cess of the resurgence was the transition from a vertically integrated closed-
system business model to a focus and network model based on open systems
at the technological and organisational levels. The challenge of design mod-
ularisation was met with the development of open-system architecture and
standard interface rules.
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Silicon Valley was the first to apply the principle of systems integration at
both the technological and business model levels, thereby to institutionalise
a new model of technology management. The irony is that systems integra-
tion has long existed in New England but as an engineering skill and tech-
nological capability, not as a unifying principle of production and business
organisation. But systems engineering and systems integration as technolog-
ical capabilities were confined largely to a closed-system architecture.
Silicon Valley demonstrated that a focus and network business model could
drive the new innovation forces and convert them into a new competitive
advantage. The development of the Internet as an open-system information
highway was itself a paradigm example of the advantage of standardised inter-
face rules and an enabler of specialist companies to plug into value networks.
Silicon Valley, as ‘new competition’, forced a wave of Schumpeterian ‘cre-
ative destruction’ across New England businesses. The region’s sharp economic
decline played a major role in explaining the timing and wide diffusion of the
transition from the closed-system to the open-system business model. The
severity of the industrial decline that ended the miracle years had two effects:
widespread business failure involving companies organised according to the
dictates of vertical integration and the release of a huge labour pool of those
educated and trained in systems integration skills. The new business model
depended on a supply of skilled labour. Without this pool the regional growth
dynamics illustrated in figure 9.1 could not have driven sustained economic
growth. Such growth would have been choked by technical skill shortages.
The skills in the labour pool and the technological capabilities that Massa-
chusetts’ enterprises had built over generations did not go away. They resur-
faced in new firms, new products and new applications. But, most importantly,
they eased the transition to a new open-system business model, a model more
appropriate to exploit the opportunities offered by systems integration at the
technological level.
The new open-systems business model advances two performance stan-
dards which are crucial to competitive advantage in New England, rapid
NPD and disruptive innovation (as distinct from incremental innovation).
The region’s machine shops facilitated the rapid diffusion of systems inte-
gration. The job-shop heritage complemented a major dimension of systems
integration, namely the capability to redesign the whole to take advantage of
design changes in component parts, or modules. The region’s custom design
heritage in machines and tooling was re-invigorated. Design was again
important. But it was now integral to the region’s business model.
The open-systems business model made possible the full set of regional
growth dynamics captured in figure 9.3. Now firm and inter-firm technology
development teams could be formed and reformed in pursuit of the new oppor-
tunities emerging as a by-product of the techno-diversification process. It was
an ideal fit for Massachusetts.42 It has re-invented manufacturing in the region.43
The techno-diversification of Route 128 is itself a consequence of the
conversion of systems integration from a technological to a business and
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industrial organisational capability. The conversion can be understood in
terms of the diffusion of the new model of technology management, the
establishing of a complementary business model capable of driving the new
principle, and an advanced, diverse, flexible and targeted skill base. Indus-
trial policy also played a key role, if inadvertently.
In fact, this specific industrial heritage turned out to be an ideal infrastruc-
ture for information technology. New England’s heritage of complex systems
product turned from a disadvantage in the age of consumer electronics and
incremental innovation to an advantage in the age of information technology
and disruptive innovation. Consequently, the region has been a major benefi-
ciary of the information technology revolution.
In a sense the resurgence has been about the reinvention of a regional
industrial system to fully exploit the opportunities inherent in the emergence
of a new technology. As Ford had used electricity to redesign the manufac-
turing plant to apply the principle of flow, New England has, in effect, used
information technology to redesign the region’s industrial capability to apply
the principle of systems integration. But, ironically, complex system products
are in many ways a better production platform for the technological man-
agement of disruptive innovation than is that of mass production.
In conclusion, both the decline and the resurgence of Route 128 can be
explained in terms of the emergence of a new competitive advantage based on
the principle of systems integration which has both fostered and been driven
by a comprehensive re-organisation of the business system. An open-system
model of specialist and networked firms has transcended the old closed-system
vertically integrated business model. The principle of systems integration, like
all principles of production, is expressed technologically, organisationally
(business model) and in engineering methodology (technical skill requirements
and educational capability). The new business model involves a strategy of
focus and networking, and an organisational structure of decentralised,
diffused and complementary design capabilities across a wide range of business
enterprises. The result has been a regional capability to rapidly create, develop
and commercialise new product concepts, to re-invent products, diversify
technologies, create new market niches and invent new industrial sub-sectors.
These processes are part of a new regional decentralised–distributed model
of innovation. An understanding of these processes holds the key to under-
standing the resurgence of growth in Massachusetts.
Notes
1 This chapter draws on material published in Michael H. Best, The New Compet-
itive Advantage: The Renewal of American Industry (2001).
2 Symbolic of the decline was the sale of the Wang Towers in Lowell, Massachu-
setts, for $500,000 in 1992, a building complex that had cost $80 million to con-
struct during the period known as the ‘Massachusetts’ Miracle’. In April 1998
Wang Towers, then home to thirty-five companies, sold for $120 million.
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3 Deming (1982) and others use the term ‘white spaces’ to denote the space between
the boxes in the organisational charts of functionally departmental enterprises.
4 The term ‘technology–market dynamic’ is a version of Penrose’s productive capa-
bility/market opportunity dynamic (Penrose, 1995). The idea of the entrepre-
neurial firm as an extension of the entrepreneurial function from an individual
attribute to a collective or organisational capability is developed in Best (1990).
5 A closed architecture is one that cannot accommodate components with inde-
pendent design rules. It means, for example, a computer that will perform word-
processing only with a software programme that is co-designed with the
computer. Wang wordprocessors did not run Word or WordPerfect.
6 See Morris and Ferguson (1993) and Garud and Kumaraswamy (1993) for
detailed examples.
7 For an elaboration of table 9.1 see Best (1998).
8 Chandler (1977) describes the devlopment of the central office–functionally depart-
mentalised business model as an organisational structure established to pursue the
business strategy of vertical integration. The vertical integration organisational
structure was particularly appropriate to achieving high rates of ‘throughput’ or
‘economies of speed’, both measures of flow. But it was more effective under con-
ditions of technological stability.
9 A leading example is Intel. Intel’s ‘dynamic dialectic’, as described by co-founder
Andrew Grove (1996), is designed to combine recurrent phases of bottom–up
experimentation and top–down direction. Phases of experimentation, which stim-
ulate new ideas and innovation, are fostered by decentralisation of decision mak-
ing. The challenge of leadership is to allow enough time for free rein to stimulate
the development of new ideas before managing a new phase during which the most
promising ideas are pursued and the weaker ideas are abandoned. The challenge
of leadership is to balance the phases of experimentation and direction so that the
enterprise can benefit from the advantages of both bottom–up initiatives and
top–down decision making. Too much experimentation can result in chaos; too
much direction can stultify innovation. Built into the challenge of leadership is a
requisite ability to manage organizational change; leaders must gain personal com-
mitments to new directions, technologies, processes and products. Without per-
sonal commitments from top to bottom, human energies will not be mobilised to
drive the redirection of organisational resources. While experimentation requires
everyone to act as designers, direction demands that everyone enthusiastically
accept the winning designs. This is no small organisational challenge.
10 The cluster dynamics model and its genealogy in the history of economic thought
can be found in Best (1999).
11 Different models of innovation are explored in Best (2001).
12 The companies are ArrowPoint Communications, Inc., of Westford, Astral Point
Communications of Westford, Cadia Networks, Inc., of Andover, Castle Net-
works, Inc., Convergent Networks of Lowell, Equipe Communications of Acton,
Ignitus Communications of Acton, Omnia Communications, Inc., of Marlbor-
ough, Redstone Communications of Westford, Sonus Networks of Westford, and
Sycamore Networks, Inc., of Chelmsford.
13 Massachusetts had 6.2 million people in 1999, 2.3 per cent of the USA’s total.
14 The firm faces a dilemma: unique capabilities are both the source of competitive
advantage and a constraint on future development. Firms that experiment and
develop unique and/or new capabilities simultaneously must choose which of the
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new possibilities to pursue as the basis of their competitive advantage. Given the
inherent uncertainty regarding technological change, firms are required to place
bets on which technological possibilities should be pursued and which aban-
doned. No firm, no matter how big, can pursue all technological possibilities.
New opportunities, which require activities that are not consistent with reinforc-
ing the firm’s basic position, risk devaluing the firm’s unique capabilities. Those
not pursued internally become ‘market’ opportunities for other firms to advance
their productive capabilities.
15 Each of these processes contribute to potential regional techno-diversification
which, if activated, can trigger industrial ‘speciation’ or the emergence of new
industrial sub-sectors (more on this in the next section).
16 Externally integrated enterprises are defined as productive units co-ordinated
within ‘closed-system’ inter-regional networks or value chains directed by global
enterprises.
17 Horizontal integration, the term used by Andrew Grove (1996) to describe open-
system networking, can be considered an inter-firm consequence of Intel’s pro-
duction concept of integrated manufacturing (see Best, 1998).
18 The regional model of innovation offers a decentralised, self-organising explana-
tion of the success of high-tech regions as an alternative to the linear science-push
model of innovation. In the science-push model, technology is thought of as
applied science; in the regional model, technology is part of the industrial
process. It is built into the process by which firms establish unique capabilities and
network with other firms. The science-push model, in contrast, fails to capture
the extent to which research is woven into the production, technology and net-
working fabric of a region’s industrial system as distinct from being an external
autonomous sphere of activity.
19 Intel is not the only driver of new products. Approximately one in five of the Sil-
icon Valley (and Route 128 in Massachusetts) publicly traded companies were
‘gazelles’ in 1997, which means they have grown at least 20 per cent in each of
the last four years (the number for the USA is one in thirty-five). See Massachu-
setts’ Technology Collaborative (1998).
20 The technology capability and market opportunity dynamic which drives the
entrepreneurial firm has an analogous technology and market dynamic that oper-
ates at the regional level. This is a collective entrepreneurial capability. It under-
lies and explains a region’s clusters.
21 See Best (1990, pp. 207–8).
22 The regional innovation processes can be be referred to as the 5Ds: disruptive
(internal–internal dynamic), dip-down (fast new product development), design
diffusion (leveraging creativity), dispersed (laboratories for experimentation) and
diversity (new technological combinations).
23 See Katz (1996, p. 15). Katz also describes network economies and increasing
returns.
24 James Francis’s early experiments in turbine technology were conducted at the
Wannalancit Mill.
25 In contrast, the American mid-west developed a regional technological capability
and competitive advantage in mass production. In both cases the regional tech-
nological capability can be expressed in a wide range of final product areas. But,
at the same time, regional technology capability is itself an expression of the
cumulative dynamics of a region’s production system.
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26 The largest manufacturing sectors in Greater Boston in the mid-1990s in employ-
ment were instruments (35,000), industrial machinery (23,000), printing and
publishing (22,000), electrical equipment (21,000) and fabricated metals
(11,000) (Terkla, 1998, p. 15).
27 Turbine technology was originally developed in New England as part of the sys-
tem of canals and locks built to power the Lowell textile mills. James B. Francis,
designer of the system of locks and canals that powered the Lowell textile mills,
was an innovator in water turbine technology.
28 Precision machining is equally encoded in the aircraft engine industry’s technol-
ogy. The Pratt & Whitney Machine Tool Company was established as an arma-
ments’ maker in 1860. Both Pratt and Whitney had been employees of the Samuel
Colt Armoury which itself had links with Eli Whitney, a controversial figure in
the development of interchangeability. Frederick Rentschler, former president of
Wright Aero, was looking for a site to develop air-cooled radial engines for the
US Navy. He went to Hartford and leased the rights to use the Pratt & Whitney
name and located in empty space in Pratt and Whitney’s machine shops. His
design concepts were translated into a functioning engine and within three years
the Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Company was an enormous success. Pratt & Whit-
ney went on to produce close to half the total aircraft engine horsepower pro-
duced in America during the Second World War. GE developed the jet engine in
Lynn, Massachusetts (see Almeida, 1999).
29 Jet engine production is not in principle different from car engine production but
it inevitably requires more stringent testing of technological modification in any
part on the performance of the whole, including the aircraft, under all types of
conditions. In this respect, jet engine production is not intrinsically different from
microprocessor production. But if jet engines were produced to the yield rates of
the best chip-making fabs in the world, the airline industry would not be feasible.
The combination of rigorous performance standards and interactive feedback
effects presents stern engineering challenges of an order of magnitude higher than
those of both car and microprocessor production.
30 The innovation potential which attracts firms from around the world into Mass-
achusetts is based on the skill base, the diversity of technologies which are poten-
tial inputs to systems integrators, and the time compression facilitated by the wide
and deep supply base for engaging in NPD . For example, Michel Habib, Israel’s
economic consul in Boston, estimates that the number of Israeli technology firms
in the Boston area grew from thirty in 1997 to at least sixty-five in early 1999.
The companies span a range of technologies, including optical inspection
machines, medical lasers, digital printing equipment, scanning technology and
bio-tech. In the words of one Israeli manager, ‘There are a lot of technological
resources and knowledge in the area we can take advantage of ’ (Bray, 1999).
31 An aircraft engine involves extremely precise tolerances, and this has in turn, fos-
tered sustained technological advances in lightweight materials, super alloys and
parts’ fabrication. These all belong to the collective entrepreneurial firm and mar-
ket opportunity dynamic which underlies the development of regional competi-
tive advantage.
32 In early 1990, seven Boston-area companies formed the Center for Quality Man-
agement to work together in TQM (total quality management). It became a model
for rapid application and diffusion of continuous improvement work organisation.
The Center identified 135 kinds of diffusion channels (Shiba, Graham and
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Walden, 1993). See Forrant and Flynn (1998) for a case study of making the tran-
sition to a high performance work system.
33 MIT’s role in America’s first high-tech industrial district inspired Frederick Ter-
man, a dean of engineering at Stanford, to plant the seeds for a west coast high-
tech version. He persuaded administrators to establish the Stanford Industrial
Park and two of his students, William Hewlett and David Packard, to set up shop
there. Another early occupant was Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center the site of
a series of innovations that came to constitute the personal computer (Cringely,
1992). Sun Microsystems, Silicon Graphics and Cisco Systems are but three other
examples whose origins can all be traced to Stanford’s classrooms.
34 See MIT’s: The Impact of Innovation website at http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/
founders
35 According to Mass High Tech (17(38). 1999. p. 23), the software industry of Mass-
achusetts is driven by ‘. . . small firms founded by former executives who have
cashed out before, or by recent graduates of the area’s top engineering schools’.
36 Cambridge University researchers have developed many innovations, often in part-
nership with industrial labs and emerging companies. Rarely have these develop-
ments been translated into regional industrial growth. The development of
engineering methodologies must involve methods for ramp-up in technical labour
supply and the institutional capability to drive it. It is as if Cambridge, Massachusetts,
has had manpower planning capability and Cambridge, UK, has not.
37 The figures on international and domestic migration for Massachusetts,
1991–98, are given in Massachusetts Technology Collaborative (1999, p. 41).
38 No other institution has played a more central role in the process of growing
techno-entrepreneurs and shaping entire new industries over a span of more than
a century. According to a study by the BankBoston economics department, MIT
graduates have started 4,000 companies nation-wide. In Massachusetts, the 1,065
MIT-related companies account for 25 per cent of sales of all manufacturing firms
and 33 per cent of all software sales in the state. See MIT’s The Impact of Inno-
vation website at http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/founders
39 In Richard Adams’s A Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, a ‘Babelfish’ device is
placed in the ear to enable communication across inter-galactic languages. Tech-
nology integration requires a capacity to communicate across technology language
fields (see Adams, 1989).
40 Machine shops require language capabilities in software, and mechanical and
electrical engineering.
41 As noted above, the productivity triad is a form of systems integration. All three
elements (business model, technology management capability, and specialist engi-
neering skills) must be in sync for a region to benefit in the form of regional
growth from technological advances. This observation goes some way towards
explaining the ‘productivity paradox’, Robert Solow’s observation that computers
have shown up everywhere except in the productivity figures. Ditto the case
(examined above) of electricity: advances in the application of electricity showed
up years after its discovery when Ford used distributed power to redesign the pro-
duction process according to the logic of flow (Best, 2001).
42 A company engaged in the manufacture of complex system products enjoyed
the advantage of the flexibility of a job shop but lacked the efficiency of flow sys-
tems. But the mass-production systems are not designed to pursue the technology
capability–market opportunity dynamic with the same degree of flexibility for
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incorporating disruptive technological change as the ‘open-systems’ business
model. In this sense, New England perhaps has gone further than Silicon Valley
in establishing a complex system products business model as distinct from flexi-
ble mass production (lean production). By the integration of software and hard-
ware, job shops that were organized hopelessly according to the dictates of
world-class manufacturing found a new business model by which they could pur-
sue a strategy of rapid NPD on technological systems integration.
43 The new business model, one of regional innovation, is simultaneously a tech-
nology management capability for rapid NPD. It is driven by competition over
the rapid development of new product concepts which, in turn, thrives on the
dip-down model of innovation. This business system pulls in, and integrates, basic
research with the manufacturing processes.
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In conclusion we draw together and evaluate a number of the themes raised
in this volume and begin to sketch an agenda for future research about
markets and the competitive process. Happily, this book resides within a
now-flourishing broader stream of ideas at the interface between economics
and sociology. Some of this new work signals the resurrection of economic
sociology, while other aspects of it emanate from within the literature on
innovation processes and, more generally, from evolutionary economics. 
There has been a very significant revival of interest in economic sociology
in the last decade (for reviews see Lie, 1997; Krier, 1999; Heilbron, 2001).
The most visible version, promoted particularly effectively by Swedberg
(1987, 1990, 1998; and, with Smelser, 1994), and currently influential in the
USA, is referred to as ‘the new economic sociology’. One of its key charac-
teristics has been its concern to retain a serious dialogue with neo-classical
economists and to engage in critique on its own grounds. However, the
notion and practice of economic sociology has been revitalised also in France
where the Regulation School, conventions’ theory, the Bourdieusian school
and the anthropology of science (for example, Callon, 1998), often drawing
on the Durkheimian tradition, have provided new theoretical approaches to
understanding the economy. The revived economic sociology has begun to
pay attention to topics like capital, money and markets in a way that was
previously absent. Its contributions include emphasis on the role of social
interaction and interpersonal relationships in economic life and especially
the making of markets, its pursuit of alternatives to rational action and
rational choice theory and its insistence upon the embeddedness of economic
activity in social and societal context.
There has been a parallel revival of interest in evolutionary processes in
economics, stimulated largely by Nelson and Winter (1982), but drawing on
a much deeper tradition of economic thinking about dynamics associated
with Schumpeter and to a lesser extent Marx and Veblen. Its roots lie in a
concern with the dynamics of capitalism, since all evolutionary theories are
at root theories of why a particular kind of world changes in the way it does.
As with the new economic sociology, evolutionary economists are wedded to
9
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a more sophisticated notion of individual behaviour than that embedded
in the idea of Olympian rationality. In this view, there is nothing wrong with
the argument that individuals seek to do the best they can in the prevailing
circumstances, but neither what is best, nor what are considered to be the
prevailing circumstances, will be the same across individuals. The point
therefore is not that individuals optimise, for that does not amount to very
much, but rather that their optimisations are locally contingent and are
certainly not independent of the network of social interactions and the insti-
tutional frames within which any individual is located. Evolutionary eco-
nomics depends crucially on the idea of the mutual determining of actions
through the functioning of market processes and thus the instituted aspects
of these processes. As such, markets as instituted relations between produc-
ers and consumers become the context in which evolution is possible. There
is a natural complementarity between a concern to understand processes of
evolution in modern capitalism and the mutual penetration of economic and
social processes, for neither markets nor competition are givens, as we
explore below; as instituted relationships, they also evolve. 
Several chapters in this collection pick up themes and theses from the
regenerated economic sociology, but generally not in a systematic fashion and
largely without an overt attempt to develop theoretical positions. Other chap-
ters display firmer attachment to the perspectives of evolutionary economics.
Yet others pursue insights about instituted economic processes deriving from
the work of Polanyi. There remains, in our opinion, a need for dialogue and
debate between the different approaches within economic sociology, and
indeed between economic sociology and evolutionary economics. There
should be more comparative testing of such theories in the future, promising
more ambitious development of theory. Meanwhile, the most important les-
sons emerging from this collection can be organised under four headings,
which we treat in turn: markets as social and socially constructed institutions;
the role of information and knowledge in the dynamics of the market process;
social consequences of market relations; and, finally, the relationship between
markets and competition. 
Markets as institutions
The idea of markets as institutions, as habits, rules of social behaviour, is of
course not new. Yet, implications of this point await their full development in
terms of distinguishing between the market framework in general and mar-
kets in particular, and in distinguishing between the rules of the game at a
point in time and the generative processes through which those rules evolve.
The chapters in this book contribute more to a sophisticated understanding
of particular markets than they do to the theory of the general market sys-
tem. By general market system we refer to the ensemble of interdependent
particular markets which exist within a particular monetary system. The
important economic feature of the market system is that its particular
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markets are ultimately interdependent, indirectly if not directly, and that
the processes of co-ordination within and between them depend upon
every exchange being an exchange against money. Insofar as co-
ordination depends upon interaction and the exchange of information
between buyers and sellers, it is impossible to separate market activity from
its social context – either generally in terms of the rules and norms of eco-
nomic behaviour, or specifically in terms of the conventions which define
each specific transaction. It is for this reason that markets have an affinity
with the idea of social networks more generally.
Every particular market has specific rules of operation, which may be cod-
ified, as in the Liverpool Rules governing trading in raw cotton, or which
may be informally and tacitly prescribed, as with the moral economy of pre-
industrial capitalism as described by E. P. Thompson (1971) or Polanyi
(1944) in his discussion of the emergence of a market in waged labour. More-
over, operative rules in particular markets are themselves subject to a process
of development. They can be expected to change as the volume of exchange
increases and as a market develops from narrow niches to serve wider groups
of consumers. They can be expected to change when innovations shift the
balances of competitive advantage between different sources of supply, as
may be happening with the development of Internet trading. Among the
major sources of change are ethical concerns and disputes concerning the
interactions between agents involved in the market and their distributional
consequences. Rules will often be informal and under-specified, such that
they may be constituted solely in purely reciprocal expectations of behav-
iour. In that regard the norms of market behaviour are not much different
from those of everyday conduct in other, non-economic, fields, where com-
pliance depends as much on convention and trust as on sanctions. A striking
feature of the history of capitalist development is the gradual spread of trust
in market exchange. Helped by stabilising political institutions, trust
increases confidence in money as a medium of exchange and a store of value,
and improves generalised guarantees against malfeasance and opportunistic
behaviour. This is the longer term outcome of an iterative process of wider
and innovative forms of engagement in social and market processes, necessi-
tating modification of the rules that govern exchange. Consequently, the
institutions enveloping market exchange alter to meet new problems and to
facilitate extended exchange within that market. This, in turn, allows the
market to develop, requiring yet more amendments to the institutional rules.
The scope of the market and the rules by which it operates co-evolve.
Through such an evolution, market processes have come to cover more
realms of economic activity and the acceptance of markets has increased
commensurately, if fitfully. 
All markets are regulated in general and in particular. The state, at several
spatial levels, provides preconditions or circumstances for market exchange and
competition, and it intervenes to counteract some of the propensities of the
market to produce untenable and intolerable inequalities, or environmental
192 Stan Metcalfe and Alan Warde
hazards, or trade in unethical products. The interesting question is how the inci-
dence and form of regulation vary over time and across specific markets. There
are some cases – for example, in the provision of public goods such as law and
order and military services – where the market’s logic is deemed not to apply
and state provision and regulation of those activities is normal. In others, self-
regulation of the market process is combined with heavy external regulation, as
in the case of food and drink provision, privatised utilities and drugs. In yet oth-
ers, the regulatory hand of the state is lightly applied as in the case of markets
for financial, legal and medical services, which are subject to strong professional
regulation. Of course, in each of these cases the boundary between internal self-
regulation and external regulation by the state is contested and, as Nelson
points out, varies over time.
A strong position on embeddedness would maintain that there are different
types of market transaction, but no autonomous market logic independent of
a specific social integument. All markets depend on institutional framing
which is historically constituted. Specific markets are not natural: they are not
given and they have no automatic outcomes. All markets have a history, and
the rules that might govern those particular markets are built up over time
through adaptive practices of production, consumption and exchange. 
Economic theory has made considerable advances by reducing market
relations to the mutual interaction of demand and supply correspondences
to represent the two sides of any transaction; but what lies behind demand
and supply, as theoretical constructs, cannot be reduced to questions of the
independent behaviour of autonomous individuals. Yet almost all approaches
to economic behaviour presuppose the existence and primacy of independ-
ent individual agents (mostly persons and firms) who engage in purposive
action in the light of their resources, knowledge and interests. Those are, as
it were, self-contained and self-possessed agents whose economic behaviour
is subject to control by themselves and themselves alone. The ontological
reality is at least as much one of interdependence within and beyond the
economic field. The social behaviours of each agent condition, to differing
degrees, the social and economic behaviour of all others. Yet, the majority
of economists, and a substantial proportion of scholars in most of the other
social sciences, use an isolated independent rational individual as the rudi-
mentary building-block of explanations of the most complex net of interde-
pendences known in human history. One of the key features of an approach
centred on social embeddedness is that it grasps rather better than most this
texture of both economic and social interdependence. It insists on the inter-
connectedness of social and economic institutions and the inseparability of
economic and social behaviours.
The implication of a ‘strong’ account of embeddedness is that there are no
universal features of ‘the market’. However, this seems to us a step too far.
Swedberg (1998) observes a danger with accounts of embeddedness and
social construction, namely that the specificity and logic of economic action
get obscured. The emergence of ‘the economy’, recognised as a separate
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sphere of existence, a separate field in Bourdieu’s terms, is itself a historical
process. We understand economic phenomena as having specific characteris-
tics precisely because there was some autonomisation of economic behav-
iour. This became obvious when market exchange came to predominate over
gift relations, household production and simple barter. The efficiency norm,
an emergent feature that developed in parallel with the spread of markets,
without which it could scarcely have been recognised or implemented, is
probably the defining feature of the modern capitalist economy, and few eco-
nomic organisations or actors are impervious to its imperatives. Markets dis-
cipline behaviour not just because of the effects of our vocabularies and
discourses of economic activity. Indeed a central consequence of market
activity is the evaluation of competing ways of using resources in terms of
costs, revenues and profits, and in so doing to provide tests of viability and
the basis for differential growth of the rival courses of action. For that rea-
son the rules by which activities are eliminated through the concept of insol-
vency are key aspects of the idea of a general market framework.
Talking of particular markets implies that they have common features,
which permit their identification as instances. We would argue, after Sayer
(Chapter 2; see also Ray and Sayer, 1999), that there are some distinctive and
prevalent characteristics of economic action in modern economies which are
precisely responses to the fact that transactions are exchanges against money
in a competitive space. This involves observing that both the tenets of a code
of strategic calculation in relation to the rivalry of sellers and the accords
between sellers and buyers are essential to the operation and survival of indi-
viduals and the system. The capitalist economy is a field wherein instrumen-
tal, optimising, competitive, self-regarding action is not only legitimate but
is positively encouraged and reinforced. Though modulated in different
types of market, these features of conduct and procedure set limits to effec-
tive economic action, and they are sufficiently binding to allow us to talk of
the imperatives, or the logic, of market behaviour. These codes have ramifi-
cations extending beyond the economic sphere as they diffuse and become
incorporated into other spheres of life.
The economic logic of the market is based essentially around two propo-
sitions. The first is that markets are means of co-ordinating production and
consumption, via the transmission of information and the exchange of goods
and services against money. How that is accomplished for particular products
will vary across space and time. The analysis of markets thus depends more
on identifying their many types, specifying configurations of buyers, sellers
and forms of bargaining, specifying forms of intermediation and charting
their variations in time and space, than upon isolating the defining essential
features of ‘the market’. The second we might call the principle of competi-
tion, that markets are open to the rival behaviours of producers and con-
sumers so that the outcome might be claimed to be that consumer needs are
met in the most effective way possible. The logic of both is contingent upon
the instituted context in which co-ordination and competition can take
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place. The means by which competition can be said to benefit consumers
more effectively are many and varied. They may depend upon the introduc-
tion of new and improved kinds of products, on new methods of production
which permit prices to be lower than they would otherwise be, or on the
introduction of new externally imposed regulations. 
As Sayer argues, an appreciation of the social aspects of markets and com-
petition must not lure us into a belief that they are cosy affairs. Restless
capitalism is often uncomfortable capitalism, and the consequence of compe-
tition is frequently deep uncertainty about the future of economic and social
arrangements and any individual’s position therein. Nevertheless, as the bulk
of the contributions to this book suggest, further exploration of the socially
embedded, or instituted, nature of markets and competition is the most prom-
ising avenue for future study. Despite Swedberg’s warning (1998, p. 165) that
‘embeddedness’ is mostly used vaguely, the idea that economic behaviour
occurs within institutional contexts and networks of interpersonal relations
seems essential to understanding how markets emerge and operate. In under-
taking such exploration it will be essential to develop a satisfactory taxonomy
of markets and the processes of exchange which they define. Consider for
example the following:
● Strongly integrated markets for homogeneous commodities and assets. In
these markets, specialised intermediaries, market makers, set prices and
hold speculative stocks to stabilise prices. These markets correspond to
Marshall’s organised markets in which there is a wide diffusion of infor-
mation in relation to current and expected conditions of demand and
supply. The preconditions for this kind of market include established met-
rics to determine quality, large numbers of buyers and sellers, over and
above the market makers, and substantial fluctuations in the conditions of
production or demand to make it worthwhile for professional dealers to
hold stocks and attempt to stabilise the market. The markets for wheat or
cotton, for foreign currencies or equities, are classic cases of what econo-
mists call ‘flex-price’ markets. The technical sophistication of the trading
arrangements in these markets can be considerable and can cover trades
in relation to future as well as current transactions; indeed, recent years
have witnessed a considerable degree of innovation in relation to the
kinds of instruments traded on, in particular, financial markets. 
● Consider next markets for highly variegated products, in which firms set
prices and producers and consumers bear the consequences of discrepan-
cies in supply or demand by varying the stocks of money or goods that
they hold. These cases correspond to many industrial markets. They can
be distinguished according to whether production is to order or whether
production is ‘speculative’. In these cases independent market makers are
absent and it is the supplier who typically bears the cost of forming the
market relationship. Ships and aircraft are built to order, as are many arts’
products (paintings, musical recordings and commercial photography, for
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example). In mass markets, the speculative risk facing the producer is
lower because many different categories of demand are consolidated and
the risk of variation in demand is thereby reduced.
● Finally, consider the case of retail markets where manufacturers of differ-
entiated goods and services quote the prices at which they agree to sell
directly or indirectly through accredited agencies. These are markets
where specialised intermediaries play an important role, not so much in
setting prices but in providing and consolidating knowledge of the range
and needs of customers and in holding stocks of manufactures.
These examples are sufficient to make the point that a detailed taxonomy of
market forms is an important element in the research agenda of an economic
sociology programme. They also hint that one differentiating dimension of
such a taxonomy will be in relation to the way that market arrangements
gather, collate and disseminate information on what is to be exchanged and
on what terms and conditions.
Markets and information
Market activity implies that buyers and sellers are ‘brought together’ across
time and space and that transactions are consummated and recorded. In this
regard, one way to look at markets is through their role as providers and dis-
seminators of information. Thus, what is available in the market, on what
terms, in relation to price, delivery, post-purchase support and rights of
redress are the principal items of information that market processes make
available. What, then, are the instituted arrangements that underpin this flow
of information? Broadly speaking the answer is that this flow of information
is provided by market intermediaries who, as it were, form a bridge between
the ‘questions’ and the ‘answers’ of buyers and sellers. Traditionally, inter-
mediation has been provided by ‘market traders’, specialists in the provision
of particular classes of good and service. That is still the case in many mar-
kets today, especially where the specification of the relevant goods or serv-
ices is complicated. Traders accumulate the requisite knowledge and reap the
economies of scale and scope that follow from turning that knowledge into
flows of information valuable to consumers and producers. However, the
relevant information involves more than the details of what is available and
on what terms. As Casson (1982) usefully identifies, the intermediation func-
tion often extends to establishing the broader terms of contractual arrange-
ments, the resolution of disputes, and the transport and storage of goods to
meet the requirements of exchange. In other cases, the role of intermediation
is played by the suppliers of the goods who provide the details of what it is
they are selling and the terms on which they will do business. This form of
market arrangement is typically found where the buyer has particular con-
tractual needs that draw upon the skills of the seller. The form of intermedi-
ation is the answer to a particular economic problem, namely how the
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information and related market-making services can be most effectively pro-
vided. The provision of these services requires that real resources are com-
mitted by one or either side of the market and these costs have to be covered
by the agreed terms of trade. The creation and circulation of knowledge and
information are crucial to an understanding of the process of competition
within markets. Moreover, the manner in which information flows will
depend upon the specific institutional form of the market. Although much
economic literature assumes that price is the pre-eminent type of informa-
tion conveyed by markets, the reality is that price is only one element in the
complex package of information which is necessary before exchanges can
take place. Except for in a very narrow range of cases, it is not the market
intermediaries who set prices; rather this function is typically established by
the manufacturers or proprietors of the goods and services in question. Mar-
kets usually only condition the freedom that suppliers have so to do. Every
firm has to answer the question ‘Who are our potential customers?’, and that
information cannot be assumed to be readily available. To acquire it may
involve considerable outlay, so that the market will only be made if there is
sufficient scale and stability in the customer base to generate a required
return on that investment. As the market grows, the costs of market making
can be spread over a larger volume of transactions, and the opportunity will
arise for the emergence of the specialised intermediaries, the suppliers of
marketing, transport, storage, advertising and publicity services and trade
publications. Thus the way in which the intermediation function is per-
formed varies with the costs and returns associated with each different prod-
uct and service. Markets do not come for free because neither knowledge nor
information is free, and so the larger the scale of the market the more refined
can be its operation. As markets grow, their mode of organisation is expected
to change (Stigler, 1951).
We have suggested that patterns of interaction between individuals on
either side of the market reflect the distribution of knowledge and purpose
between the participants and that this interaction has to be organised. To the
extent that social interaction is a mechanism for the transfer of information
about market opportunities, the functioning of markets is socially contin-
gent. Market activities are information generating and communication
based. They are therefore kinds of networks that are regenerated through the
process of exchange. Market activities codify and make publicly available the
relevant information to facilitate transactions, but much information
remains uncodified and is transmitted outside of formal market arrange-
ments. Tacit understanding of the attributes of different products or services,
for example, is often transmitted through processes of individual communi-
cation in social networks. How markets work then depends on the associated
social structure.
Burt’s 1992 contribution was to explore the role of information networks
as factors shaping the outcome of the (market) competitive process. He
argued that access to superior information depends on an agent having a large
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number of non-redundant contacts each of whom provides different kinds of
information. Dense networks are not efficient because it is assumed that all of
their members possess the same information and are in that respect substi-
tutable for each other. His central hypothesis is that profitability increases
with a firm’s access to non-redundant network nodes, what he rather idio-
syncratically calls ‘structural holes’. Agents who bridge these holes, inter-
preted as gaps in linkages within the social network of market relations, have
strategic capacity and significance in the transfer of information. Burt does
not deal with the dynamic question of how such networks are to be created
and sustained in the face of competitive actions of rivals. However, from our
perspective, the process through which market arrangements are formed
should be at the centre of a dynamic account of the embeddedness of eco-
nomic relations. An immediate implication of this argument is, for example,
the idea that firms compete by building non-redundant networks of customers
and suppliers – their own particular networks of market relations. Here we
find a close connection with Marshall’s (1919) emphasis on the external
organisation of the firm and with the idea of the social capital of the firm.
We hinted above that the traditional appraisal of markets is normally
carried out in terms of the efficiency of the exchange process that they sup-
port. The maximisation of the efficiency of the use of given resources to meet
given needs is the usual benchmark. This is too limited a perspective, for two
reasons. First, it loses sight of the sources of increased efficiency in innovative
behaviour and the role of markets in promoting and adapting to innovation.
In a market economy, every economic position is, in principle, open to chal-
lenge by rival business conjectures, and that implies continued structural
change in economy and society. Indeed that is the creative destruction aspect
of capitalism. Second, it fails to account for the economising nature of mar-
ket institutions themselves and for the fact that these instituted frames are not
given but are created as part of the market process. These twin aspects of a
dynamic perspective capture the central feature of modern capitalism, namely
its capacity for internally generated transformation. 
Social consequences of market relations
During the 1990s, sociological investigation of markets has tended to aban-
don earlier concerns with the social effects of the operation of markets and
to concentrate instead on the social processes by which markets are made. In
the resuscitation of interest in the work of Karl Polanyi, for example, it is the
emphasis on the social embeddedness of markets and the social conditions of
existence of market societies, rather than his critique of the malign effects of
markets, that is pre-eminent. Not that the first is unsatisfactory – far from it.
The demonstration that markets are dependent on frameworks of law and
co-operation among agents in market relationships, and that they are subject
to communal and collectively recognised norms and values, is enormously
important both in understanding economic transactions and in challenging
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the empirical applicability of the axioms of economic theory. But it is notice-
able, nevertheless, that much less attention is paid to the outcomes of mar-
ket arrangements now than in the 1980s, when there were intense political
debates about the effects of markets, as indeed there were to an even greater
extent at the outset of the Keynesian era.
Possibly there is now some consensus that previous accounts of the effects
of markets were over-generalised, unproven and empirically under-
researched, such that the less beneficial aspects of market mechanisms were
exaggerated. Indeed, for sociologists at least, the tendency was probably to
consider markets in the more general context of a critique of capitalism
which conflated markets with the system of private property ownership,
thereby attributing effects to markets which were not necessarily generic
(Zelizer, 1988). A more nuanced understanding might entail that there are
no general outcomes characteristic of all markets, only tendencies for certain
effects which might also vary between different types of market. Neverthe-
less there is a need to restate, in order to review, key claims about the social
consequences of market relations.
First, market exchange alters the tenor of social relationships by fostering
impersonal, neutral and impermanent interaction between agents. Even
though many particular markets are home to networks of sustained inter-
personal interaction, tendentially market relations increasingly weaken
social ties within the economic realm. 
Second, the proliferation of products and the manner of their promotion
alter what people want, affecting their endogenous preferences (Knight,
1934; Bowles, 1998). One does not have to postulate that consumers are
dupes to acknowledge that market strategies may be effective in stimulating
desires for gratifications unattainable through the purchase of commodities.
That overall realignments of wants contribute to greater general happiness
or satisfaction is not a foregone conclusion. 
Third, many would argue that intensification of market experience erodes
civic association and faith in the effectiveness of democratic politics (for
example, O’Neill, 1998; Kuttner, 1999). To the extent that one can buy what
was previously co-produced voluntarily with other members of a community
– for example, voluntary associations for recreation or mobilisations for
improved social provision – then purposive communal ties within the public
sphere are reduced. To the extent that the market is pronounced as superior
to collective provision, then democratic determinations and collective solu-
tions are disparaged. Also, the melding of notions of ‘citizenship’ with the
status of ‘a consumer’, which Burgess (2001) shows is increasingly a feature
within the European Union, individuates people, inviting them to weigh
their personal interests rather than those of any collectivity. 
Fourth, and associated, the free running of competitive markets tends to
create inequalities which undermine principles of equality, particularly social
equality which Marshall (1950) saw as the foundation of citizenship in the
twentieth century. That political dominance by parties, ideologies and policies
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of New Right provenance coincided with increasing inequalities in income
within the nation states of the Western world, strikingly so in the USA and
Britain, should come as no surprise. Indeed, for Marshall (1950), it was pre-
cisely the tendencies of markets to generate material inequalities that called
forth welfare provision which might give each citizen sufficient resources to
participate fully in social life. Parallel inequalities conceived on a global scale
compound the indictment. 
Fifth, the dominance of markets appears to imply that employment is the
only useful and valuable form of work that requires compensation and that
only that which can be sold is worthy of being produced. National account-
ing systems consider only that work and that wealth which circulates in the
formal economy. Economic services which are exchanged within families or
communities and work undertaken in the home are not counted. The effect
is a peculiar devaluation of domestic and communal activity which system-
atically materially disadvantages one half of the population, women, and
devalues caring in relation to earning. 
Sixth, justifications for outcomes as consequences of market logic generally
allow economic decisions to be taken without reference to moral, political
and social considerations. The efficiency norm, central to processes of ratio-
nalisation in modern economies, spills over into realms of human life where
it is inappropriate or destructive. The application of rational action schemas
to arenas other than the economic, as for instance in applications of the
‘household economics approach’ associated with Becker (1975), suggest that
codes of conduct increasingly mimic economic motivations in fields like
marriage, parenting, education and the like. 
Indeed, and seventh, one effect of the prevalence of markets and their
discourse is a tendency to legitimise and propagate the influence of econom-
ics as a mode of knowledge. Recently some scholars have come to argue that
economics, in its neo-classical dominant form, is coming to act less as an expla-
nation of economic activity and more as a prescriptive theory for the design of
social institutions (Callon, 1998; Slater and Tonkiss, 2001; Miller, 2002;
Slater, this volume, chapter 5). Through the offices of the World Trade Organ-
isation and the like, institutional arrangements are forced upon supplicant
states which are nothing other than the imposition of the doctrine of the free
market as conceived by the academic discipline of economics. The best
defence of the assumptions of neo-classical microeconomics, and of rational
choice theory more generally, is that they are heuristic abstractions. They do
not describe the world, but provide ideal–typical or schematic reductions,
radically simplifying reality for purposes of measurement, modelling and pre-
diction. To move from that to prescription of economic arrangements which
institute the axioms of a highly simplified model – in the form of advocacy of
‘free’ markets, ‘perfect’ competition, etc. – is palpably misguided. Since the
empirical study of markets indicates that the existence of a range of social and
regulatory processes has hitherto been essential to the effective operation of
actual markets, there is much scope for perverse policy recommendations. 
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Finally, appeal to the inexorable logic of the market provides a means of
legitimisation for the rich and powerful by denying human responsibility for
the distribution of valued resources. The winners in the competitions
involved in markets typically legitimise their good fortune by re-expressing
it as the natural and inevitable result of the operation of the market. This nat-
uralises the distribution of resources in society and, by justifying success,
allows the successful to attribute the blame for failure to those who fail. 
Whatever the ultimate merits of these arguments, they provide compelling
reasons to reflect on the social consequences of the spread of markets in the
process of economic integration. A pertinent and concise summary of the
negative social effects of the operation of intense competition through the
market is offered by Lane (1991, p. 13) who describes the consequences of
the efficiency norm thus:
When the efficiency norm overrides other considerations in a consumer-driven
economy, it sacrifices designing work to meet the needs and desires of workers;
it lends credibility to government reluctance to redistribute income; it limits the
force of ethical considerations; it uproots community life; it undermines eco-
logical reparations.
The extent to which any of the effects listed is singularly the effect of the
market is arguable. However, it is noticeable just how comparatively rarely
these considerations are currently aired and debated. Some immediate rea-
sons for this might include the prevalence of identity politics, a decline of
scholarly interest in power and the powerful, and continued widespread
acceptance of economic growth as the primary goal of political management.
It is also partly an effect of the hegemony of the doctrine of consumer sov-
ereignty and the discourse of the market: it is difficult to mount an overt
intellectual challenge to the necessity and irreversibility of the continuing
spread of market mechanisms. Old socialist objections are viewed as
anachronistic, associated with nationalised enterprises and ineffective man-
agement within the public sector. More generally, the power of states has
been subject to liberal critiques which equate markets with freedom and
states with authoritarian control. Nevertheless, there exists substantial, de
facto, practical and popular mistrust of markets among the population at
large. Organisations for parents opposed to consumerism, public opinion
polls indicating the extent of support for state welfare provision as in defence
of the British NHS, the general hostility towards high salaries and salary
increases for directors of private corporations, the constant demand for
monitoring and regulation of private organisations from consumers’ groups
and associations, not to mention the resurgence of global anti-capitalist
protest, suggest that not everyone has faith in the market system. However,
these suspicions lack a coherent intellectual expression, not to mention a
viable political vehicle, for their implementation.
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Markets and competition 
Markets are necessarily, but not solely, and to quite different degrees, com-
petitive. In the absence of thorough reflection it is easy to overlook the
collaborative aspects of market behaviour. The Latin root of the term com-
petition is competere, to strive together. The nature of that striving together
deserves more attention. Not only are markets orderly and organised, char-
acteristics in the absence of which they can scarcely be said to be in existence,
but it is also the case that something more than simply competing in accor-
dance with the rules of a particular game is required. 
Kuttner (1999) makes the ironic comment that in the USA, whenever there
is any sign of the economy or any of its component organisations faltering,
policy makers prescribe more competition. But competition is not necessar-
ily good, or at least it is only so for economists. Lane (1991) comments that
while economists think along a continuum from competition to monopoly,
psychologists use one of competition and co-operation – the value judge-
ments of the two disciplines are diametrically opposed. As the reflections of
Harvey (chapter 4) suggest, co-operation and competition are neither wholly
good nor wholly bad.
It can be argued that economic competition is generally beneficial when it
has the following effects:
● if it is an impulse to creativity and innovation in products and the organ-
isation of production and market arrangements;
● if it increases allocative efficiency;
● if it sustains an efficiency norm powerful enough to generate sustained
economic development;
● if it increases the circulation of accurate information about products and
practices, and enhances stimulation and cognitive engagement;
● if it gives consumers ‘choice’ by allowing them to exercise discretion about
what to select;
● if it delivers diversity of products of differing quality and price to match
the preferences of the consuming population; and
● when it protects the public good.
By contrast it can be argued that the negative effects of economic competi-
tion are found when:
● it exacerbates negative externalities of markets;
● it is indifferent to conditions of labour;
● it incites fraud and opportunism;
● consumers are forced constantly to take seriously the imperative of caveat
emptor;
● it creates social failure in the absence of adequate means to handle fairly
and constructively, or to offer adequate compensation to, those who fail
in the competitive process;
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● the efficiency norm generates hyper-competition leading to poor quality
and defective products, ineffective guarantees for consumers, perversely
short-term calculation, high levels of bankruptcy and bad debt, insuffi-
cient funds for future investment and inadequate training of workforces.
Such considerations clearly question the universality of the mantra that com-
petition is always beneficial within particular markets and that unrestrained
competition is good for the market system as a whole. It thus behoves us to
explore more critically, and in greater detail, the different modes, modalities,
levels, constraints and bounds to competitiveness in different types of mar-
ket. This might be done partly by examining the role of competition in the
emergence, stabilisation and disintegration of particular markets. But as con-
sumer associations, more frequently in the past than the present, sometimes
recognise, the consumer is also the worker and the citizen in other contexts.
The costs of the efficiency norm and of negative externalities are exploited
intensive labour and degradation of public provision.
The potentiality of competition says nothing about actual levels of com-
petition; as Weber observed, even when there is only one incumbent the fact
of it being a market means that some other firm, some challenger, may enter
freely to offer similar, substitute or different quality items. Nor is the way in
which competition is instituted preordained. For example, the product mar-
kets that Harrison White examined exhibit a very limited and peculiar sort
of competition. If the principal mechanism for determining which products
to sell and at what prices is constant surveillance of competitor firms in
order to achieve parity in provision, then the idea that an orientation to effi-
ciency generates ‘competitive’ pricing seems to be thoroughly mistaken.
Other studies indicate that the motor of competitive rivalry is often com-
paratively subdued in comparison with other forces operating within partic-
ular markets. Baker et al. (1998), building upon the argument of Fligstein
(1996) that markets can be analysed as a political process, provide a sugges-
tive approach to evaluating the role of competition in the making and repro-
duction of particular markets. They examined the survival rates of
relationships between advertising agencies and their clients in the USA. They
distinguished between three sets of processes – competition, power and
institutional forces – for each of which a number of empirical indicators
could be furnished, in order to assess their relative importance in explaining
the trajectory of the market for advertising services. They indicated that the
rules which were adumbrated in the period during which advertising serv-
ices were initially established – rules which included remuneration as a rate
of commission at 15 per cent of the cost of a campaign, the exclusivity of the
relationship between agency and client, and an associated presumption of
long-term loyalty – continued to hold sway at the end of the twentieth cen-
tury. These were precisely institutional conventions which stabilised markets
and reduced direct competition between agencies as suppliers. Thus rates at
which contracts between agencies and clients were dissolved, when new
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business might be put to open tender or when clients sought new or multi-
ple suppliers of services, were comparatively few. The destabilising effects of
competition were thus weak, mitigated both by institutional rules and by the
operation of particular structures of power. For instance, organisational size,
financial status and centrality within markets influenced rates of dissolution
of contracts.
This schema seems fruitful in that it allows us to distinguish degrees of
competitiveness and to chart their consequences. In this regard it is impor-
tant to appreciate that it is not simply the rules governing directly competi-
tive behaviour which constitute institutional forces. A full list would have to
include legal regulations, informal rules or norms, tacit agreements among
organisations about procedures and mutually acceptable forms of competi-
tion, inter-organisational collaborations and alliances, as well as interper-
sonal ties between employees of different firms. Moreover, this is not just a
matter of interpersonal acquaintanceship and mutual accommodation
among incumbents of positions in adjacent firms. Workers have identities, or
there are claims and obligations upon them, other than as incumbents of a
position in an organisation. Claims upon them also arise from their occupa-
tional and professional affiliations. The occupational associations of practi-
tioners exert an influence over appropriate levels of competition, partly
through policing of professional standards applied to particular operations.
The extent of competition permitted and existing between medical practices
is restricted in a way fundamentally different from that which obtains
between small retailers. It is also the case that where the circulation of infor-
mation is an essential element of a production process, levels of collabora-
tion are required, such that over-competitive or over-zealous appropriation
or exploitation of the knowledge shared among members of a ‘college’ may
be punished by subsequent exclusion from the network of information
exchange. As Lane (1991) reports, studies show that excessive competitive-
ness on the part of individuals frequently hampers their progress and success.
The relatively high levels of collaboration among cultural producers in the
east end of London, examined by Tonkiss (chapter 6) illustrate some of these
points, and this contrasts strongly with the case of the software industry
reported by Athreye (chapter 8).
Ultimately, then, we might argue that markets are institutions, with
particular norms and rules, which are based not upon ruthless competition
between autonomous and anonymous suppliers in pursuit of limited
demand, but upon socially ordained and regulated processes. It is partly
competitive, but importantly socially embedded, a product of co-operation,
collaboration and collusion. 
The agenda
Besides our general call for more open theoretical debate, the issues discussed
above define an agenda for research in terms of the institutional foundations
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of a market system and an agenda for detailed research on the evolution of
particular markets. 
Concerning the first of these topics, we have suggested that the most
important task is to understand the relationship between market systems and
economic change. In this regard, it is impossible to separate the role of mar-
kets in generating new knowledge from the role of competition in translat-
ing new knowledge into economic change. The competitive process forms a
bridge between the generation of new knowledge and its economic conse-
quences. Thus it is not surprising that all serious scholars of capitalism have
understood the central role that innovation plays in the long-term transfor-
mation of the system and have understood how the knowledge which under-
pins innovation arises from within the system. Hence, market institutions, in
relation to other knowledge-creating institutions, have a fundamental role in
facilitating different forms of response to innovation and in shaping the
kinds of innovations which are generated and accepted. 
A further dimension requires development. Not only has the analysis of
innovation been dominated by an excessively technological perspective, but it
has been driven almost exclusively by the idea that innovation relates exclu-
sively to the problem of supply and production (Harvey et al., 2001). Equally
important is the role of consumer knowledge and the fact that innovation
depends upon consumers changing their behaviour. There is very little con-
crete analysis of consumption in this domain and we need to understand more
clearly the role of consumption in the emergence, growth, stabilisation and
decline of particular markets. We know much more about strategies for tar-
geting markets by suppliers than we do about the behaviour of customers.
Certainly the latter do not compete like suppliers do, and the principles that
might explain how different aggregates of individuals come to select the same
products are highly contested and probably therefore poorly understood. 
In relation to the second topic, there is a need for the detailed analysis of
the full conditions for the emergence of particular markets and their subse-
quent development. The contributors to this volume have pointed to the
enormous range of factors involved in the formation and operation of par-
ticular markets. The examples drawn from retailing (Harvey, chapter 4) and
from the football-entertainment industry (Michie and Oughton, chapter 7)
illustrate the specificity and variability of market arrangements. It is clear
that the history of the development of these markets has been conditioned
by very different kinds of influences, socially constructed in specific contexts
of time and place. Theories of markets need to be sensitive to the full range
of forms that particular markets can take and proper consideration of alter-
native taxonomies of market types should be an important part of future
inquiry. We might, for instance, analyse the distinctive features of different
types of market – product, labour, capital – and their interconnectedness
with different types of intermediation and exchange process. This might
usefully form a platform for the comparative empirical study of the variety
of market types across different industrial sectors and nation states. One
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problem facing any taxonomy of markets will be the question of boundaries.
Slater in chapter 5 uncovered some of the critical conditions under which
a market can be constructed and deconstructed, drawing attention to
the processes of social cognition and classification affecting the stability of
markets. In addition, Best (chapter 9) identified the importance of spatial
boundaries, implying a geographical dimension to the distributed innovation
processes which characterise current arrangements. 
A deeper issue in the working of market processes involves the social con-
struction of economic categories which give shape to business practices and
public understanding of economic activity. Here the role of formal economic
thinking is of importance, but how that thinking is translated by individuals
into knowledge and practice is not very clear. Therefore, it seems important
to explore the understanding that economic agents have of their own practice.
For instance, it would be interesting to explore the perceptions, understand-
ing and practical operations of key and powerful actors in industry and gov-
ernment regarding the nature and limits of competitive processes in different
national and sectoral contexts. In this regard, wider use of qualitative, even
ethnographic, methods of investigation might elucidate a range of views pre-
vailing at any one time and their change over time. We have already drawn
attention to the relative neglect of the role of consumers in relation to inno-
vation and the competitive process more generally. This is to emphasise the
role of markets in generating and disseminating information which influences
changes in consumption behaviour. For example, the complex of connections
between the behaviours of firms and their customers, market research organ-
isations and their clients, advertisers and their audiences provide a nexus
through which economic knowledge impacts on everyday activities.
Finally, if defining characteristics of market systems are the rate and the
manner in which they develop from within, then it follows that the incidence
of the costs and benefits of change will be very unevenly distributed across
the members of a particular society. At one level this requires a form of wel-
fare analysis beyond the logic of Paretian economics. More fundamentally,
however, it demands re-examination of the ethical dimensions of the social
and political case for market systems. The normative presumption in favour
of markets, noted by both Nelson and Sayer (chapters 1 and 2), should be
challenged more widely and more frequently. We have suggested that this can
be fruitfully explored in terms of the virtues of the market. Collective public
concern about the general social consequences of competitive market rela-
tions should be re-established as a raison d’être for empirical studies of mar-
ket behaviour.
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